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Abstract 
 
It is the central argument of this thesis that American foreign policy in its critical founding 
years involved an active participation in the European balance of power. A framework is 
presented of American foreign engagement in this period which rejects existing notions of the 
newly independent nation as diplomatically isolationist from the start. The thesis also rejects 
two generally accepted origins of isolation, an interpretation of President’s Washington’s 1796 
Farewell Address as a warning against entangling alliances, and of an American neutrality as, 
what John Adams referred to as a perfect impartiality. Instead, concerns with neutrality and 
avoidance of alliances which are interchangeably quoted when discussing isolationism, are 
exposed as nuanced terms that had specific meanings. They are best understood as a 
framework that mandated a hybrid approach to the creation of policy, within which ideology 
and realism were given greater relative weight depending on international conditions. Hence, 
at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, the ideological basis of foreign affairs that 
rejected political alliances, enshrined in the 1776 Model Treaty, was compromised in favour of 
a French Treaty. After success in that War, foreign policy took on a subtle complexion. Once 
independence had been achieved, American statesmen felt compelled to articulate an 
approach to foreign affairs that, whilst claiming an equality of dealings with European powers, 
in practice circumvented that neutrality by taking advantage of their rivalries in a rapidly 
evolving view of American national interest. Analysis of early foreign affairs through this prism 
of balance of power, illustrates the effectiveness of the emerging, ideologically polarised 
American nation in confronting the established international structure that was the European 
equilibrium. An equilibrium designed to contain conflict and restrain power, provided fertile 
ground for statesmen to achieve the objectives of national interest without compromising the 
fundamental tenet of the American founding. 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
 
An early twentieth century America isolated from the affairs of Europe, unwilling to enter into 
political alliances, and determined not to become unwittingly involved in European wars, has 
come to be associated directly with President Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796.1 
Washington explained that distance from Europe made the country safe from external danger 
and that it was permanent alliances with European nations that held out the prospect of 
dragging America into unnecessary wars. Hence; “our detached and distant situation invites 
and enables us to pursue a different course….Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? 
… It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign 
world”.2 It is this warning, that America must avoid entangling alliances, that has been taken by 
subsequent commentators to be evidence of the Founders’ original intent that America must 
be isolated in its foreign affairs.3 The Address has  contemporary resonance with Donald 
Trump’s America First doctrine, which, according to some, mandates disengagement from the 
world.4 Hence, the warning of the Address as the de facto premise of an isolationist foreign 
                                                          
 
 
1 President George Washington, first President of the United States (1789 to 1797), and former Commander of the Continental 
Army. See; (i) Beeman R., Plain, Honest Men, The Making of the American Constitution, (Random House: New York, 2011), p. 415., 
Rossini D. (ed.), From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy, (Keele University 
Press, Keele, 1995), pp. 13., and, Morison S. E., (et.al), The Growth of the American Republic, Volume I, (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 1980), p.315., (ii) However, Bagby W. M., America’s International Relations Since World War I, (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 1999), p. 11., argue that Washington only warned against participation in European wars, not against trade and 
commercial connections. (iii) This is the idea of a Washingtonian “quasi regime”, i.e. neutrality and isolationism, see Watson R. P., 
(et.al.), Presidential Doctrines, National Security from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush, (Novo Science: New York, 2003), p.15.  
(vi) However, some historians regard the warning of the Address as not actually influencing American foreign policy until about 
1917 when President Woodrow Wilson finally called for a rejection of entangling alliances, and therefore power politics in 
international affairs, instead for a partnership of nations dedicated to world peace (within the League of Nations). Wilson explicitly 
rejected “entangling alliances which would draw [nations] into competitions of power”, hence closely linking the consequences of 
entangling alliances with participation in the balance of power. See, Ambrosius L. E., Woodrow Wilson, Alliances, and the League 
of Nations, (The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2006), pp. 139-165. (v) For this idea that 
American isolationism in the early part of the twentieth century involved a desire to avoid entanglement in Europe, see; Morison 
S. E., (et.al), The Growth of the American Republic, Volume II, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1980), p. 403. (vi) see also 
Johnstone A., Against Evil. American Internationalists and the Four Freedoms on The Eve of World War II, (Cornell University Press: 
New York, 2014), p.1, in which Johnstone argues for isolationism on the eve of World War II as no more than non-interventionism, 
and for the avoidance of any participation overseas.  
2 See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp, accessed 3rd June 2017.  
3 The actual term “entangling alliances” in fact comes from Thomas Jefferson’s first inaugural address on election as President, 
see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp.  
4 See for example; Rothman L., The Long History Behind Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy, (Time Magazine, 28th March 
2016) http://time.com/4273812/america-first-donald-trump-history/, accessed 16th January 2017, and Stephens P., Trump 
Presidency: America First or America Alone?, (Financial Times: London, 9th January 2017). For an alternative point of view which 
sees Trumpian policy not as isolationist, but in terms that define national interest in very specifically American, as opposed to 
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policy, persists and has been given the weight of history by equating it with the founding 
period.5  
 
This thesis dispels the notion that America was founded on ideas of isolation by presenting an 
analysis of American foreign affairs in the years before Washington became President. An 
inquiry into the factors that influenced engagement with the world in the critical founding 
period from 1774, the ostensible start of the American Revolution, to 1789, when the 
Constitution had been adopted by the states, suggests that, from the start, America was 
actively involved in the European balance of power.6 The analysis exposes, therefore, not an 
isolationist nation, but one firmly committed to full engagement with Europe, in other words, 
to an internationalist foreign policy. 7 
 
                                                          
 
 
universal terms, in other words not America First, but Americans First, see; Kagan R., Trump marks the end of America as world’s 
‘indispensable nation’, (Financial Times: London, 19th November 2016).  
5 Kaplan L.S. in the essay; Toward Isolationism: The Rise and Fall of the Franco-American Alliance, in Kaplan L.S. (ed.), The American 
Revolution and A Candid World, (The Kent State University Press: Ohio, 1977), p.134., argues that whilst isolationism had its origin 
in the Farewell Address, it was not a term that came into common usage until 1920. Underlying its importance in the American 
foreign and domestic policy discourse, given both its warning of foreign alliances, and of faction at home, the Address has been 
read aloud at the beginning of every session of the United States Senate since 1901, see; Riddick's Senate Procedure: Precedents 
and Practices, (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, 1992), S. Doc. 101-28.   
6 The eighteenth century is generally regarded as the era of balance of power politics. See; (i) Morgenthau H. J. Politics Among 
Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. (McGraw Hill: New York, 1993), Sheehan. M. The Balance of Power. History and 
Theory. (Routledge: London, 1996), Scott. H.M. The Birth of a Great Power System. 1740–1815. (Pearson: Harlow, 2006), and Dull J. 
R., A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1985), pp. 13-25., (ii) for discussions of the 
idea that a European balance of power was “no more than a phrase” and has not been properly analysed, see Black J. British 
Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century: A Survey, (Journal of British Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1987), pp.26-53., (iii) however, 
for theories of eighteenth century balance of power politics see the same author’s analysis in; Black J., The Theory of the Balance 
of Power in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century: A Note on Sources, (Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 
1983), pp. 55-61., and (iv) Jonas M., Isolationism in America (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1966), who argues that America was 
isolationist from the start ‘to safeguard the independence of a new and weak nation by avoiding, whenever possible, involvement 
in the military and political affairs of the major powers’, i.e. that America did not take part in equilibrium politics.  
7 Gilbert F. To the Farewell Address. Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy. (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1961). Gilbert 
explains that, although foreign affairs per se had not been developed in policy terms during the colonial period, through 
immigration, and the medium of print, Americans were cognisant of the English debate over isolation from, or active involvement 
with the European balance of power. Thomas Paine, through his work Common Sense, argued for an American freedom from 
balance of power politics, by highlighting the close connection between trade and foreign policy, in particular the idea of free 
trade. Freedom to trade without artificial monarchical inspired governmental restrictions, i.e. mercantilism, would tie foreign 
affairs to the people and not to those of a political elite. As a partner willing to trade freely with all of Europe, America would be a 
friend to all. Political ties would be destructive to these ends. This was to be the new order in world affairs, and America would be 
at the vanguard of this economically interdependent world. Considered in these terms, American foreign policy was not 
isolationist. Alexander Hamilton, however, rejected the notion that free trade would make the world a safer place. He favoured 
power politics since strength would give respect aboard. An America that was a hegemon in its geographic domain would be the 
best guarantor of safety and prosperity.       
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At this juncture it is important to note that the early American foreign policy discourse did not 
utilise terms  such as isolationism and internationalism to describe an approach to foreign 
affairs or as a consideration in the development of policy. These terms are being used in this 
thesis to permit discussion of the central argument that ideas akin to isolationism and 
internationalism in foreign affairs are located in the founding period. Hence the intention is 
not to describe early American foreign affairs as isolationist or as internationalist per se but 
more specifically to expose, as an alternative to the Farewell Address, the importance of the 
balance of power to Americans of this period. In so doing, the aim is to demonstrate that 
foreign policy was predicated on the basis of an active involvement in European affairs, and 
therefore, to borrow a modern phrase, internationalist as opposed to what has become 
acceptable to describe as isolationist as a direct consequence of relying on the Farewell 
Address.  
 
The internationalism argument relies on the participation of America in the Eighteenth Century 
European balance of power as will be explained later in this Chapter. The absence of ideas akin 
to isolationism as an influencing factor in foreign policy making are therefore not a necessary 
condition of the thesis argument. However, a discussion of foreign affairs in this period would 
be incomplete without an attempt to identify if the converse to internationalism had meaning, 
and, if it did what that meaning was and if it was influential. Chapter Five achieves this by 
exploring what isolationism meant, and then rejecting the notion that such ideas were either 
ever taken seriously, as in the case of the fleeting exploration by Jefferson  of a closed  society, 
or that they failed to gain traction, as in the flirtation of some Anti-Federalists with the political 
and geographic separation from Europe. This thesis does not argue that Anti- Federalists were 
isolationist, only that the arguments of some of these, predominantly men, can be described 
as such.  This final rejection of isolationism therefore simply underpins the earlier 
internationalist argument of the thesis.    
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Other terms used in developing the argument also require some definition. Firstly, neutrality 
which was a term in common use in this period, arises often in the writings of American 
politicians, writers, and statesmen to state a desire to remain aloof from European affairs. 
Chapter Four explains the specific meaning of this term to those who made policy and to those 
who wrote about foreign affairs. Secondly, realism and pragmatism are used interchangeably 
to describe an approach to foreign affairs that is based around the view that there is essential 
anarchy in the international state system and therefore that nations compete to gain 
advantage and in which, therefore, the balance of power system is an organising and 
stabilising force.8 Thirdly, equilibrium is defined as the essential equality of power between 
nation states participating in the balance of power resulting in the absence of actual or 
threatened preponderance. Lead indicators of a threatened change in the balance are 
discussed later in this chapter.   
 
Moving on to a discussion of the argument, in the period analysed, America was committed to 
a narrow definition of its national interest, that emphasised the pursuit of trade, security and 
territorial expansion, all within the confines of an aversion to political alliances.9 This basis for 
policy was asserted in the 1776 Model Treaty, the framework for foreign affairs, adopted at 
the outset of the Revolution.10 Americans did not, therefore, in the words of John Quincy 
Adams, go in search of monsters to destroy, they were not committed to the spread of liberty 
                                                          
 
 
8 Morgenthau (1993) 
9 For the idea that national interest is shaped and defined by ideas of national identity, see; Chafetz G. (et al), (eds.), The Origins of 
National Interest, (Frank Cass: London, 1999) pp. vii-x., and p.203. The role of slavery in shaping a distinctly American identity, 
albeit manifesting itself in political terms as an anti-slave North and a pro-slave South, is explained in Mason M., Slavery and 
Politics in the Early American Republic, (The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2006); pp. 4-5. Although Mason 
explains that slavery formed an “integral part  of Northern sectional identity”, clearly the politics of slavery affected both Northern 
and Southern sections and therefore can be regarded as having shaped national identity.   
10 A copy of the Model Treaty, also known as “A Plan of Treaties”, may be found in the Adams Papers, held at the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, https://www.masshist.org/publications/apde2/view?id=ADMS-06-04-02-0116-0002, accessed 5th June 2016. 
Some regard parts of the Model Treaty as having been taken almost verbatim from British treaties, see Grant J., John Adams, Party 
of One, (The Folio Society: London, 2008), p. 143. However, the Model Treaty, in its free trade ideas, is also described as being the 
polar opposite of the regulations by which British trade operated, see Rappleye C., Robert Morris, Financier of the American 
Revolution, (Simon and Schuster: New York, 2010), p.52.     
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and freedom, or to Puritan notions of separation from Europe.11 The national interest 
demanded not an isolationist America safe by virtue of distance, unwilling to engage 
diplomatically, but an active America willingly participating in the European balance.12 
 
This conclusion is surprising given that political separation from Europe was simply 
indispensable to the singularity that was the Republican union, with its distinctive ideas of 
liberty captured in the 1776 Declaration of Independence. However, such an ideal could never 
survive if actual, as opposed to declared, independence was to be achieved because foreign 
alliances were needed to strengthen the American military capability. The Declaration pre-
empted this situation when it referred to holding nations; “Enemies in War, in Peace Friends”, 
but it was the penultimate paragraph that referred to the contracting of alliances, which 
clarified that friendship would mean alliance making.13 The tenet of aloofness from Europe 
therefore came to be compromised in 1778 with execution of the French Treaty, and would 
again, for example, with Thomas Jefferson’s proposal in 1786 for a reciprocal military alliance 
with Portugal for protection of the Mediterranean trade against the Barbary Pirates.14  
 
                                                          
 
 
11 This is not to say that all historians have rejected the idea of there being an American participation in the European balance of 
power. For example, Herring G. C. From Colony to Superpower. U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2008) explains that, despite being morally opposed to the machinations of European politics, the Americans sought to actively 
exploit balance rivalries. However, policies aimed at taking advantage of balance rivalries in the post War period, after the French 
alliance, are not brought into consideration in this work. For the warning against looking abroad for “monsters to destroy”, see; 
Schlesinger Jr. A., Foreign Policy and the American Character, (Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 
1983), pp. 1-16., this is a warning against entangling America in foreign wars which only have the objective of promoting (very 
loosely defined herein) liberal values, as opposed to narrow economic, or security interests. 
12 Ibid Schlesinger (1983), the author argues that in fact maintenance of an American independence depended on the European 
state system remaining in balance, in the sense that it was not in American interests to weaken either Britain or France.  
13 A copy of the Declaration of Independence may be found in The Constitution of the United States of America and Selected 
Writings of the Founding Fathers, (Barnes and Noble: New York, 2012). p. 108. The fact that the in the penultimate paragraph of 
the Declaration powers concerning alliances and trade; that is; “contract alliances, establish commerce”, appear separately may 
lead to a conclusion that alliances were not contemplated only as pertaining to trade but in a far wider sense, as recognising that 
the union would not be independent without foreign alliances. See also Higginbotham D., The War of American Independence, 
Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789, (Indiana University Press: London, 1971), p. 117., in which the author explains 
that declaring independence would encourage foreign support.  
14 Letter from William Carmichael to the American Commissioners in Europe. 3rd February 1786, TEN III, pp. 85 to 89. Jefferson also 
proposed a more general alliance involving Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Naples, Sweden, and France as a bulwark against Barbary 
attacks, see; Oren M. B., Power, Faith, and Fantasy, America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present, (W.W. Norton and Company: 
New York, 2011), p.24. 
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It was this combination of ideology and pragmatism in policy making, with ever shifting 
weights between the two, that meant that after the end of the Revolutionary War, the policy 
of neutrality adopted by the Continental Congress did not preclude the negotiation of post-
War British trade concessions using the threat of an ever closer union with France. National 
military, naval and economic weakness, required a more nuanced approach to the making of 
foreign policy, albeit within the overriding ideological framework of the Model Treaty, but one 
that emphasised the importance of the European balance.15 
 
The argument of internationalism as an active participation in the European balance of power 
presented here, is contrary to the opinion of many modern historians who have come to 
describe early foreign affairs as isolationist because of a desire to avoid political alliances.16 
This thesis provides an alternative analysis to that of historians who base themselves in the 
Farewell Address, and those that refer to the 1778 French Treaty as an outlier in foreign policy 
                                                          
 
 
15 Gilbert (1961), provides an illustration of the nuanced nature of American foreign affairs. He describes the two opposing 
approaches to post war foreign affairs as aloofness from balance of power and the involvement in balance of power. The former 
to be achieved by a concentration on American maritime power and commerce. 
16 Hendrickson D., Union, Nation or Empire, The American Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941, (University Press of 
Kansas: Kansas, 2009). The author explains that internationalism, as a concept in the eighteenth century, represented a 
commitment to the international law of nations and the society of states. American diplomats were attached to a diplomacy that 
would have as its aim, the reduction of the risk of war through economic interdependence, for which free trade was critical. 
Hendrickson says that, from about 1776, concepts of international relations, such as cooperation, constancy and predictability 
were constantly debated. Hence, while the descriptive policy, internationalism, did not exist in the eighteenth century, the 
conditions associated with such a policy did. However, it is not just historians that reject internationalism in foreign affairs. Some 
Americans of the early period similarly rejected involvement in the European balance, describing it as “summary of the evils which 
America has escaped”, and rejecting the idea that equilibrium encouraged stability and not constant war, quoted in the essay; The 
Expanding Union, Onuf. P. S. in Konig, D. T.(ed.), Devising Liberty. Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic, 
(Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1995), p. 55. The American academic Walter Russell Mead, tantalisingly described foreign 
policy as being activist and involved in world affairs from the start, but referred only to the 1778 alliance, and the Louisiana 
Purchase in the Napoleonic period without reference to the post-Revolutionary War period, see; Mead W. R. The American 
Foreign Policy Legacy, (Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 81, No. 1, January to February 2002), pp. 163-176. For a 
view that isolation as non-entanglement in European affairs was mentioned as early as 1775, see Weinberg A. K. International 
Affairs: The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation, (The American Political Science Review, American Political 
Science Association, Vol. 34, No. 3, June 1940), pp. 539-547. Political considerations are here thought of as those that lead to 
entanglement in the, predominantly, foreign affairs of another nation which could lead to unwanted or unforeseen military or 
naval engagement on behalf of that nation or another. This definition can be contrasted with that given, for example, in Giesecke 
A. A., American Commercial Legislation Before 1789, (Burt Franklin: New York, 1970), pp. 144-145, who illustrates political 
considerations by reference to a British refusal to treat with America after 1783 whilst there remained uncertainty as to the 
strength of the post War union. Marks takes the view that Americans only opposed alliances because they feared being the 
weaker partner, not because they had a fear of alliances, see; Marks F. W.III. Independence on Trial. Foreign Affairs in the Making 
of the Constitution. (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1973). 
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making.17 Although reference is made in the literature to the writings of the Founding Fathers, 
there is not the balance of power analysis of American foreign affairs that is provided herein.18 
This apparent oversight may in part be attributed to a refusal to accept that there was an 
American foreign policy until such time as there was a Constitutional Republic, in others 
words, until 1789 when the Constitution had been ratified by nine of the original thirteen 
states.19 One implication of this argument is that there was no American national interest until 
ratification. This idea is rejected in Chapter Two of this thesis, which explains that there was an 
extant national interest on the eve of the Revolution, being the shared and common objective 
of the colonies in maintaining autonomous government autonomous of Great Britain.20 
 
Considerations of European superpower rivalries were first brought into sharp relief in colonial 
affairs from the commencement of the Seven Years War in 1756.21 The British American 
                                                          
 
 
17 Or fail to lay sufficient weight on American foreign affairs between 1774 to 1789, see for example Ryan D. US Foreign Policy in 
World History. (Routledge: London, 2000).    
18 See for example, Adler S. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction, (Abelhard Schuman: New York, 1957). pp.10-
11. Adler provides the exemplar for this analytical gap. He describes the writings of the Founding Fathers as urging Americans to 
stay out of the affairs of Europe, but then relies heavily on the Farwell Address as the origin of American isolation. Brown R. D. in 
The Founding Fathers of 1776 and 1787, A Collective View, (The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol 33 No 3, July 1976), 
pp. 465 to 480, provides a definition of the Founding Fathers to include the ninety-seven individuals who either signed the 
Declaration, attended the Constitutional  Convention, or both. See also Rakove J., Revolutionaries, Inventing an American Nation, 
(Vintage: London, 2011), p. 247., in which Rakove explains that the reality of the foreign situation meant that it was left to a small 
group of what he calls “well-situated actors”, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay and John Adams, to determine an American foreign 
policy. Historians would suggest that the relationships between not just politicians, statesmen, political writers and commissioners 
but also those between “ordinary citizens” are also an important of foreign relations and policy making, see; Goedd P, GIs and 
Germans, Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949, (Yale University Press, Princeton, 2002), and Gienow-Hecht, J.C.E., 
Sound Diplomacy, Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations 1850-1920, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012).  
19 This is the implication of the preface to; Schmitz, D. F., The Triumph of Internationalism. Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in 
Crisis, 1933-1941, (Potomac Books Inc.: Washington D.C., 2007) p. xi. It is also the conclusion of; Clinton W.D.s,, The Two Faces of 
National Interest, (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1994), p. 14. Clinton explains that Constitutional reform 
“brought closer the day when state interest would be labelled national interest”. However, Mead would disagree with the notion 
that there was no American foreign policy in the early days of the Republic, by pointing to the American exploitation of European 
rivalries, see; Mead W. R., The American Foreign Policy Legacy, (Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 81, No. 1 (Jan-
Feb, 2002)), pp. 163-176. See also; Brands H. W., The Idea of the National Interest, (002). (Diplomatic History. 23. 239 - 261. 
10.1111/1467-7709.00165). 
20 Identifying the existence of national interest at the outset of the Revolution goes some to way address some of the concerns of 
historians for example ibid, Schmitz (2007), p. xi., who regards the creation of a Constitutional Republic as the point at which 
America had a foreign policy. 
21 See Shennan J. H., International Relations in Europe, 1689-1789, (Routledge: London, 1995), p. 51, who describes the British 
belief at the outset of the Seven Years War that the European equilibrium depended on victory over France in America. In 
Massachusetts, two counties proposed as early as 1774 that any foreign protestant power be called upon to negotiate with Britain 
on behalf of American rights, see; Brown R. D., Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts, The Boston Committee of Correspondence 
and the Towns, 1772-1774, (W.W. Norton and Company: New York, 1970), p.110. See also, Jones D. V., License for Empire, 
Colonialism by Treaty in Early America, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1982), pp. 7-9., in which the author describes the 
importance of America in worlds affairs after the Seven Years War as involving the Iroquois League as part of a Euro-American 
treaty system. However, Borneman W. R., The French Indian War, Deciding the Fate of North America, (Harper: New York, 2006), 
pp. 298-299, explains that all the colonists learned from the war was the importance of acting in concert with other colonies, and 
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colonial experience, had formed distinctive ideas for some colonists that the conflicting 
demands of European nations interested in North America, were fertile ground for exploitation 
in their interests.22 Whilst fought ostensibly to restrain French territorial ambitions in America, 
Britain’s aims in this war in expelling the French from the continent chimed with those of the 
colonists who had sought such an end for “over…..forty years”.23 Hence, very early on, 
colonists had betrayed an insight into the value of an Anglo French rivalry to what could 
generally be in their interests.24 Some historians have argued that the experience of the Seven 
Years War more fully integrated the colonists into the British Empire.25 However, the end of 
                                                          
 
 
the limits of British power. The reference to the major European powers as “superpowers” is intended to convey their relative 
international military, naval and political power as opposed to a more modern definition which assumes nations with a nuclear 
capability.       
22 Simmons R. C., The American Colonies, From Settlement to Independence, (W. W. Norton and Company: New York, 1976), p. 
275. Morison (1980), pp. 114 to 115, take the view that the Albany Plan for union of the thirteen colonies on the eve of the Seven 
Years War was influenced by a desire to restrain French expansion which had been underway for many years prior to 1753. Hence, 
quoting, Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts; “the French seem to have advanced further toward making themselves 
masters of this Continent”. The Plan, providing for a union of the colonies under control of the Crown with a council of advisors 
comprised of colonial representatives, would bind Americans closer to the British for purposes of protection from French 
expansionism and would be part of a wider plan for alliance with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. This is also the view of Hinderaker 
E. (et.al.), At The Edge of Empire, The Backcountry in British North America, (The John Hopkins University Press: Maryland, 2003), 
p. 106. See also, Kane T. M., Theoretical Roots of US Foreign Policy, Machiavelli and American Unilateralism, (Routledge: New York, 
2006), p. 35.  For the idea that the Albany Plan was nothing more than a plan for colonial security, with the implication therefore 
that it was independent of considerations of an Anglo-American bulwark against French expansionism, see Boyd J. P. Anglo 
American Union, Joseph Galloway’s Plans to Preserve the British Empire, 1774 – 1788, (University of Pennsylvania Press: 
Philadelphia, 1941), pp. 36 – 37. For the idea that the Albany Plan was a plan only for the better management of Indian affairs, 
see; Alden J. R. The Albany Congress and the Creation of the Indian Superintendencies, (The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, September 1940), pp. 193-210. On the other hand, the French similarly concerned themselves with colonial 
interference in New France, in particular occupation of the Ohio lands and in the French fur trade, see; Eccles W. J. France in 
America, (Fitzhenry and Whiteside: Vancouver, 1972), pp. 178- 179. In support of the thesis, Draper, explains that a local conflict, 
fought to preserve the interests of “land speculators” was blown up into a wider conflagration until it’s raison d’etre became one 
of altering the European balance of power, see; Draper T. A Struggle for Power. The American Revolution, (Times Books: New York, 
1996), pp.166-167. It was not only Britain in this sense that concerned itself with changes to the equilibrium, Spain also worried 
that the War threatened changes to the balance on the North American continent, see; Corbett J. S. England in the Seven Years 
War, A Study in Combined Strategy, Volume II (Longmans, Green and Co.: London, 1907), p. 74.  
23 Alsytne R.W.V. Empire and Independence. The International History of the American Revolution. (John Wiley and Sons: London, 
1965), pp. 12-13. For the aims of Britain in the Seven Years War, to impose hegemony on its “Atlantic empire” as well as for 
providing for the security of the colonies, see Tucker R.W. et al, The Fall of the First British Empire, Origins of the War of American 
Independence, (The John Hopkins University Press: Maryland, 1982), p.23. However, also see Lowe J. T. Our Colonial Heritage. 
Diplomatic and Military (Lanham: New York, 1987), pp. 292-293. The author argues that a British involvement in the removal of 
the French presence in America was ill judged, altering as it did the balance of power in Europe to the ultimate detriment of the 
British Empire, because it ultimately foreshadowed the American drive for independence.    
24 See; Brown R. E., Middle Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780, (Cornell University Press: New York, 
1955), p.205., in which Brown explains that the Seven Years war had as its objective the security of the British trade only. See also; 
Savelle M., Seeds of Liberty, The Genesis of the American Mind, (University of Washington Press: Seattle, 1965), pp. 343-345.  
Alternatively, the colonists are said to have developed their understanding of foreign affairs from their involvement, through their 
London agents, with the British Parliament see; Bemis S. F., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, (Alfred A. 
Knopf: New York, 1927), p.3. Alternatively, some authors take the view that the consequence of the Seven Years War was to 
reinforce the colonies in their right to be different from each other i.e. they became even more focussed on their own affairs now 
that French Indian threats on the western border had dissipated, see; Watson J. S., The Reign of George III, 1760-1815, (Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, 1985), pp. 174-178.   
25 For the idea that the end of the Seven Years’ War created the circumstances for the American Revolution, see Scott H. M., 
British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1990), chapter The Legacies of the Seven 
Years War, pp. 29-52. 
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this conflict also witnessed the beginnings of a colonial antipathy towards the Empire because, 
for example, of the colonial experience of engaging with British soldiers, who regarded 
irregular militia as inferior fighting men.26 Colonists were therefore becoming aware of their 
distinctiveness and were even preparing, according to some authors, to express their demands 
for independence.27  
 
Benjamin Franklin was one such early exponent of balance of power, and he warned Britain in 
1756 of the risk of a French Indian encirclement of the English American colonies, appealing 
directly to Britain’s strategic concern to contain French ambitions in America. This appeal is 
one of the first instances of active American [that is British American colonial] involvement in 
the European balance of power between France and Britain.28 Ironically later, after the end of 
the Seven Years War, as Parliament refused to countenance British American colonial military 
adventures against Canada, balance of power concerns would act as a restraint on American 
expansionist tendencies. For example, the Quebec Act of 1774, one of a series of acts knows as 
                                                          
 
 
26 Butler J. Becoming America. The Revolution before 1776, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge Massachusetts, 2000), pp. 127-
130. Further, whilst making no comment on the balance of power perspective given above, Marshall sees the Americans, as 
willing, diligent and keen participants in the Seven Years War on the North American continent, and hence believing themselves to 
have earned the right to be regarded as an important and integral part of the British Empire, a belief that ended with the 
stationing of troops in the colonies after the end of the War and subsequently by the Coercive Acts, see; Marshall P. J. The Thirteen 
Colonies in the Seven Years’ War. The View from London, in Flavell J. and Conway S. (eds.) Britain and America Go to War. The 
Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754 -1815. (University Press of Florida: Gainesville, 2004), p. 71. For the concern 
amongst British politicians that the end of the Seven Years war was leading to ideas of separation from Britain, see the description 
of the views of British politician William Burke, a relative of Edmund Burke, in Galloway C. G., The Scratch of a Pen, 1763 and the 
Transformation of North America, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006), pp. 165-168. But also see Lovejoy, D. S., Rhode Island 
Politics and the American Revolution, 1760-1776, (Brown University Press, Providence, 1969), p. 19-22, for discussions of the 
negative economic impact of the Seven Years War on Rhode Island as a result of the loss of ships and depression caused by falling 
demand after the end of war spending. See also; Rogers A., Empire and Liberty, American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-
1763, (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1974), p. 59., for a description of the development of the American view of 
themselves as different from the British soldiers sent to prosecute the war, because of the high degree of independence of the 
average American soldier from command, and a general dislike of the ostensible threat to liberty posed by the existence of the 
British soldier in America.         
27 This is the point made by Savelle M., Seeds of Liberty, The Genesis of the American Mind, (University of Washington Press: 
Seattle, 1965) quoted in Greene J. P. Interpreting Early America, Historiographical Essays, (University of Virginia Press: 
Charlottesville, 1996), p. 329. See also;  Kagan Robert. Dangerous Nation, America and the World. 1600 to 1898. (Vintage Books: 
New York. 2006). 
28 Graebner Norman A. et al. Foreign Affairs and the Founding Fathers. From Confederation to Constitution. 1776 to 1787. 
(Praeger: California. 2011) support this view that the colonials were the first to engage the balance of power. Inherent, then, in 
this assessment is the acceptance that the colonies, before the Revolutionary War, shared an interest in expelling France from 
North America.    
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the Coercives, caused Americans to believe that the British were appeasing, what for 
Americans was, a threatening Catholic dominion of America.29 
The Analytical Timeframe  
The analysis that underpins the argument is usefully developed in three distinct phases, the 
period from the start of the War for Independence to 1782, the intervening years 1782 to 
1783, when peace in the War for Independence was being negotiated, and the post War years 
to 1789. In these periods, American Commissioners and Congress tried to exploit the 
competing interests of France and Great Britain in what was in the interests of the American 
union.30 In turn, for two reasons, it was in the interests of the European nations to balance the 
union of the thirteen states. Firstly, the American union was a balancing weight in the 
equilibrium and an alliance with it, or its detachment from a competitor, was an important 
consideration in European politics. Secondly, America was regarded as being of future 
influence as an emerging nation, and therefore a prospective danger to the equilibrium, and 
could not be ignored. Hence, as will be demonstrated below, from the start, European 
balancing strategies sought to limit the degree to which the union, could influence the 
equilibrium.31 American internationalism in this early period is therefore described by its 
participation in the European balance of power, and by the balancing strategies adopted by 
the European nations to contain the usefulness of America to the equilibrium.32  
                                                          
 
 
29 See for example, Coupland Sir R. The Quebec Act: A Study in Statesmanship. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1968). For an 
alternative view, see Phillips P C.  The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. (Johnson Reprint: Mississippi, 2009). The 
author explains that the Act incorporated the northern Ohio territory into Quebec, thus excluding the Americans and sparking 
fears of a British strategy of containment or at least a restraint on the ability of the states to expand westwards. However, Bourke 
R., in Empire and Revolution, The Political Life of Edmund Burke, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2015), p. 448, makes the 
point that the Quebec Act was motivated by nothing more than the obligation felt by Parliament towards the French population of 
Quebec after the victory of the former in the Seven Years War which had seen the expulsion of the French from North America.        
30 Armitage D. The Declaration of Independence. A Global History, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass, 2007). 
31 An explanation of England’s situation in the European balance of power, given by Lord Bolingbroke, philosopher and politician, 
in the early part of the eighteenth century, provides the framework for the American involvement in balance of power politics 
adopted here. See Maurseth P. Balance of Power Thinking from the Renaissance to the French Revolution, (Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 1. No. 2, 19764), pp. 120 – 136.  
32 Congress was fully cognisant with the idea of a European balance of power, see Hutson J. Intellectual Foundations of Early 
American Diplomacy. (Diplomatic History, Volume I Number I, Winter 1977). However, Graebner et. al. (2011) offer the view that it 
was only certain Founders, for example John Adams, who recognised the existence and value of the European balance of power 
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The First Period 
In the first period, an active engagement in the equilibrium is identified in the American 
diplomatic overtures to France and to Spain given the latter’s alliance with France under the 
Family Compact.33 The French alliance was possible because of France’s desire to regain 
prestige after its disastrous losses to Britain in the Seven Years War. Congress recognised that 
France was anxious to redress the balance with Britain and that it could do so by assisting 
American Independence.34 France, however, delayed overt involvement until 1778 for one of 
two reasons. Some historians take the view that it was success in the battle of Saratoga in 
what is now upstate New York, that finally convinced the French Foreign Minister, Comte de la 
Vergennes that the Americans could win independence.35 Others, take the view that France 
had regained her lost naval power and, confident in her ability to provide support, formally 
recognised the American nation.36 Either way, France was actively concerned to increase her 
power relative to that of the British by depriving her of her North American colonies.37  
 
As the 1778 French Treaty was confirmed in the Continental Congress, a conviction developed 
amongst some American statesmen that independence would involve full participation in the 
balance of power, with diplomats assigned responsibilities consistent with a nation that would 
be internationally engaged.38 It was not just independence that would be causative of this 
                                                          
 
 
and that others chose to adopt an isolationist view of the American situation (i.e. they preferred to rise above the politics of 
Europe).  
33 For an alternative view, see Stagg J. C. A. Borderlines in Borderlands. James Madison and the Spanish American Frontier. 1776 to 
1821. (Yale University Press: Virginia, 2009).  
34 Herring (2011).   
35 Gordon William. The History Of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the Independence of the United States of America, 
including an account of the late war and of the Thirteen Colonies, from their origin to that period. Volume III, (Printed for the 
Author: London, 1788). This view is reinforced by Rakove J. N. The Beginnings of National Politics, An Interpretative History of the 
Continental Congress, (Alfred P. Knopf: New York, 1979), p. 251, who explains that Congress “hoping to capitalise on Saratoga, was 
anxious to see an alliance with France”.  
36 Dull J. R. The French Navy and American Independence. A Study of Arms and Diplomacy. 1774 to 1787, (Princeton University 
Press: New Jersey, 1975). 
37 See for example, Bemis. S. F. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution. (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1957).  
38 Arthur Lee to The Committee of Foreign Affairs, Paris, April 2nd 1778, DCAR Volume II, p. 148. Lee explained that the powers to be 
given to American diplomats in the future would determine “the future rank of the United States of America” amongst other 
nations. Indeed, such powers and the “rank” assigned to the diplomats would determine, “the importance they must command in 
the balance of European power”.   
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outcome, a prolonged War held out the possibility of transforming the union into a militarist 
society. America was a union of states engaged in an existentialist conflict, it was flanked by 
adversaries, and opposed by domestic loyalists unwilling to support separation from Britain. 
Americans were therefore required to develop the “military virtues and talents” that would 
assure not only victory, but sustainability of the post-War state against external dangers.39 
According to John Adams, one time plenipotentiary to Holland, prolonged conflict with 
modern European armies, would cause Americans to become ineradicably accustomed to war, 
the art of conflict, and to participating in an ongoing struggle against one European nation or 
another. In other words, America would, because of a continuous struggle with Europeans 
anxious to destabilise it, develop the capacity to reciprocate, create dangers for European 
powers, and therefore decide the balance, by either refraining from military involvement, or 
offering its participation on one side. Even if it tried to avoid military involvement, it would be 
drawn into the politics of the balance since its existence made it, according to Adams, a 
“weight candle” in the equilibrium.40 
 
Hence, from the beginning, American statesmen absorbed as an essentially universal truth, the 
importance of active international engagement. Whereas in the first period, engagement 
                                                          
 
 
39 John Adams to the President of Congress, Paris April 18th 1780, DCAR Volume III, p. 5. “The longer this war is continued in 
America, the more will America become habituated to the characters of the soldier and the marine………. the deeper will the 
foundations of American power be laid, and the more dangerous will it become to some other of the Powers of Europe”. 
Alternatively see; Hoffman E. C., American Umpire, (Harvard University Press: Massachusetts, 2013), in which the author argues 
not for an American empire but for America as the umpire of the world that acted as the exemplar for international change in 
which empires as controlling international entities were replaced by the nation state.   
40 Extracts from a Journal. John Adams. DCAR Volume III. p. 695. Whether a balance of power framework explained engagement 
between European powers or whether equilibrium as a factor in foreign affairs was illusory, Adams’ comments betray an 
acceptance of the balance and of its importance to American foreign policy thinking; “It is obvious that all the Powers of Europe 
will be continually manoeuvring with us, to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us 
a make-weight candle, when they are making out their pounds”. What may have influenced American statesmen in these years 
was the danger of pursuing a strategy based on taking advantage of rivalries too far, to the extent that one nation or another in 
the equilibrium would be irreversibly damaged so as to alter the balance in favour of the other, leaving America at the mercy of a 
newly emerged European hegemonic power. This was a consideration for Jefferson in 1807 as Napoleon’s Continental System 
came to be opposed by Great Britain, and Americans wondered whether the  European balance of power as the basis of American 
security, could be maintained, see Tucker R. W. and Hendrickson D. C., Empire of Liberty, The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson, 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford,1990), p. 217.   
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would involve an alliance, made possible by extant balance rivalries, in the following two 
periods, balance of power influences on American policy are described by considering the 
importance of it, as an emerging nation, to the equilibrium.  
The Second and Third Periods 
In the following two periods then, American participation in the equilibrium is described from 
two perspectives. Firstly from the positive actions that European states took in a desire to 
maintain the balance against a prospective American hegemony because of its dangerous 
ideas of republican government, and free trade.41 Secondly from the proactive American 
participation in balance rivalries in the national interest.    
 
From the first perspective, in the two periods that follow the Revolutionary War period, 
American internationalism is explained by an expansion of the theory of balance of power 
which describes risks of disequilibrium from an emerging hegemon within a balance, to one 
that describes risks that are posed by states that are otherwise on the periphery of a balance.42 
Hence, since Americans had adopted ideas of free trade that were dangerous to European 
nations accustomed to state controlled mercantilism, and because Americans posed the risk of 
allying with current balance participants, they were brought into direct contact with the 
European balance. 43 In short, France and Great Britain were anxious to ensure that relative 
                                                          
 
 
41 Ideas of free trade did exist in the American exploration of foreign affairs. Free trade is not, however, a term that is completely 
synonymous with current definitions or understanding. Instead it is used by early Americans to move the focus of trade away from 
state controlled mercantilism, of which the British Navigation Acts were a significant mechanism, to a system of trade that placed 
the merchant at its centre. Hence, merchants would be free to trade with their foreign counterparts in their own economic self-
interest, albeit within a general framework of which state controlled tariffs would be an element, but, for example, the tight 
restrictions akin to those imposed by the Navigation Acts, would not. The literature describes economic interdependence as  a 
foreign affairs benefit of these notions of free trade, since nations that trade with each other would not go to war with each other, 
(see, for example, Meyers(1973)).  
42 For discussions of equilibrium see, Gulick. E. V. Europe’s Classical Balance of Power. (W. W. Norton and Company: New York, 
1955). For discussions of methods and approaches adopted during the eighteenth century, to assess the relative strength of 
competing balance of power participants, see Scott (2006). Scott explains that military build-up, changes in population size, 
colonial possessions and ownership of territories, might all be leading indicators of a risk of change in the balance.    
43 Hoffer P. C. The Brave New World, A History of Early America, (The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 2006), pp. 364 – 
394. The author explains that the basic ideas that would support free trade were already underway by the end of the seventeenth 
century in so far as the protection of private property rights was concerned, and that by the middle of the eighteenth century, 
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power in Europe was not altered by a newly independent America. Restraining the ascendancy 
of the post-War American Republic would involve both France and Britain in attempts to 
“diminish” American power, specifically by “stinting her growth”, and for France to interfere in 
her domestic affairs to secure political outcomes favourable to Louis XVI.44 In other words, 
France and Britain would each ensure that a strong America did not become a valuable ally to 
its competitor. Put another way, in the words of the theory of equilibrium, these nations 
would adopt balancing strategies against the peripheral American state. Strategies adopted by 
states operating within equilibria are described further below. It is important to note at this 
juncture that it is not being suggested that Congress was actively developing a policy of 
alliance making that would involve military commitments on behalf of one or other European 
power.45 A far more nuanced approach to foreign affairs was being debated and shaped by 
men at the fore of thinking about how the Republic should engage with the world.   
 
Central to thinking from the second perspective, was the idea that America would adopt an 
ostensible neutrality in an effort to remain diplomatically equidistant from Great Britain and 
from France. 46 In other words, signalling that it would not align with one or other of these 
                                                          
 
 
although legislation was being passed in Britain that empowered businessmen to build the transport infrastructure, which 
“undercut mercantilism at every turn”.  See also Greene J. P. (ed.), The American Revolution, Its Character and Limits, (New York 
University Press: New York, 1986), essay of Higginbotham D., The American Republic in a Wider World, pp. 165-170, in which the 
author explains that negotiation of free trade agreements with European nations were not easy because of the fear amongst these 
nations that such arrangements threatened to weaken Britain and therefore invite British reprisal. For the value of colonies to 
European nations, given mercantilist ideas of trade, see; Calder A., Revolutionary Empire, The Rise of the English Speaking Empires 
From the Fifteenth Century to the 1780s, (Pimlico Press: London, 1998), p. 419. Free trade would be based on treaties and implied 
the imposition of imposts (duties on trade) no greater than those levied on the imports of other nations with whom such “most 
favoured nation” arrangements existed. See American Commissioners to Favi, with Observations on Treaty Project, 8 June 1785, 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 8, 25 February–31 October 1785, Boyd J. P. (ed.), (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1953), pp. 187–195. FONA. 
44 TFP, p.55. The desire to restrain American growth is in the argument made by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Eleven when he 
explains that Great Britain worried that America would create a navy and begin to compete directly with her in the carrying trade. 
Therefore, for Hamilton, it was in the interests of Europe to “foster division” amongst the states in order to keep America weak or 
in a state of disarray.    
45 Williams A. W. From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations. (John Wiley and Sons: New York, 
1952). 
46 For the interchangeability of neutrality with impartiality, see Winik J., The Great Upheaval, The Birth of the Modern World, 1788-
1800, (Simon & Schuster: London, 2008), p.465.  
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nations.47 America would, however, offer to compromise its neutrality if it could secure 
valuable concessions from one or other European nation. Hence, whilst, professing neutrality, 
men such as Washington, Thomas Jefferson (Virginia Governor and delegate to the Continental 
Congress), John Adams (in addition to being plenipotentiary to the Netherlands, was 
Commissioner to France and Great Britain between 1778 and 1788), John Jay (Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs and Commissioner to Spain), and Benjamin Franklin (United States French 
Commissioner), would actively shape a policy that demanded concessions in exchange for 
compromising American neutrality. Far therefore, from asserting as unconditional the idea 
that there should be no political connection, the realities of the international situation in so far 
as the American national interest was concerned, inevitably required a more careful blend of 
that ideology with realism.48 Thus, America continued to be actively involved in the European 
balance of power, after the War had ended. These ideas are explored in Chapter Four.  
The National Interest in the Second and Third Periods 
A post-War American national interest required participation in the equilibrium for three 
reasons; firstly, the expansion of the international trade, secondly for the ideological reason 
                                                          
 
 
47 This is described as the strategic viewpoint of Great Britain and France in an essay by Graebner A. N. The Pursuit of Interests and 
a Balance of Power, in Merrill D. and Paterson. G. T. (eds.) Major Problems in American Foreign Relations. Volume 1: to 1920. Sixth 
Edition. (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston MA, 2005). The Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition which infers that 
triangulation involves positioning oneself by reference to two political standpoints in order to, either appeal to, or to appease, two 
opposing political parties. In the sense used here, I am suggesting a third option, neither appeal nor appeasement but 
manipulation. See also; Marshall P.J. Remaking the British Atlantic. The United States and the British Empire after American 
Independence. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012). p. 55. The author takes the view that once American Peace Commissioners 
had negotiated separate peace preliminaries without recourse to the French, America as well as Britain, could be assured that the 
French alliance had ruptured. Hence, that American could thereafter be neutral.   
48 Onuf et al describe the American approach to the European balance of power in more specific terms, as an attempt by 
American statesmen to remake the European equilibrium according to the principles of free trade, i.e. as an interdependent 
system of nations for whom war would be economically unviable, see, Onuf P. and Onuf N., Federal Union, Modern World, The 
Law of Nation in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814, (Madison House: New York, 1993), p.93. The ideas of realism and ideology 
were expressed in Washington’s Address, in terms of; realism as practical conceptions of interest in foreign affairs versus political 
alliances, and the avoidance of entanglement with other nations that might be predicated only on the grounds of ideology. Further 
that trade ties were more valuable than those based on political considerations, see; Chernow R., Washington, A Life, (Allen Lane: 
London, 2010), p.756. The description of a non-isolated America given here is the opposite of what is termed neo-isolationism 
which arises by virtue of geographical distance, the isolationist bent of its politicians, and, more importantly, weak neighbours. As 
far as the last of these criteria are concerned, America would not have been described as neo-isolationist in this period, due to the 
existence of hostile Spanish and British neighbours see; Cox, M. and Stokes. D., US Foreign Policy, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2008), p.19., see also; Brown M. E., America’s Strategic Choices, (The MIT Press: Massachusetts, 1997), p. x.  
 
 
23 
 
that Americans wished for a total independence from the French treaty commitment, and 
finally to assure the security of the states. 
 
The expansion of international trade with France and Britain on equal terms through a policy 
of favourable, non-monopolistic, trade treaties was the primary means to achieve economic 
growth.49 A failure to treat French and British trade equally, through the imposition for 
example of reduced imposts, would alter the economic power of one or another of the 
European nations and run the risk of altering the balance of power.50 Secondly, America 
needed to extricate itself from the mutual defence terms of the 1778 treaty with France, since 
these obligations threatened to embroil the Republic in unnecessary European wars.51 
Although the opportunity to do so would not present itself until 1793, when Revolutionary 
France declared war on Great Britain and Washington declared an American neutrality, the 
Americans had preferred a closer post-War relationship with Britain than with France.   
 
Finally, the several states had to be protected from external threats that risked diminishing the 
Republic, leading to a rupture in the union and the creation of three confederacies. Risks to 
the security of the union were very real. The British continued to occupy the north western 
                                                          
 
 
49 Murphy O.T. Charles Gravier. Comte de Vergennes. French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution. 1719 to 1787. (State University 
of New York Press: New York, 1982). The diplomatic objectives of France, in assisting America, included trade as a fundamental 
aspect of French aims because in 1778 the Americans achieved separate treaties of amity and of commerce. Although the French 
Foreign Minister, Comte de la Vergennes, was not a believer that the cost of keeping and maintaining colonies was economically 
viable, especially since treaty making could provide a similar outcome, he nevertheless recognised that the aim of weakening 
Britain inevitably required capturing its colonial trade. 
50 A similar point was made, albeit in relation to Spain, by the early eighteenth century Spanish diplomat Jose Campillo y Cossio 
when he explained, discussing a reformed economic policy towards the Spanish American colonies, how “each million that goes to 
another nation without a corresponding million returning to Spain amounts to putting the nation on a higher level than ours and 
lowering ours in the process”, see; Cowans J. (ed.), Early Modern Spain. A Documentary History, (University of Pennsylvania Press: 
Philadelphia, 2003). A New Economic Policy for America. 1762, p. 217, essay by Cossio Jose Campillo. Congress generally, however, 
lacked the power to enforce treaty commitments across all the states, therefore blunting somewhat the strategy explained here, 
see; Letter from John Adams to Secretary Jay. Grosvenor Square. 17th October, 1785, TWJA Volume VIII. p. 322.   
51 Stinchcombe W. C. The American Revolution and the French Alliance. (Syracuse University Press: New York. 1969). pp. 8-9. The 
author states that commercial ties were the primary goal of American foreign policy at this time but that the military alliance was 
the main reason for the alliance with France. The author quotes Gilbert (1965), pp-54-66., as concurring with this analysis. 
Americans rationalised an approach to extrication from commitments to the French by applying greater weight to their manifest 
destiny than to assistance from the French, when considering their obligations under the 1778 Treaty, see; Corwin. E. S. The 
Monroe Doctrine, (The North American Review, University of Northern Iowa, Vol. 218 No. 817, December 1923), pp. 721-735.    
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forts, refusing to relinquish them despite assurances in the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty, ostensibly 
in retaliation for the failure of the state legislatures to permit enforcement of the debts of 
British merchants. Congress suspected that the situation suited the British since it allowed 
them to maintain a presence in North America.52 Suspicion was only heightened by British 
support for the creation of an Indian Confederacy and attempts to entice the Vermont 
territory away from the union.53 Similarly, in the southwest the Spanish tried to encourage into 
their North American colonial system, western settlers in the Kentucky and Franklin colonies.54 
There also remained the risk of attack from Indian tribes all along the western border, and a 
continued dispute with the Spanish over navigation rights to the Mississippi River which some 
Americans believed important to the trade of the western settlements. Hence, if the American 
Congressional union could not guarantee the security, rights of self-governance and ultimately 
republican forms of government to settlers in the west, the Spanish would do so by offering 
access to a colonial system that went some way to do meet these demands.55  
 
Given these considerations of national interest, an America that was disengaged or isolated 
from the world, ran the risk of becoming nothing more than a vassal for European interests. 
Therefore, it was never in American interests to disengage or to maintain an isolation in 
                                                          
 
 
52 Letter from John Adams to Secretary John Jay. Grosvenor Square. 21st October. 1785, TWJA Volume VIII, p. 325. Adams reported 
how William Pitt had closely tied the question of the British Forts to the outstanding debts but, now decided to go further by 
insisting that Congress pay those debts, to which Adams had replied that no such thing had been contemplated, only that British 
creditors would meet with “no lawful impediment to the recovery of their debts”.  However, Pitt took the view that since lawful 
impediments had indeed been put in the way of British creditors, i.e. the stay laws passed in certain states, then Congress must as 
a consequence have adopted those debts to itself.   
53Marshall (2012), p. 89. The British were busy trying to tempt the Vermont settlers to a closer connection to Quebec, and to 
separate Kentucky from the American union by developing a separate trade with those settlers. See also, Bennett D., A Few 
Lawless Vagabonds, Ethan Allen, The Republic of Vermont, and the American Revolution, (Casemate: Philadelphia, 2014)  
54 See; Phillips (2009), and; Barksdale K. T., The Lost State of Franklin, America’s First Secession, (The University Press of Kentucky: 
Kentucky, 2009). The suspicion that the Spanish were trying to entice the fledging territory of Franklin away from the union, and to 
support Indian insurrections encouraged proposals for barter and trade, and more permanent solutions by encouraging Indian 
American intermarriage, education and exemption from taxes. The latter was a measure too unsavoury for the Virginia legislature 
to consider in 1784, see; PHP, pp.193-283. However, such sensitivities did not apply in the Illinois territory where the number of 
French Native American marriages was significant, see; Morrissey R. M. Empire by Collaboration. Indians, Colonists, and 
Governments in Colonial Illinois Country, (University of Pennsylvania Press: Pennsylvania, 2015), p.149  
55 Weeks W E. The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Dimensions of the Early American Empire. 1754-1865. 
Volume 1. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013). 
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economic or diplomatic terms. This was not to say that the idealistic notion of no political 
connections described in the Model Treaty would be discarded. Rather, it is to say that such a 
consideration would simply mean that it was possible to avoid alliances, whilst still being an 
active participant in balance rivalries.   
Early Ideas of Isolationism     
Given the importance of isolation to this discussion, it is important to consider whether it was 
ever considered as a policy construct in these years. Quite apart from the idea of isolation in 
the eighteenth century, it is clear from the literature that there is no one clear definition of 
isolationism even in the twentieth century. Johnstone describes the difficulties in trying to 
define an American isolationism given that the nation has been connected to the world 
through international trade for much of its history.56 He explains that men such as Washington 
and Jefferson knew that it was never possible for America to isolate itself given its need for, 
even temporary, military and commercial alliances. Indeed Johnstone points to Doenecke’s, 
Storm on the Horizon, as an explanation that isolationists were predominantly concerned with 
avoidance of unnecessary war, not for a political separation from Europe per se.57 American 
isolationism has traditionally been thought of in terms of the geographical isolation that is 
implied by this political separation from the affairs of Europe, but, for some, subject to the 
proviso that Americans continued to retain some interest in European political affairs because 
of the latter’s importance to the national interest.58  
                                                          
 
 
56 Johnstone A. Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign Relations, (Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 9, 1, 2011), 
pp. 7-20. 
57 Doenecke J., Storm on the Horizon (Rowman and Littlefield:, Oxford, 2000). This desire to remain uninvolved in European 
problems, does not, for Schlesinger prohibit active engagement in the international trade, or the use of military action in defence 
of this interest; Schlesinger A. Jr., Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat, (Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign 
Relations, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Jul - Aug., 1995)), pp. 2-8. 
58 Rofe, J. S. Isolationism and internationalism in transatlantic affairs, (Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 2011, 9: 1), pp.1-6. This is 
also the definition of isolationism in Fensterwald B., Jr., The Anatomy of American "Isolationism" and Expansionism. I, (The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Sage Publications, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1958), pp. 280-309.  Other definitions equate isolation with 
nationalism based on both a fear of the destructive wars in which the European nations have historically involved themselves, see; 
ibid, Rofe, p.3. See also; Boyle P. G., The Roots of Isolationism: A Case Study, (Journal of American Studies, Cambridge University 
Press, Vol. 6, No. 1, April, 1972), pp. 41-50., who argues that the European balance of power should be viewed only in terms of 
power politics, not, for example, as a struggle between good and evil. This view of isolationism is attributed by the author to Hiram 
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If, for some, avoidance of military alliances is a requisite for isolationism then, for other 
historians  foreign policy takes on an internationalist complexion when America is challenged 
by competitors, requiring it to safeguard its security and access to overseas markets through 
alliance making and diplomatic activity.59 Others would, however, say that internationalism 
requires involvement in multilateral action, since, unilateralism is simply a characteristic of 
isolationism.60 Indeed, that unilateralism is in the national interest because it allows for 
flexibility in policy making because multilateralism limits the room for manoeuvre due to the 
demands of alliance partners.61 However Cole brings the argument full circle when he explains 
that isolationism means not just unilateralism, but specifically non-interventionism, echoing 
the circumstances of a militarily weak eighteenth century America. Further, that isolationism is 
a child only of the twentieth century because eighteenth century America had close European 
economic, diplomatic and familial ties, and could therefore never be described as isolationist. 
However, since America was affected by European power politics, it could not ignore what was 
happening in Europe. 62  
                                                          
 
 
Johnson, an early twentieth century Governor of California, and United States Senator. However, Unger defines an internationalist 
foreign policy as one that requires strong nations to use their economic and military strength to promote the development of the 
weaker and less developed nations, see; Unger D. C., A Better Internationalism, (World Policy Journal, Duke University Press, Vol. 
29, No. 1, Spring 2012), pp. 101-110.  
59 Conn R. E. Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism and Europe, 1901-1950. (Greenwood Press: 
Connecticut, 1991). Walker explains that overseas competition was influential in an isolationist approach to policy making in 
circumstances when American leadership was not needed in the absence of international dangers. Hence, as the Cold War came 
to a conclusion and Congress questioned expenditure on overseas involvement, policy makers saw America as one of many, albeit 
preponderant,  international economic actors, but one which no longer needed to use force of arms to maintain peace, see; 
Walker M., New American Isolationism? The Mood of American Introspection and Fatigue with the Tiresome World Is Growing 
Fast, (International Journal, Sage Publications, Vol. 52, No. 3, Summer, 1997), pp. 391-410. For the idea that internationalism is 
linked to the decisions and education of a foreign policy elite, see; Busby J. W. and Monten J., Without Heirs? Assessing the Decline 
of Establishment Internationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy, (Perspectives on Politics, American Political Science Association, Vol. 6, No. 
3 (Sep., 2008),) pp. 451-472. See also Johnstone (2011) who explains that less has been done to create a reliable definition of what 
internationalism means, and often any involvement of America in the affairs of other nations is sufficient grounds for defining the 
policy to be internationalist. Johnstone points to Kuehl et. al. to explain that internationalism can be defined as a political 
internationalism or belief in international institutions, and a single international community with no borders. Other definitions 
refer to the spread of democracy and democratic values, see; Kuehl W., and Ostrower G., Internationalism, in Deconde A., Burns R. 
D., and Logevall F., (eds.), Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy, Second Edition, Volume 2, (Scribner: New York, 2002), p. 241, 
and p.254. 
60 Legro J. W., Whence American Internationalism, (International Organization, MIT Press, Vol. 54, No. 2, Spring, 2000)), pp. 253-
289.  
61 Ikenberry G. J., Is American Multilateralism in Decline?, (Perspectives on Politics, American Political Science Association, Vol. 1, 
No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 533-550. 
62 Cole W. S., United States Isolationism in the 1990s?, (International Journal, Sage Publications, , Vol. 48, No. 1, United States 
Foreign Policy: A New Isolationism?, Winter, 1992/1993), pp. 32-51.  
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Despite these arguments, it is safe to say that the term isolation itself was not used in the 
eighteenth century American foreign policy debate. However, isolation as an ideological 
concept was present, but it is not to be found in the Washingtonian avoidance of entangling 
alliances, with all that this implies. Instead it is located in two essentially theoretical 
arguments. Firstly, in the Jeffersonian discussion of a closed agricultural society, independent 
of all connections with the outside world.63 Secondly, in the arguments of the two blocs that 
respectively supported or opposed the draft Constitution of 1787, the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists. The Federalists sought centralisation of power to protect from foreign dangers and 
to provide the means to engage with the world on equal terms, that is, as a unified nation, as 
opposed to a loose confederation. The Anti-Federalists, however, regarded the threat of 
external dangers as exaggerated, and looked inwards to a stable state system, akin to the 
European equilibrium within which the states maintained independence from Congress. These 
ideas are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. At this juncture it is useful to summarise the 
Constitutional arguments. 
 
In essence, Anti-Federalists proposed an isolation from the affairs of Europe predicated on the 
one truism that America was free from foreign dangers to its union by virtue of distance. 
Indeed, that foreign dangers would only present in the American continent, if political power 
came to be centralised by Constitutional reform. The creation of an overly powerful federal 
government that took powers from the states, it was argued, and placed it in the hands of a 
powerful Executive, and a small number of Congressional representatives, would only create 
the circumstances for foreign political interference. This would happen because foreign agents 
would be tempted to encourage state faction, destabilisation of the union, and its division, by 
                                                          
 
 
63 This was not a theory that at all influenced foreign affairs nor that was even considered as a realistic proposition. The intention 
of bringing into this argument is to demonstrate that isolationist ideas in this period can only be found in this type of theoretical 
construct, the musings of thinkers such as Jefferson and of  some of the Anti-Federalist writers.   
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offering bribery to the Executive and Congressmen. Hence, the current state system, by 
maintaining a balance of power between the states because of the loose confederation of the 
Articles of Confederation, offered better protection. Simply, this was because state, unlike 
national, Congressmen were more likely to have sympathy for local concerns, be closer to the 
people, and less in thrall to either an all-powerful Executive or to foreign interests.  
 
The Anti-Federalist belief in separation from Europe and the benefits to national security 
found in the state system, contrasted with that of the Federalist desire to pursue a policy 
which inevitably involved participation in the balance.  
 
According to the Federalists, centralisation of power would provide two important elements, 
fundamental to the execution of such a policy. Firstly, reform would create a stronger union, 
freed from European intrigue, which threatened post-War state cohesion, a directly opposing 
view to that of the Anti- Federalists.64 State cohesion was at risk, because the individual 
American states saw no need for a constitutional arrangement stronger than the Articles, now 
that they had achieved their original War aim of maintaining state autonomy from Great 
Britain.65 Secondly, it would grant the Executive the power to protect the union from foreign 
dangers by removing certain powers from the states and placing them instead within a central 
government. Centralisation would strengthen the union by granting the power of taxation, 
maintenance of an army, command of the state militia (when called into the actual service of 
the United States), regulation of commerce and enforcement of treaties. A Congress able to 
remove the fault lines in the union of which foreign nations would seek to take advantage, 
would also be  better able to protect itself against foreign dangers.66  
                                                          
 
 
64 Lang D G. Foreign Policy in the Early Republic. (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1985). 
65 See for example; Barker C. A., The Background of the Revolution in Maryland, (Yale University Press: Yale, 1967), pp. 184-188. 
66 See for example; Marks (1997) 
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Federalists, anxious to ensure support for Constitutional reform, went to great lengths to warn 
that these foreign dangers existed, even if there was insufficient evidence of an inevitable 
interstate civil war. In the absence of actual conflict, dangers to the union from external 
menaces were explained in more abstract terms, by reference to antiquity, as those that afflict 
states that choose to maintain loose arrangements with each other, and are therefore 
vulnerable to foreign peril.67 Chapter Five explores these ideas in greater detail. 
The Analytical Balance of Power Framework  
In investigating the American national interest in 1952, Morgenthau, when discussing 
elements of national interest in the early founding period, provides support for the arguments 
presented above. Morgenthau explains that “the Founding Fathers had a clear conception of 
the relationship between the isolation of the United States from the affairs of Europe and an 
active foreign policy to be pursued by the United States.... isolation was not a gift of nature to 
be preserved by doing nothing. It was rather the result of an intelligent and deliberate foreign 
policy to be achieved by hard thinking and hard work”.68 Hence, if Americans were to achieve a 
detachment from Europe, avoidance of entanglement in the words of the Address, they had to 
adopt an overall schema for a post-War foreign policy, that involved, as a key element, a 
pragmatic engagement in the European equilibrium.       
         
The analytical framework of this thesis that describes the engrossment of this equilibrium 
thinking in the early American foreign policy debate, requires the definition of two theories of 
balance of power. One, a general theory, describes how member nations, such as France and 
                                                          
 
 
67 See; Wood G.S. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, (The University of North Carolina Press: North Carolina, 
1969), p. 6. For the problems of effectively extrapolating the experiences of antiquity in order to arrive at an acceptable 
formulation of Eighteenth Century (or indeed later) federalism, see Deudney (2007), p.5. These limitations, Deudney explains, 
arise because discussion in the literature of the experiences in antiquity on which international theory is based, arise from an 
investigation of only a small number of small polities and not a “random selection… from Western …historical experience”.  
68 Morgenthau H. J. What Is the National Interest of the United States? (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 282., July 1952), pp. 1-7 
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Britain, behaved relative to each other, the second, a theory of peripheral state involvement, 
describes the importance of smaller, emerging or states otherwise peripheral to the general 
equilibrium.69     
Balance of Power: A General Theory  
The general theory of balance of power explains how nations within the equilibrium relate to 
each other, and develop policies to maintain or, in the event of disruption, reinstate the 
equilibrium.70  
 
The eighteenth century Swiss political philosopher Emer de Vatel in his work, the Law of 
Nations, provides the foundation for balance thinking in Europe in this period.71 According to 
Vatel, central to the European system was national interest, and each nation made policy and 
formed alliances, that achieved its own national objectives.72 One implication of Vatel’s theory 
is that nations were not influenced by ideological considerations that conflicted with the hard 
goals of national interest.73 However, he explains that national aims were complemented by a 
                                                          
 
 
69 Hawthorn G. Thucydides on Politics. Back to the Present. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2014). The author describes a 
similar  situation when discussing the Greek states around 432 BC. Members of the Peloponnesian League shared the common 
interest within a balance of power system of protecting themselves against a strong Athens. Further, Hawthorn explains that a 
larger and more powerful state was incentivised to engage with smaller states to avoid the risk of losing influence over a period of 
time, if it failed to protect their interests. In other words that smaller states would seek protection from association with other 
participants.  
70 Chafetz et. al., (1999), provide a definition of balance of power as a system in which strong nations do not concert with other 
strong nations, but with smaller and weaker nations, because the aim is not to “maximise power”, but to ensure that the essential 
balance remains inviolate. However Inis explains that it is unclear in the definition of balance of power, how power is distributed 
between the participants, i.e. whether equally or unequally, and further that adherents to balance of power theory fail to explain 
why such systems have failed to restrain participants from waging war, see; Inis L. C., The Balance of Power Revisited, (Review of 
International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 15, No. 2, Special Issue on the Balance of Power, April 1989), pp. 77-85. In 
support of this latter point, see the explanation provided by Little, that a balance of power system encourages conflict, because of 
the emergence of a nation willing to exert itself, causing other participants to re-balance by waging war; Little R., Deconstructing 
the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought, (Review of International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 15, No. 2, 
Special Issue on the Balance of Power, April 1989), pp. 87-100. Further, for the point of view that power, by definition must be 
distributed unequally since otherwise equally powerful nations would constantly be at war see; Hjorth. R., Hedley Bull's Paradox of 
the Balance of Power: A Philosophical Inquiry, (Review of International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 33, No. 4., 
October 2007), pp. 597-613. Finally for a description of balance of power as either; (i) an “adversarial” system in which nations go 
to war to re-instate the equilibrium, or (ii) an “associational” system, in which nations cooperate to maintain stability, see; the 
review by van de Haar E., of Little R., The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Wiley for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944-, Vol. 84, No. 6, November 2008), pp. 
1303-1304.  
71 Haakonssen K. (ed.). The Law of Nations, Emer de Vattel, (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 2008). 
72 Ibid, Haakonssen (2008). p. 496. 
73 Chatterjee P. The Classical Balance of Power Theory, (Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 9 No. 1, 1972), pp. 51-61. The author gives 
a definition of balance of power politics by defining the key characteristics of nation-states who participate as “individual actors”, 
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desire, shared by all balance participants, to maintain the equilibrium.74 This is because it was 
in the interests of each balance participant to ensure that no one nation gained pre-eminence 
over any of the others since this could ultimately result in, what might be termed, hegemonic 
tyranny, an implication of Vatel’s reference to a desire to maintain “order and liberty” within 
the system.75 Risks of disequilibrium, and the threat of tyranny, could arise from the build-up 
of economic or military resources by one participant and the changed balance would then 
demand that rebalancing take place.76 Equilibrium could be reinstated in one of two ways. 
Firstly, by virtue of a concert of the remaining members of the system which might require a 
union of both stronger and peripheral nations, or secondly, a strong balance participant may 
build up its military and naval power in order to redress the disequilibrium.77 
Just as importantly, participants may unify as an opposing confederacy in anticipation of a 
threat and not only in the face it. Therefore, de Vatel explains, it is permissible to take 
precautions to protect against the emergence of a hegemon and indeed that it would be 
prudent to do so.78 One implication of de Vatel’s theory of pre-emption is therefore that, 
emerging, and hence, peripheral states, that in the future could be valuable members of a 
counter balancing concert, must either be embraced as current alliance partners or they must 
be contained to prevent them from allying with a future hegemon.79 It is this anticipatory view 
                                                          
 
 
the leaders of each state being concerned primarily with preserving and furthering their perceived national interests, and in which 
a single actor cannot dominate but a system which allows actors to increase their own capabilities within the system.  
74 In support, see; Stein A., The Balance of Power in International History. Theory and Reality, (Journal of Conflict Resolution, Centre 
for International Studies, Cornell University, Vol. 17. No. 1, March 1973).pp. 33-69. Stein describes the literature as referring to six 
propositions one of which describes the efforts of participants to balance a nation that threatens “preponderance”.  See also 
Maurseth (1964), pp. 120-136. Maurseth describes power within the balance in terms of a zero sum relationship. In other words, 
preponderance of a nation signals a reduction in the power of other nations, requiring the latter to re-balance the threatening 
power. See also Gulick (1955), who describes this re-balancing as being both the most effective response of threatened nations, 
and critical to the maintenance of stability in the system. However, Papayoanou P. A., Economic Interdependence and the Balance 
of Power, (International Studies Quarterly, Wiley, Vol. 41, No. 1. March 1997), pp. 113-140., explains that nations sometimes do 
not directly confront a threatening nation but pursue more passive measures whilst simultaneously pursuing military build-up. 
Papayoanou also explains that nations do not always pursue balancing strategies when they are economically interdependent on 
the threatening nation because they cannot leverage domestic resources in pursuit of hard balancing strategies.        
75 Haakonssen (2008). p. 496. 
76 However see, Maurseth (1964) who also describes the difficulties in trying to establish when a change in the balance has taken 
place because of the difficulty in making unbiased decisions. 
77 Hawthorn (2008). p. 27, and also p. 498., this is the reference to the creation of “confederacies”.  
78 Haakonssen (2008), p. 499. This is the reference to the maintenance of a “vigilance” to prevent being “lulled to sleep”.  
79 Haakonssen (2008), pp. 496-499. 
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of a possible disequilibrium that explains American involvement in the balance of power, as 
will be described in greater detail later.  
 
An alternative view put forward by Henry Kissinger, is that America has never in its history 
participated in the European equilibrium, because it has never been faced by a power in need 
of balancing, or that could balance it.80 In other words, America has never faced a nation that 
can sufficiently threaten it, and that when America did intervene in the two world wars it did 
so for reasons not involvement in the European equilibrium, but for reasons of ideology.81 This 
conclusion, however is puzzling from two points of view. Firstly, America as a confederation of 
former colonies at the start of the Revolution, was directly threatened by Great Britain leading 
ultimately to the 1778 alliance with France. Kissinger’s view may therefore rely on a definition 
of America as a Constitutional Republic as opposed to a loose collection of colonies, as it was 
at the start of the Revolution. Secondly, Kissinger’s conclusion relies on the general balance 
theory, and places little or no emphasis on the importance of peripheral nations, that is, 
America in the eighteenth century. Other political scientists argue that although it is puzzling 
that America has not previously been balanced this does not mean that it is either not in need 
of balancing, or that there is no nation or nations that can balance it. Hence, for example, 
modern China and Russia, have the ability to balance America, either in isolation or with 
others. Further, that it is only a question of time before a unipolar nation becomes too 
dangerous and must be brought back into some form of balance.82  
 
                                                          
 
 
80 Kissinger. H. Diplomacy. (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994) pp. 17–22, and p. 137.   
81 Quoted in; Kesler C. R., Saving the Revolution, The Federalist Papers and the American Founding, (The Free Press: New York, 
1987), p.83.   
82 This is argued in the introduction to; Ikenberry G. J. (ed.), America Unrivalled, The Future of the Balance of Power, (Cornell 
University Press: New York, 2002), pp. 4-6. For the inevitability of balancing see also in this volume the essay by Waltz K. N., 
Structural Realism after the Cold War.  
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Aside from the considerations described above of, what might be termed, full members of an 
equilibrium, emerging states can also threaten imbalance.  
Balance of Power: A Theory of Peripheral State Involvement  
An explanation of the balance of power theory as it applies to what might be termed smaller, 
peripheral, or emerging states is needed to fully describe the American situation in the 
eighteenth century.   
 
Balance of power theories deal with a wider definition than the general balance theory, and 
embrace emerging nation states. Alfred Vagts, starts from the convenient assumption of a 
nation state in isolation to describe its possible importance to balance participants. He explains 
that although any state isolated from balance of power politics may not see itself as in 
competition with others in the balance system, it may, because of competition amongst 
balance participants, be forced into the competition.83 Vagts does not explain the 
circumstances that might cause forcible entry other than to refer to the American experience 
at the outbreak of the Second World War. However, Stephen Walt (quoted in Levy et al) assists 
the argument, when he describes threats to the balance of power that arise both from 
perceptions of possible future actions and from ideologies that are considered dangerous.84 
Further, Levy et al support Vagts’ explanation, when they describe how some historians have 
accepted the notion that it is not necessarily the strongest power that threatens to upset the 
balance, but sometimes the “greatest threats to [the] interests [of the balance powers]” that is 
                                                          
 
 
83 Vagts A. The United States and the Balance of Power, (The Journal of Politics, Vol. 3. No. 4, November 1941). pp. 401–449. 
84 This more traditional theory of balancing is that expounded, according to Levy et al, by Waltz N.K. Theory of International 
Politics. (McGraw Hill: New York, 1979) and Walt S. M. Origins of Alliances (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1987). That the 
American Revolution, with its novel ideas of republican government were dangerous to monarchical states, was held true by 
Leopold von Ranke, the German historian, to the King of Bavaria, when in 1854, von Ranke explained that the creation of “a new 
republic based on the rights of the individual…introduced a new force into the world….up this point the conviction had prevailed in 
Europe that monarchy best served the interests of the nation”, quoted in; Adams W. P., The First American Constitutions, 
Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: New 
York, 2001), p. 128.    
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considered dangerous to the balance.85 This explanation does not, it is submitted, preclude 
risks to the balance from essentially peripheral states that arise from their availability as 
possible allies.   
 
Hence, the clearest demonstration of American involvement in the equilibrium is in the foreign 
policies of the European nations towards it. Policies represented stark illustrations of, what are 
called, soft and binding balancing strategies, adopted against emerging threats to the balance. 
Quoting works by Paul, Nexon explains that traditional hard balancing strategies, such as 
military buildup or alliance building, are usually adopted against an emerging hegemon (a 
current balance participant that increases its military might, for example) within a balance of 
power system, but that it is soft and binding balancing that is used to restrain or prevent 
disruption from a prospective entrant. Soft balancing, may involve divide and balance 
strategies in which the “balancer” concerns himself with trying to entice allies away from the 
prospective entrant or tries to create faction within the prospective entrant state in order to 
create instability. The intention being to create intrastate volatility leaving a state vulnerable 
to a divide et impera strategy. The fear of such an enterprise helps to explain Congressional 
concern with protecting the union from European intrigue. 86  
 
In the American experience, Spanish incentives to western settlers to entice them away from 
the union, British support of Indian tribes in the North as a buffer against American expansion, 
and encouragement of the Vermont territory to cede into the remnants of a British colonial 
system, are illustrations of divide and balance strategies. Indeed, Morgenthau confirms this 
assessment in his explanation of how divide and balance strategies apply equally well to 
                                                          
 
 
85 Levy J.S. and Thompson. W. R. Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe. 1495 –1999. (Security Studies, 14:1, 1-
33, 2005).  
86 Nexon. D. H. The Balance of Power in the Balance, (World Politics, Vol. 16. Issue 02, April 2009), pp. 330 -359. See also Paul T.V. 
Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy, (International Security, No. 1, Summer 2005). pp. 46–71. 
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strategies that create tensions intra-union (within the American union) as they do to 
prospective threatening alliances between competing nations within a balance of power 
system. In support, Morgenthau provides the illustration of the French strategy from the 
seventeenth century to World War II, to divide the German empire into small states, so as to 
prevent the creation of a cohesive union of them.87 
 
On the other hand, binding strategies attempt a more direct subservience of a prospective 
entrant by creating interdependencies with the aim of weakening an opponent’s ability to 
“pursue autonomous policies” that might be counter to the balancer’s interests.  Work by 
Schweller indicates that binding may be more relevant to later periods when there were more 
formal international institutions, into which powers could be bound, than in the eighteenth 
century. However, Schweller’s description of binding strategies as those that are aimed at 
bringing a power into the “established order”, with the aim (one of many) of “entangling the 
rising power in a web of policies”, is also helpful and it describes European strategies towards 
America.88 Hence, European inertia in adopting American ideas of free international trade and, 
for example, Britain’s policy of constraining post-War American shipping within the ideas of 
the pre-War Navigation Acts, are illustrations of binding strategies. In many ways, therefore, 
America was being enticed into the European balance.  
 
European powers in their preoccupation with America, were concerned not with traditional 
strategies of balancing against a currently observable threatening hegemonic power, the 
general theory explained above, but with the threat posed by an emerging American nation 
and its dangerous ideology; the peripheral state theory described here. Further, American 
                                                          
 
 
87 Morgenthau (1993). See in particular p. 194.  
88 Schweller R. L. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. (Princeton: New Jersey, 2008.) p.36.  
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continental, as opposed to European continental, hegemony threatened the Spanish colonies 
in the southwest, and the British Canadian relationship in the northwest as a result of 
Congressional plans to extend Republican government to the western settled territories.89 
Hence, Congress was brought into direct conflict with Britain’s plans to create disunion, and 
Spanish concerns to protect its North American colonies from American expansion. 
 
Therefore, before the War, American involvement in the balance can be understood from the 
perspective explained by the general theory outlined above. For France, an American alliance 
held out the hope of re-balancing against Britain. After the War, American involvement is 
described by the soft and the binding balancing strategies that mandated a policy of 
containment of American ideology and of American expansion. Fears of both free trade with 
its promise of creating economic interdependencies between nations, are ideological conflicts 
with European forms of monarchical and absolutist government.90  
 
The question however remains, does the above framework describe an American participation 
in the equilibrium? What is incomplete in this schema is the perspective of the peripheral 
state, and specifically whether it is true to describe it as a balance participant solely by virtue 
of it being the subject of a balancing strategy. In other words, can a peripheral state be 
described as participating in the general balance of power when it is being balanced? 
Alternatively, must the peripheral state be adopting its own balancing strategy vis a vis the 
general balance, in order to be properly described as participating? The question of whether or 
                                                          
 
 
89 Some historians take the view that the risk of a prospective American hegemony was recognised as early 1763, and that it is for 
this reason that the British government rejected out of hand the idea that there could be an “imperial legislature” in which there 
would be colonial representation because this would only create significant American power by uniting the colonies, see; 
Dickerson, O. M., The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution, (University of Philadelphia Press: Philadelphia, 1951), p. 55   
90 See Black (2004), and Black J, A System of Ambition, British Foreign Policy 1660 – 1793, (Longman: London, 2000) for discussions 
of foreign affairs within constitutional and absolutist monarchies.  However, for the view that George III rejected sectional political 
interest as the basis for foreign affairs in favour of an idea of national interest, see; Middlekauff, R., The Glorious Cause, The 
American Revolution, 1763-1789, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), p. 20. 
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not America participated in the balance is central to the internationalism argument of this 
thesis.  
 
An answer to the question of participation can be identified by adapting the aforementioned 
questions as two propositions. The first proposition postulates that it is sufficient only for a 
balance member to subject a peripheral state to a balancing strategy, for the latter to become 
a balance participant. If this is true, then the above analytical framework describes American 
participation. That is, the very existence of an American state with prospective or actual 
economic and military power, or conflicting ideologies, made it a nation peripheral, but salient 
to the equilibrium. Hence, one could, describe America as a passive participant.  
 
The second proposition, however would introduce the troublesome idea of materiality to the 
argument by tightening the condition that must be fulfilled if America is to be described as 
participating, by requiring that a peripheral state is only a participant if it specifically adopts its 
own balancing strategy. An analysis of the ideas that shaped American foreign affairs makes it 
axiomatic that it, as a peripheral state, small and emerging, and lacking substantive military or 
diplomatic power, adopted a policy stratagem that did just this. Applying the ballast of 
influence to balance rivalries in the national interest, it offered to alter the balance in favour of 
France or Britain. Whether or not, as a peripheral nation, its overtures succeeded is beside the 
point. What is important is that the offer was credible and this can be measured by the 
response of the British and the French. The Spanish control of navigation of the Mississippi 
River was to prevent American growth, as was the presence of British troops in the 
northwest.91 Congress’ attempts to limit the facility of European powers to influence the 
                                                          
 
 
91 David Ramsay’s Oration at Charleston, South Carolina, Bailyn B. (ed.). The Debate on the Constitution. Federalist and Anti-
Federalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification. Part Two. (Library of America: New York, 1993), pp. 
506-510. See also Maier. P. Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution. 1787-1788. (Simon and Schuster: New York, 2010). 
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separate states which could have led to the creation of separate confederacies within the 
union, was another. Hence, European powers were pre-occupied with America as an emerging 
and potentially powerful state, and American policy was to take advantage of this concern.  
The Historiography of Internationalism and Isolationism in Early American Foreign Affairs 
Theories that describe early American foreign affairs, put forward an alternative view to that 
described above. These theories include; Appleman-Williams W., From Colony to Empire: 
Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations (1952); Gilbert F., To the Farewell Address. 
Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (1961); Varg P., Foreign Polices of the Founding Fathers 
(1970); Marks III F., Independence on Trial. Foreign Affairs in the Making of the Constitution 
(1997); Onuf P. and Sadosky L.J. American Internationalism and the U.S.  Constitution (2005); 
Kagan R., Dangerous Nation, America and the World. 1600 to 1898; (2006) Graebner N. (et al.), 
Foreign Affairs and the Founding Fathers. From Confederation to Constitution. 1776 to 1787 
(2011); and Herring G., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (2011).92 
 
Whilst some historians have accepted the importance of balance of power to American 
statesmen such as Jefferson and Adams after 1789 (Graebner), these arguments place less 
emphasis on the balance of power, and hence internationalist, perspective presented here. 
Instead historians discuss the importance of the maintenance of the balance of power to 
American security. In other words, the hope and expectation that equilibrium members would 
be too preoccupied with their own rivalries to be concerned with America.  
 
                                                          
 
 
92 Williams (1952); Gilbert (1961); Varg P., Foreign Polices of the Founding Fathers, (Pelican, London, 1970); Marks (1997); Essay 
by Onuf. P. S. and Sadosky L. J. American Internationalism and the U.S. Constitution, in Merrill et. al. (2005); Kagan R. Dangerous 
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Founding Fathers. From Confederation to Constitution. 1776 to 1787, (Praeger: California, 2011), and; Herring (2011). 
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Otherwise, current theories describe the foreign policies adopted by early American 
statesmen, as representing five substantive courses of action. Firstly, there is the universalist 
description, or the idea that American foreign policy seeks to spread universally applicable, 
Revolutionary ideas of liberty and freedom (Varg, Marks, Kagan, and McDougall).93 
Universalism in foreign affairs in the period under review appears on first blush to be a 
misnomer given the military weakness of the early Republic. However, universalism implies 
both idealism and pragmatism. As an exemplar for the oppressed peoples of the world, but not 
necessarily as a nation willing or able to assert itself on their behalf, it is idealistic. 94 However, 
when used to justify expansion west on the grounds that Congress sought to spread American 
values by guaranteeing western territories a republican form of government, universalism is 
pragmatic.95 Alternatively, one might regard such a position as cynical in the sense of being a 
justification for westward expansion at the expense of the Indian tribes.  
 
Universalism has also been considered in more trade centric terms (Varg, Herring, Marks, 
Hendrickson). Hence, that trade was not just a goal of foreign affairs in the national interest of 
economic expansion, but that it contributed to the spread of republican ideas that emphasised 
economic interests above military objectives for their own sake. Therefore, Americans did not 
just wish to expand trade, they desired a commercial revolution that would encourage free 
trade, by creating free ports as an alternative to the prevailing form of state controlled 
                                                          
 
 
93 See for example Kaplan S. L., The Treaty of Alliance with France and American Isolationism, in Merrill D. et. al. (2009). Kagan 
(2006) describes the American Revolution as a universalist event, one in which liberal principles of free trade and representative 
government would be a beacon for the oppressed peoples of the world. Brands H.W., What America Owes the World, The Struggle 
for the Soul of Foreign Policy, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998), within the context of Washington’s Farewell 
Address, brings a different perspective to the argument that America represented the exemplar for the world. Brands argues that 
entanglement in the affairs of Europe would “corrupt the example” of a republican and free America. This is what Brands calls the 
exemplarist school, i.e. the example that American ideas of republican liberty set for the rest of the world which is essentially 
benign compared to Brands’ vindicationist school which requires the exertion of force in support of these American ideals.  
94 When America does not seek to spread its Revolutionary ideals, but instead becomes a nation “to whom all Nations will 
come…to whom the Remnants [sic] of all ruined people will fly ….for refuge”, see the essay; The Expanding Union, Onuf. P. S. in; 
Konig (1995), p. 57.     
95 See also; Kissinger, H., World Order, (Random House: London, 2015), p.6. The author describes American foreign policy in this 
period as being to promote Revolutionary values of liberty and republican government.  
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mercantilism.96 For Americans, free trade would not just deliver commercial benefits, it would 
create economic interdependence and therefore reduce the risk of international state 
conflict.97 In terms of foreign policy engagement, the revolution in international trade, would 
require active commercial treaty making, diplomatic engagement and ultimately the 
development of a navy to protect American interests (Onuf et al).98  
 
The American demand for luxury goods and need for overseas markets for agricultural and 
manufacturing surpluses, was to be served by an internationalist foreign policy which, 
according to Onuf et al, would not be theirs of right, but would require treaty making within a 
broad strategy of foreign engagement.99 Commercial engagement implied both the 
deployment of a navy to protect trade, and active European diplomacy, which required 
effective federal government to sustain diplomacy, restrain interstate competition, and 
remedy the failure of the states to comply with treaty commitments. Commercial agreements, 
did not, however, imply military treaty commitments. Hence, whilst foreign affairs were 
concerned with the development of commercial relationships, since it was the general belief, 
according to Varg, that all international relationships should be based on consent and trust, 
political alliances were to be avoided since they could ultimately require the deployment of 
military power. In any event, since foreign affairs, in the eighteenth century, served monarchs 
and princes and not the people, the people had more to gain from an international system that 
promoted free trade, as opposed to a mercantilist system which was the servant of the ruling 
                                                          
 
 
96 See Greene (1986), p.165. 
97 However, see Meyers M. (ed.), The Mind of the Founder, Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison, (Brandeis 
University Press: Hanover, 1973), p. 215., who argues that this doctrine of economic interdependence was more a pragmatic 
choice than it was an idealist one given the weakness of the American military, the absence of a navy, and an American dislike of 
standing armies. For an alternative perspective, that global interdependence has been “the dominant trend in human history” for 
at least five centuries, see; Deudney D. H., Bounding Power. Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village 
(Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 2007). P. 1.  
98 American interests against Barbary Pirate attack would not ultimately be protected by a navy until about 1794, see Puls M., 
Henry Knox, Visionary General of the American Revolution, (Palgrave: New York, 2008), p. 213.  
99 Essay by Onuf and Sadosky, in Merrill, et. al. (2005).    
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classes. Hence, according to Varg, the Founders desired replacement of the balance of power 
with economic interconnectedness, and Americans were prepared to trade their dislike of the 
centralised power that the Constitution would bring, for international trade, and the security 
that it would assure.100   
 
The second course of American foreign policy is the imperialism of territorial and trade 
expansion, but independent of ideological considerations, explained by McDougall by 
reference to  the contradictions inherent in universalism. According to McDougall, Alexander 
Hamilton in Federalist One had not only equated the dangers faced by the Republic in 1783, 
from the Spanish in the southwest and the Barbary Pirates in the Mediterranean, with security 
but more importantly as a constraint on a rapidly expanding future American empire.101 
Therefore, American security concerns were not only with the preservation of the union from 
external interference, but with concerns that they would act as a restraint on the ability of the 
union to expand beyond the original thirteen states. Hence, that the Constitution was needed 
to perfect the union in large part for the purposes of security, and to permit prosecution of an 
effective expansionist, foreign policy.102 Kagan supports this argument, but concludes that 
                                                          
 
 
100 Varg (1970). The right to the western lands was justified on a variety of different grounds including one that sought vindication 
from the failure of the Native American tribes to settle and organise the land which therefore left it free for imperial expansion, 
see Black J. Crisis of Empire, Britain and America in the Eighteenth Century, (Continuum UK: London, 2010), p. 11. However, 
Jennings F, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies, (W. W. 
Norton and Company: New York, 1984), p. 243, explains that the idea that the western lands were free for occupation, referred to 
as vacuum domicilium, as wrong on the grounds that, firstly the Indian tribes, if not conquerors, were certainly “preservers” of the 
land, and secondly because the western lands were ordered by successive British monarchs to be purchased from Indian tribes, 
who were hence by implication its legitimate “owners”.    
101 The colocation of the west with growth of the American economy is referred to as the “Frontier thesis”, after Turner F. J. who 
stated that “the advance of American settlement westward explains American development”, see Faragher J. M. (ed.), Rereading 
Frederick Jackson Turner, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998). See also, Nester W. R, The Frontier War for American 
Independence, (Stackploe, Pennsylvania, 2004), p. 342., who explains that American values of independency, and liberty were 
“partially forged on the anvil of frontier hardships”. See also, Bickford C. B. and Bowling K. R., Birth of the Nation, The First Federal 
Congress, 1789-1791, (Madison House: New York, 1989), p. 77. who explain that Franklin, Adams and Washington were all 
believers in the inevitable westward expansion of an American empire. This latter belief is reinforced in; Richter D. K., Trade, Land, 
Power, The Struggle for Eastern North America, (University of Pennsylvania Press: Pennsylvania, 2013), p.8., who quotes Theodore 
Roosevelt as explaining that the War for Independence was also a war for control of the west either by conflict or by treaty. See 
also; Sexton J., The Monroe Doctrine, Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America, (Hill and Wang: New York, 2011), pp.77., 
who describes the irony between America’s avowed denial of the imperial colonialism of the Europeans whilst promoting ideas of 
expansion westwards. See also, Stuart R. C., United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871, (The University of 
North Carolina Press: North Carolina, 1988), pp. xi-xiii. 
102 McDougall W.A. Promised Land, The American Encounter with the World Since 1776. Crusader State. (Houghton Mifflin 
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idealism was a driving force in foreign affairs since the colonists shared an Anglo-Saxon vision 
of themselves as bringing civilisation to the world, and hence their right to expand on the 
North American continent.103  
 
Thirdly, is the idea supported by Hendrickson, who unpicks the ideology of American trade 
explained by Herring and others, in order to identify the internationalist nature of foreign 
affairs as representing two facets. 104 Firstly, an attachment to neutrality as the basis for 
eliminating wars and secondly, a commitment to free trade, with the same objective. This then 
is an alternative view, that equates neutrality, not internationalism, with free trade as the 
basis of a more stable world.105   
 
Fourthly, for Bemis, American security was firmly anchored in the European balance of power, 
and the French alliance was made possible because of equilibrium considerations.106 The 
Founders, Graebner explains, established the framework of American foreign policy with the 
balance firmly in mind since, because it had the effect of “limiting the behaviour of the 
ambitious”, it acted in the interests of American security.107 Hence, for historians such as 
Herring, the balance operated so that America had little to fear from European nations, since 
an attack on America by any one nation would signal a change in the equilibrium, immediately 
provoking support for America from other balance participants. Kagan, however, regards the 
European balance of power as working directly against American expansionist plans after 
1763. Hence, for example, Edmund Burke, the Anglo Irish politician regarded French Canada as 
                                                          
 
 
103 Detweiler F.G. The Anglo-Saxon Myth in the United States, (American Sociological Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1938), pp. 183-
189. The author attributes this shared Anglo-Saxon vision to an inherited corpus of “political, legal, and intellectual” discourse and 
tradition brought to America by successive generations of English colonists. 
104 Herring (2011). 
105 Hendrickson (2009). 
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interest within the European balance of power by Bemis (1957). For Jefferson, sustaining the European balance of power was key 
to ensuring American security, see; Malone D., Jefferson the President, Second Term, 1805-1809, (Little Brown and Company: New 
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important to British interests as it would act as a constraint on American expansionism. 
Therefore there was a balance of power not only in Europe but on the North American 
continent, according to Burke.108 
 
The above descriptions of internationalism in foreign affairs as being rooted in territorial 
expansion are used by Kagan to dilute any thought of isolationism by rejecting the traditional 
view of it as located in the early seventeenth century Puritan New England colonies.109 Kagan 
dismisses the myth of an American shining city as a sanctuary from the religious oppression of 
the Old World on two grounds. Firstly, by describing Puritans as “global revolutionaries”, who 
used America as their base for a “counter offensive” aimed at reformation of the Scottish and 
English churches.110 In other words, as a launch pad for active involvement with the Old World. 
Secondly, by pointing out that the idealism that had brought the Puritans to America was 
swamped, by the turn of the seventeenth century, by evolving liberal societies that were 
preoccupied with material possessions, the foremost being the hunger for land.111 The middle 
and southern colonies, which had not originated in Puritan ideals, always had the 
straightforward objective of material gain from acquisition of land.112  
 
Whereas the above theories to some degree refer to balance of power considerations, none 
explore sufficiently the effect that equilibrium thinking had on early American statesmen at 
the forefront of shaping foreign policy. The creation of the American state by the 1776 
                                                          
 
 
108 This is quoted in Draper T. A Struggle for Power. The American Revolution, (Times Books: New York, 1996), pp.9 -10.   
109 This is the view attributed to, amongst others, Gilbert ( F. The Beginnings of American Foreign Policy: To the Farewell Address. 
(rev. ed.) (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1965). 
110 For example, according to Miller, the Puritan exodus to the New World represented “an organised task force….executing a flank 
attack on the corruptions of [English] Christendom”, see; Miller P. Errand into the Wilderness, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge 
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Declaration of Independence, which, according to Armitage, by proclamation, met the three 
conditions necessary for statehood, also created the circumstances for balance 
participation.113 The Declaration asserted an equality in status as a nation with other nations, 
an American willingness to abide by the rules of international society in terms of making war 
and peace, and a treaty making capacity and therefore a legitimacy in in international trade. 
Hence, Armitage believes that Europeans were caused to fear for their colonial possessions, 
which in turn created a danger to America that there could be a British French Spanish concert 
against its independence. It is submitted that Armitage’s explanation simply reinforces the idea 
that it was in American interests to engage European nations to prevent this threatening 
alignment by taking advantage of their balance rivalries.   
Contribution of this Thesis to the Literature 
This thesis offers an original contribution to the interpretation of early American foreign 
affairs, by building on the work of existing scholarship (including Kagan, Dangerous Nation and 
others referred to later).114 Firstly, it is argued that it is spurious to locate the origin of a 
twentieth century American isolationism in Washington’s Address. The identification of an 
early form of national interest of the union of the British American colonies at the outset of 
the Revolution, implies that an interpretation of an origin of American foreign engagement 
should begin much earlier than 1796. By tracing its evolution from colonial times, and by 
identifying the development of autonomous government in the colonies from the early to mid-
eighteenth century, this thesis explains how colonial shared interest came to be described as a 
pan-colonial interest, or an early American national interest.115 Collective interest, as national 
                                                          
 
 
113 Armitage (2007). However, see Kuethe A. F. and Andrien K. F., The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century, War and 
the Bourbon Reforms 1713-1796, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2014), p. 278, who explain that the French were 
motivated in encouraging the Spanish to strengthen their colonial system (the years from about 1765 were characterised by 
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interest with its roots in colonial self-determination, in which Lutz locates the origin of 
representative state government, was the aim of a much earlier American internationalist 
foreign policy.116   
 
It is important to dispel the notion that twentieth century isolationism was a child of the 
eighteenth century, because not do so would leave later isolationist policies with an 
undeserved ancestral legitimacy.117 Kaplan supports this proposition to a degree when he 
explains that the term isolationist is no older than the 1920s, and that the isolationism of early 
America was directly concerned with not joining any confederacies, even when these had the 
aim of free trade, and had nothing to do with European politics.118  This explanation of 
isolationism does not preclude the involvement of America in the balance of power, it simply 
confirms the aversion to political treaty making.    
 
Secondly, this thesis explains that post-War neutrality, the essential proxy for descriptions of 
isolationism, in its substance held a highly nuanced meaning for Americans. It decreed the 
blending of ideology and realism as the foundation for conducting foreign affairs. The ideology 
of no political connection was blended with pragmatic considerations of the national interest 
to produce a policy that implicitly supported participation in the balance of power.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis places balance of power thinking at the heart of American foreign policy 
making. The equilibrium was an important element of eighteenth century European politics, it 
is important therefore, to explain American involvement in it relative to the accepted 
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neutralist and isolationist interpretations of foreign affairs.119 The balance of power 
perspective of this thesis does not reject idealistic or pragmatic universalism but adopts it, by 
using it to define national interest, as an interest in commercial innovation, western 
expansion, and security. Universalism as an ideology that sought to spread American ideas of 
liberty and republican government, is however rejected on the grounds of military weakness.   
 
Fourthly, this thesis rejects the dismissal, by for example Dougherty and Hendrickson, of 
foreign affairs as only a catalyst for constitutional reform, i.e. as its casus, and, instead, 
explains constitutional reform as arising directly from the demands of an internationalist 
foreign policy, i.e. as its ratio essendi.120 Strong national government was required in the 
national interest, since, as Marks explains, domestic failures exacerbated external dangers 
thereby magnifying security concerns.121 Constitutional change therefore made for a more 
credible nation abroad.  
 
Finally, this thesis exposes the meaning of isolationist ideas as an argument between Federalist 
and Anti-Federalist. Whereas Federalists saw dangers to the union everywhere, Anti-
Federalists saw them only in Constitutional reform that, inter alia, centralised power, creating 
                                                          
 
 
119 Ideas of American isolationism and neutrality were, according to some historians, formed as early as the mid seventeenth 
century, and subsequently “crystallised” after the end of the Seven Years War after which the French left the North American 
continent and Americans came to realise that they had been simply used by, European powers, as participants in a wider struggle 
for dominance within the balance of power equilibrium, see; Adler S. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction, 
(Abelhard Schuman: New York, 1957). p. 10. The author also makes the rather peculiar assertion that the Declaration of 
Independence itself represented “an act of isolation, for it cut the umbilical cord with the mother country”. This is also in, Greene J. 
P. (ed.), The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution 1763-1789, (Harper and Row: New York, 1968), p. 314, essay by Kenyon 
C. M. Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old Fashioned Interpretation. Kenyon explains that far from 
creating the basis of an internationalist foreign policy, the Declaration of Independence caused Americans to look inwards at 
domestic affairs safe in the protection afforded by the national government of the Continental Congress, and isolated from 
external threats by geography and water. Other historians consider the Declaration to represent the precise opposite, that is 
signalling the creation of a nation willing, and now able to treat with other nations, see; Armitage (2007). For support that the 
Declaration was an internationalist act, see; Sadosky L. J., Revolutionary Negotiations, Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the 
Founding of America, (University of Virginia Press: Virginia, 2009), p.79., who describes independence as “American entry into the 
European centered [sic] diplomatic and commercial system”.    
120 The grounds upon which the Constitution actually obtains. 
121 However, see; essay by Kenyon C. M. Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old Fashioned 
Interpretation, in Greene (1968), p. 315, According to Kenyon, the minimum awareness of foreign dangers amongst Americans 
more generally, and the existence of faction prevented the emergence of a common interest, or national interest.   
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the circumstances for foreign intrigue. This is the major theme of Chapter Five and is exposed 
in the writings of the two blocs during the Constitutional ratification debates.   
Construction of the Thesis  
The argument of this thesis is made in four further major chapters.  
It is taken as axiomatic that the fundamental aim of foreign policy is the achievement of the 
national interest. Given that at the beginning of the Revolution there were a disparate set of 
thirteen colonies each with its own form of government and with a relationship primarily with 
London, it is important, when prescribing any explanatory description to the foreign policy of 
the early union, to ascertain if there was such an idea as national interest. It is submitted that, 
if there was such a thing as an early national interest, then three general requirements would 
need to have been met. Firstly, that there was an interest common to and shared by all of the 
colonies, and secondly, that achievement of this interest was delegated to a representative 
body. If there was no easily identifiable concept of a national interest of the thirteen colonies, 
it would be difficult to argue that they, as a unified body, adopted one foreign policy. Hence, 
thirdly that dissent in any and all of the colonies was silenced or compromised.       
 
Chapter Two explores the idea of a national interest at the outset of the Revolution, using 
these three conditions, in two second order questions. Firstly, since it has been argued that the 
complexion of early American foreign engagement was internationalist, what was the national 
interest that was the antecedent cause of this policy? Secondly, given the lack in 1774, of 
cohesion between the original colonies, how could this interest be described as national, and 
indeed, did national have meaning at the time? In other words, was there really a shared 
interest and to what extent could it have been described as an American national interest.   
 
This chapter explains that each colony had developed local government autonomous of Great 
Britain by the eve of the Revolution. Hence in 1774, as the colonies prepared to confront the 
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consequences of what are referred to as the Coercives, the legislative attacks on American 
freedoms, each had the same interest, and that was preserving the extant, de facto autonomy 
of government from Great Britain. This independence of government was located in the 
constitutional arrangements in each colony that had allowed local legislatures to assume a 
high degree of control over local affairs, a view supported by a recent study of the government 
of Virginia from 1600 to the present day.122 That constitutional arrangements are emblematic 
of the principle that local matters were to be determined locally, was made by de Vattel, who 
explained that constitutional arrangements are the “fundamental regulation that determines 
the manner in which the public authority is to be executed”.123 In other words, the public 
authority, being the local legislature in each colony, regulated the affairs of its citizens with a 
view to the general colonial welfare and to procure their obedience. These essentially 
independent states maintained ties of loyalty, trade and, at some level, a supervisory 
subservience, to London, but certainly not to each other nor to any overriding American 
authority. 
 
However, the effect of the Coercives was to cause a sudden change in the colonial relationship 
from one centred on London, to one based on an intercolonial acceptance of the interest that 
was common to them all, the maintenance of autonomy. The mechanism that facilitated the 
change was the creation of reliable lines of inter and intracolonial communication, through the 
development of Committees of Correspondence that suddenly began to spring up in each 
colony, and that took on extra-legal powers until they became the representative colonial 
                                                          
 
 
122 Tarter B. The Grandees of Government Origins and Persistence of Undemocratic Politics in Virginia. (University of Virginia Press: 
Virginia, 2013.). pp. 89 to 108. I am indebted to Brent Tarter, University of Virginia Library, for his explanations and discussion of 
this concept in his emails of 23rd and 24th April 2014 and for his reference to the 1933 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary (West 
Publishing Co: St Paul, Minnesota, 1933), the legal dictionary used as standard in the United States. The point made by the quote 
is that the nature of colonial government had been so engrained that this effective “grant” of government by the British 
authorities had become “beyond legal memory”. See also Beeman R. et al., (eds.), Beyond Confederation, Origins of the 
Constitution and American National Identity, (University of North Carolina Press: North Carolina, 1987), p. 29., in which the author 
points to the colonists understanding of a constitution as being “a written…. or an…unwritten…..design” for government.  
123 Haakonssen (2008). pp. 91 to 92. 
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body. The Committees were responsible for resolving the hitherto separate colonies into a 
single coherent voice, by authorising, at least initially, delegates to a Continental Congress, to 
insist on the single aim of returning the colonies to the status quo ante. This is the early and 
shared interest of the colonial union.124 Consensus was by no means universal, or arrived at by 
virtue of an immediate colonial unanimity. Chapter Two therefore explores the disagreement 
between two major factions, the radicals in support of a break with Britain and the 
conservatives, in favour of compromise, that required resolution before the First Continental 
Congress was able to fully articulate a shared interest. 
 
The conclusion of Chapter Two is that there was a shared colonial interest, sufficient to be 
described as a national interest, which was the raison d’etre for a balance of power based 
foreign policy that is described in Chapter Three. It is left to Chapter Four to explore further 
the idea of a post-War national interest which evolved into one that went beyond the desire to 
maintain an independence, to matters of security, economy, and territorial expansion.    
 
Chapter Three explains that internationalism in early American foreign policy through the lens 
of exploitation of balance of power rivalries, was shaped by men such Adams, Franklin, John 
Jay and Jefferson who were actively involved in foreign affairs. The union that emerged in 1774 
from the separate colonies lacked the military strength to win independence without foreign 
support, hence alliance building by participation in the balance of power, was at the core of 
American foreign policy. Given the always precarious nature of the War, American statesmen 
were more willing than in later years to make concessions that involved political alliances. This 
chapter, therefore, explores the work of American Commissioners to Europe in their efforts to 
                                                          
 
 
124 [ Amicus Republicae] Address to the Public. Containing Some Remarks on the Present Political State of the American Republicks 
[sic], etc. Exeter 1786, Hyndman C. S. and Lutz D. S. (eds.), American Political Writing During the Founding Era 1760-1805. Volume 
I. (Liberty press, Indianapolis, 1983). p.656.  
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secure the French alliance to support the War effort in terms of loans, materiel, and 
favourable trade agreements.  
 
The balance of power framework adopted in the analysis that underpins Chapter Three 
exposes the two central themes of the equilibrium argument of this thesis. Firstly, the 
exploitation of balance rivalries that for many years after the War had ended would continue 
to be a feature of policy making. The 1778 French alliance would take on importance just as 
great as it had during the War, if not greater as fears of either a Franco American or an Anglo 
American alignment were used in trade and territorial negotiations in Europe and on the North 
American continent. Secondly, the analysis exposes the importance of the early American 
union to the equilibrium as both a current participant, peripheral but important to the 
balance, and as a prospective hegemon. The Chapter describes the balancing and binding 
strategies adopted by the European powers to contain an independent America, and to 
prevent it becoming too strong.  
 
It is not suggested that the balancing and binding strategies were sufficient to restrain a post 
War American expansion, but the country was weakened after the War had ended. Hence, as 
described in Chapter Four, the ostensibly neutral American foreign policy adopted after the 
War had ended had at its root, the exploitation of rivalries by offering an American alignment. 
 
Chapter Four exposes the professed neutrality of foreign policy thinkers as more nuanced than 
a cursory definition of neutrality might suggest. It was only after the War had ended that it was 
possible for Americans, free of considerations of an existentialist threat, to contemplate that 
neutrality might allow a greater engagement with the world.  
 
 
 
 
51 
 
Hence, this Chapter explains that neutrality was defined on the basis of five basic precepts, the 
effect of which was to mandate active engagement with European nations. Firstly, that the no 
political connections ideology of the Model Treaty was to be paramount but that, secondly, 
this did not mean that America should become insular and inward looking. Thirdly, that these 
two conditions should be compromised if the national interest demanded. Fourthly that the 
very existence of American as an independent regional power threatened disequilibrium, and 
hence fifthly that geographic distance was not a protection. Given these basic conditions for an 
American foreign policy, the traditional definition of neutrality must be subjected to two 
provisos. Firstly, neutrality should be compromised from a view of it as a perfect impartiality, 
to one that allowed for leverage of the French alliance. Secondly, that military or other 
alliances where the national interest demanded it, should be considered a realistic foreign 
policy choice. This chapter explores these ideas within the context of the prevalent continental 
situation, viz, the presence of both Spain and Britain in the North American continent.   
 
Whereas this and preceding chapters have sought to dispel the notion of an American 
isolationism by arguing for its obverse, that is internationalism as an active participation in the 
balance of power, the argument is completed in Chapter Five by dismissing altogether the 
existence of ideas of isolationism in the eighteenth century foreign policy debate.  
 
As explained above, Chapter Five locates the meaning of isolationism, as it might have been 
understood in eighteenth century American foreign affairs, as representing the Jeffersonian 
ideal of a closed society, economically isolated from the rest of the world, reliant on its own 
agricultural output, and dependent on a basic manufacturing capability for the luxuries 
previously provided by British merchants. The chapter explains that European immigration and 
familial ties, trade connections and reliance on British credit, and the limits to economic 
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growth inherent in such societies, meant that the concept of the virtuous American farmer, 
growing sufficient only for domestic demand, never gained credibility as a policy choice.      
 
The second meaning of isolationism is to be located in the debates that took place between 
the Federalist and the Anti-Federalist blocs.125 If isolationism was to gain traction in the 
Constitutional  Republic, it would require the victory of the Anti-Federalist view of the 
American state system as being the guarantor of security from foreign interference in 
American politics, as against the Federalist argument that centralisation of power within the 
Executive and the Congress provided this safety.        
 
  
                                                          
 
 
125 The Federalists have been described as “conservative…[and] aristocratic”, and the Anti-Federalists as representing the 
“agrarian” interest, see; McGuire R. A., To Form a More Perfect Union, A New Economic Interpretation of the United States 
Constitution, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), p.15.   
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2. Chapter Two: National Interest on the Eve of the Revolution  
The Concept of National Interest 
Nye explains that there is no such thing as national interest because nations generally fail to 
achieve domestic agreement on what should be international objectives.126 Hence, he explains 
that in the absence of a public opinion that is fully engaged with foreign objectives, it is left to 
a policy elite and to factional groups to determine, by definition a limited view of interest. In 
modern terms, examples of this lack of consensus include: any relatively weak domestic 
support for the twenty first century goal of globalisation; the most effective approach to 
domestic terrorism, and; whether American values or interests should form the basis of policy.  
 
However, Morgenthau explains that national interest is founded in a pragmatic assessment of 
the international environment and, in particular, in the international competition for economic 
and military power and that it is this consideration that forms the basis of national interest, 
not, for example, ideology.127 Morgenthau explains that in the eighteenth century, the national 
interest of the United States, according to the Federalists was located in three areas. Firstly in 
protecting the republican experiment from foreign influence, secondly in maintaining an 
isolation by remaining neutral in the affairs of Europe, and thirdly in the balance of power for 
American security because nations concerned with their competitors within the balance would 
be unconcerned with America.128 This conception indicates that, although the national interest 
changes over time, the national interest of the United States falls into one of the three basic 
                                                          
 
 
126 Nye J. S., The American National Interest and Global Public Goods, (International Affairs, Wiley, (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78, No.2, April 2002), pp. 233-244. The intention here is to develop a framework using definitions 
of the national interest from the literature and applying them to the Eighteenth Century experience in the British American 
colonies.  
127 Morgenthau (1993). Osgood expands on this idea by explaining that the national interest was to be found in establishing the 
relative weight given by a nation, in its foreign affairs, to ideology and self-interest, see; Osgood R., Ideals and Self Interest in 
American Foreign Relations, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1953). 
128 Morgenthau (1952), pp. 1-7.  
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categories of; security, international trade, and the maintenance of international stability 
through, for example, supporting international institutions. It is the degree to which policy 
makers are concerned with these three issues that shapes its foreign policy.129    
 
This chapter explains that the early American national interest was firmly located in the 
competition between nations for power, both economic and military. Chapter Two explained 
that, for the colonies, the origin of national interest lay in their continuing struggle in 
maintaining government autonomous from British control.130 It was in the preservation of this 
independence of government in each of the colonies, that created the union, that led to the 
war with Britain, and, in pursuit of victory, that caused the union to adopt a foreign policy that 
mandated engagement with the European balance of power.131  
The Three Conditions for National Interest 
The early national interest is exposed by firstly identifying a common interest of the colonies, 
by establishing that a compromised view of it was delegated to a representative body, and by 
demonstrating that any dissent against the compromised view, was neutralised. These are the 
three conditions that had to be fulfilled for there to have been a national interest at this time 
and are developed below, and subsequently applied to the colonial situation from circa. 1774.  
  
                                                          
 
 
129 Nuechterlein D. E. United States National Interests in a Changing World, (University Press of Kentucky: Kentucky, 1973). 
130 For an explanation of this autonomous government as arising by virtue of distance which prevented “incorporation” into 
Parliamentary authority, see; Green J. P., The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2011), p. 74. For the idea that autonomy became more entrenched after the end of the Seven Years War, see; Green 
J.P. (ed.), Negotiated Authorities, Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History, (University Press of Virginia: Virginia, 
1994), pp.178-179. For the continuing conflict between Parliament and the desire of the assemblies for autonomy, see; Middleton 
R., Colonial America, A History, 1607-1760, (Blackwell: Oxford, 1992), p. 324. Self-government as the right of the original colonists 
had, according to Lutz, it’s origin not just in European constitutional tradition, but in colonial charters, compacts, traditions, 
agreements, ordinances and oaths, see; Lutz (1992). 
131 Essay by Morgan E. S. Colonial Ideas of Parliamentary Power, 1764-1766, in Greene (1968), p.153., explains this autonomy to 
have arisen in some parts of the thirteen colonies by 1765 as the 1763 Stamp Act had the effect of causing some colonies to 
regard themselves as totally autonomous of Britain and Parliament, albeit recognising the King as sovereign.  
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Interest  
The idea that interest is the object of foreign policy was given voice by Charles Evans Hughes, 
President Calvin Coolidge’s Secretary of State between 1921 and 1925. Hughes explained 
foreign affairs as being “practical conceptions of national interest arising from some immediate 
exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective”.132 In other words, engagement in 
foreign affairs involves the implementation of policy in the national interest, an interest which 
might be located in present day concerns, have its origin in the past, or both.133 The historian, 
Charles A. Beard, better known for his conception of the economic origin of the American 
Constitution, traces this view of national interest from the Founding Fathers to at least the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. Beard quotes Navy Admiral and historian, Alfred T. Mahan, 
to support Hughes’ view. According to Mahan, “self-interest is not only a legitimate but a 
fundamental cause for national policy”.134 Inherent in these related definitions are therefore 
two important ideas.  
 
Firstly, the inextricable link between foreign policies and national interest, which are 
associated such that the very raison d’être for the former as a strategy for foreign 
engagement, is the promotion and defence of the national interest, and that self-interest is a 
legitimate cause for engagement in foreign affairs. The word legitimate can have several 
connotations, but two stand out most vividly in the colonial history. There is legitimacy given 
by the acceptance of self-interest by a broad section of the political community in each colony, 
                                                          
 
 
132 Quoted in Beard A. C., The Idea of National Interest. (Macmillan Company: New York, 1934) 
133 The national interest is also the common interest, compromising all factional and minority concerns to the greater good, see; 
Grotius H. The Rights of War and Peace, (Elibron Classics: London, 2005), p. 285.  
134 Beard C. A.  An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. (The Free Press: London, 1986). For Mahan, the 
national interest was in strong overseas trade connections which had to be protected and promoted by a strong maritime 
presence, see; Rofe J.S., Under the Influence of Mahan, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and Their Understanding of American 
National Interest, (Diplomacy & Statecraft, December 2008, Vol. 19 Issue 4), pp.732-745. Beard is considered a controversial 
historian and thinker not least because of his conceptualisation of the origins of the American Constitution in the economic self-
interest of a merchant and land owning elite, as opposed to in the disinterested actions of a founding group dedicated to 
republican ideals of liberty, self-government and entrepreneurial advancement, see; McCorkle P., The Historian as Intellectual: 
Charles Beard and the Constitution Reconsidered, (The American Journal of Legal History, , Vol. 28, No. 4, October 1984), pp. 314-
363.      
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which is explored further below. There is also legitimacy by virtue of the law of nations, in 
other words, once the colonies had created a union and declared it sovereign, it had the same 
rights as any other nation to declare a national interest because there was a community with 
shared interests. Secondly, there is the identification of two possible roots of national interest. 
One which arises from immediate or topical concerns, such as a security imperative, and the 
second which has historical origins that manifest in the present day. The long experience of 
local government that the colonists were eager to defend in 1774, is an illustration of interest 
in an historical context. It was this interest in maintaining autonomy of government in each 
colony that was delegated to a representative Congress. 
 
The question that remains is whether the word national had meaning at this time given the 
separation of the colonies. Ultimately, interest could only be described as being nationally 
accepted when state sovereignty had been compromised by the Constitution. Before then, the 
essential value of the concept of national was in its demonstration of the degree to which all 
colonies were prepared to accept Congressional representation, and therefore to compromise 
their individual demands. This compromise was not accepted because it was for the common 
good i.e. in the national interest, but because it represented the only viable option for each 
colony, given the circumstances. The colonies were too weak to take on Great Britain 
individually, this is why they were, to a surprisingly high degree, prepared to accept joint 
representation of common grievances. Therefore, even if there was no nation as such, prima 
facie, a necessary condition for a national interest, there was pan-colonial consensus. Hence, it 
is accurate to think of national interest at this time as the shared interest.135 
                                                          
 
 
135 Kraus M., Intercolonial Aspects of American Culture on the Eve of the Revolution, With Special Reference to the Northern 
Towns, (Octagon: New York, 1972), p.14. Kraus helpfully explains that, for example, the colonies shared a “common fund of 
experiences”, in dealing with London. 
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Representation 
The political community of the British American colonies created by virtue of this shared 
interest, expressed its desires through a Continental Congress, the representative of their 
common voice.136 This was a surprising outcome because the colonies had been independent 
of each other, and whilst they had maintained a connection with London, there was very little 
in the way of a relationship between them.137 However, any intercolonial conflict that did exist 
was essentially benign, demonstrated by the way that boundary disputes were prosecuted, 
their cooperation in trade, and the innocuous nature of intercolonial prejudice.138  
 
For example, boundary disputes were postponed until after the end of the Revolutionary War, 
hence for example, the dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia to the area in what is 
present day Pittsburgh, was not finally resolved until 1780.139 Boundary disputes were 
generally confined to correspondence between state legislatures, and ultimately referred to 
the Privy Council, they did not extend to civil war.140 Indeed, boundary disputes did not affect 
                                                          
 
 
136 Burchill S., The National Interest in International Relations Theory (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2010) pp 11-29. See also, 
Morgan E.S., and Morgan H. M., The Stamp Act Crisis, Prologue to Revolution, (The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel 
Hill,1995), pp. 306-307., in which the authors locate the roots of national interest, as described above, with the 1763 Stamp Act 
Congress during which colonists came together to protest the placing of duty on all manner of items including newspapers. See 
also, Jilson C. and Wilson R. K., Congressional Dynamics, Structure, Coordination and Choice in the First American Congress, 1774-
1789, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1994), pp. 290-291, in which the authors explain this common interest as starting on 
the eve of the Revolution, and persisting until at least 1786, despite sectional differences based on state sovereignty (that is, 
states’ rights).   
137 The clearest explication of this point is made by Greene J. P. Peripheries and Centre. Constitutional Development in the 
Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States 1607-1788. (University of Georgia Press: Georgia, 1986). See also 
Black (2010), pp. 3 and 7., who explains the concentration of English power over the individual colonies in terms of a legal 
authority exercised by an imperial power, similar to that expressed by other European nations, one aspect of which was the 
control over colonial trade by use of legislation that restricted exports to British, that is not American, owned ships, by use of the 
Navigation Acts.   
138 Nevins A., The American States During and after the Revolution 1775 to 1789. (Augustus M Kelley: New York, 1969). pp 1, 2, 47, 
49. Nevis explains that the colonies were very different from each other in a variety of ways, for example, the structure and types 
of their government (Pennsylvania’s  legislature, for example, comprised only one chamber), in their demographic (the people of 
Massachusetts were more similar in racial terms than other colonies), in the degree of their patriot versus loyalist sentiment (New 
York comprised greater numbers of loyalists). Also in their desire to adopt the complaint against the British made by the other 
colonies (for example Georgia adopted the patriot cause much later and Nevis attributes this to a variety of factors, including the 
danger faced by the existence of 10,000 Indian tribesmen on its Western border which required British protection, and the 
bounties that the colony received from Great Britain for the production of silk and indigo). However, see Rakove (1979), p.142-
143., who explains that intercolonial conflict extended to conflicts between settlers, between Quakers and Connecticuters over 
the Wyoming Valley, and between militia of different colonies sent to support other colonies.  
139 See; Ward (1971), pp. 204-223., and also; Potter J. E. The Pennsylvania and Virginia Boundary Controversy, (The Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1914), pp. 411-412. Similar disputes were prosecuted between Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania concerning rights to the Wyoming Valley, see; Force Archive, Volume 1, pp. 261-262.  
140 Force Archive. Volume 1. pp. 251- 261. Perhaps not surprisingly, the inhabitants of the disputed areas also attempted to have 
their voice heard, attempting to choose one colonial master over another on grounds, for example, of the expensive cost of justice 
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cooperation in other areas especially when matters such as ownership of western lands or 
trade were concerned.141 The intercolonial trade conflicts that existed, were caused by tariff 
laws passed by those colonies that operated one of the seven major ports through which all 
trade passed.142 However, trade legislation also had the aim of protecting against inferior 
products from other colonies, protection of the currency from counterfeiters, and maintaining 
the quality of colonial produce. Virginia, for example, passed an act in October 1705 forbidding 
the importation of tobacco from Carolina “or parts without the Capes” so as to prevent 
“inconveniencies and disadvantages” to the Virginian trade.143  
 
However by 1778, when the conflict with Great Britain was underway, little encouragement 
was needed for the adoption of laws empowering a state Governor to provide assistance to 
                                                          
 
 
in Pennsylvania compared to that in Virginia; Force Archive, Volume 1, p. 276. A letter signed by 587 inhabitants settled on the 
Ohio River described the “mild, easy and equitable government of Virginia” compared to that of Pennsylvania.  
141 Instructions to James Tilgham et. al., Force Archive. Volume 1. p. 279. These gentlemen comprised a committee appointed by 
John Penn tasked with meeting Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, and negotiating rights to the Ohio territory with him. 
However, cooperation, did not extend to the adoption of intercolonial collaborative agenda when disputes were appealed to the 
Privy Council in London, see Varga N., Robert Charles. New York Agent, 1748-1770, (The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 
Vol. 18 No. 2, April 1961), pp. 211-235. One reason being for this with few, albeit significant exceptions, the colonies were unable 
to see a common interest in the initiatives addressed in London by the agents of other colonies and therefore little reason to 
adopt a coordinated response. Colonial agents would represent all manner of issues including boundary and land disputes, they 
would support or oppose legislation that affected the colonies and tried to promote, to avoid the Royal veto, laws passed in the 
colonies. Until about the middle of the 1750s, the agents did not act in concert and indeed often re-enacted intercolonial disputes 
in London see; Kammen M. G., A Rope of Sand. The Colonial Agents, British Politics and the American Revolution, (Cornell 
University Press: New York, 1968), p.13. A vivid illustration of the continuation of intercolonial conflict by proxy is that which led 
New York to reinvigorate its London agency, which until around 1748 had been allowed to lapse. Newly appointed agent, Robert 
Charles, was instructed by the New York legislature to oppose a law passed in New Jersey which purported to settle a boundary 
dispute, clearly in its own favour. This situation would not be unusual given the profile of many of the agents as indigenous 
Englishmen without colonial connections of business and family, see; Kaplan L. S. Colonies into Nation. American Diplomacy 1763-
1801. (The Macmillan Company: New York, 1972.) pp. 10-13. See also; Ward H. M., Unite or Die, Intercolony Relations, 1690-1763, 
(Kennikat Press: New York, 1971), p. 204. 
142 Nevins (1964), p. 556. The major dependencies included all imports into the lower south through Charleston, South Carolina 
and of the upper south through Baltimore and Philadelphia.  
143 Hening. Volume III. October 1705. p. 203. Reference to the word “Capes” is to Cape Charles and Cape Henry, the entry points 
into the Chesapeake Bay. Such legislative action continued as late as 1758 with the passage of an act imposing duties on liquor 
imported overland from Pennsylvania, see; Bacon’s Laws of Maryland, 1758 Session of Assembly. Volume 75, 
http://aomol.msa.maryland.gov/000001/000075/html/, p. 567. In the same year, a bill was passed by Maryland on 13th May, 
prohibiting the copying of the bills of credit of Virginia, Pennsylvania and New-York and using them as a means of payment in 
Maryland, see; Bacon’s Laws of Maryland, 1758 Session of Assembly. Volume 75, 
http://aomol.msa.maryland.gov/000001/000075/html/, p. 565. Further measures, albeit few, were in the nature of protective 
legislation. For example, the October 1765 law that prevented the “clandestine transportation of bad and unmerchantable [sic] 
tobacco from this colony to the provinces of North Carolina and Maryland”; based on a review of Hening Statutes at Large. See; 
Hening W. W. (ed.), Hening Statues at Large, Volume VIII, (Franklin Press: Virginia, 1819), Chapter. XVIII. An act for amending the 
Staple of Tobacco, and for preventing frauds in his majesty's customs. p. 69. By prohibiting the bulk sale of poor quality tobacco 
not only was the reputation of the Virginian trade protected, so too were neighbouring colonial consumers who might 
inadvertently purchase substandard goods and thereby suffer a financial loss. Between 1776 and 1781 there were few further 
laws respecting imposts not just because of the War, but also because of the general Anti-British feeling against this type of law, 
being similar to the series of Navigation Acts imposed by the British; Hill W., The First Stages of the Tariff Policy of the United 
States. (American Economic Association: Baltimore, 1893). pp. 39-41. 
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“sister” colonies, such as the Virginia law of October 1778 authorising the deployment of the 
militia in aid of South Carolina.144 Such cooperation existed despite pre-War discriminatory 
legislation that had attempted to restrict the spread and influence of Quakers, Catholics, and 
Jews.145 Prejudice on the grounds of religion had extended to the founding fathers, and for 
example, James Madison expressed his personal dislike of Quakers in 1775 when he 
complained that they “are the only people with us who refuse to accede to the Continental 
association…” 146 Similarly, Jefferson, on visiting the Maryland assembly building in 1766 
commented on the Speaker’s yellowing wig, comparing the session to a meeting of Virginian 
planters.147 Virginians generally regraded themselves as superior to other colonies by virtue of 
being the oldest and the largest of the colonies.148 Despite these differences, and although the 
colonies were not unified in any sense, they did share the common characteristic of local 
government autonomous of Britain.149 Hence, representation of the mutual interest through 
Congress was accepted by each colony because they were prepared to place their common 
interests ahead of their differences, and prepared for decisions, such as that to mobilise a 
Continental Army, to be binding on them all.150  
                                                          
 
 
144 Hening. Volume X. Chapter V. (Franklin Press, Virginia, 1819). An act to extend the powers of the Governour [sic] and Council. p. 
477.  
145 For example, laws were passed by Virginia in March 1756 prohibiting the free movement of papists and for them to be 
disarmed in order to prevent the rise of Catholicism in that colony, a concern which took great importance at the outbreak of the 
Seven Years War; Hening. Volume VII. Chapter IV, An Act for disarming Papists, and reputed Papists, refusing to take the oaths to 
the government. p. 35.   
146 William Bradford. Jr. Virginia, Orange County, January 20, 1775, Hunt G. (ed.). Writings of James Madison. Volume I. 1769-
1783. (Library of Liberty: New York, 1900). p. 28. Prejudice was not, however confined to religion, it extended to stereotypical 
views of the inhabitants of the different colonies. Washington, for example, regarded New Englanders as being an “exceedingly 
dirty and nasty people” referring also to accounts of their alleged cowardice in the field, and general unreliability. 
147 Meacham J., Thomas Jefferson. The Art of Power. (New York: Random House, 2012). p. 38. 
148 For example, the so called Frankford Advice given to a small group of patriots by the physician Benjamin Rush, shortly before 
the meeting of the First Continental Congress in September 1774, advised the Massachusetts contingent to be circumspect in the 
way that they approached the Congress. Philadelphian delegates were known to be against independence and the Virginians 
considered themselves the oldest and most populace of the colonies and in a position to therefore take the lead in the 
proceedings. The Massachusetts delegates were advised to stay in the background and allow the Virginians to suggest and develop 
any “bold measures”, see; ibid Meacham (2012), pp. 101-102. 
149 Bourke (2015), p. 457. Burke described this autonomy as having arisen by virtue of a tacit acceptance by colonists that were 
was a trade-off between liberty and commercial control, that is, the Americans had early accepted the British right to tax in 
exchange for letting them have their liberty in America.   
150 The creation of, and support for, a Continental Army in particular was important to the development of the national character 
of the union that was willing to fight for its belief in liberty, see; Royster C., A Revolutionary People at War, The Continental Army 
and American Character, 1775-1783, (The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1979), p.3.  According to Morgenthau, 
the common interest was the “surest of bonds between states”, in other words what concerned them all, bound them closer 
together than they were otherwise, quoted in; Gustafson L. S. (ed.), Thucydides’ Theory of International Relations, A Lasting 
Possession, (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 2000), p.240. 
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Important to the idea of there being this community, is that it had interests distinct from 
[other] foreign nations, and that these interests were articulated through Congressional 
leadership.151 The political community declared itself sovereign, and thereby created the 
circumstances in which a representative Congress claimed ownership of the national interest 
and created a foreign policy to prosecute it.152  
 
Beard explains that a representative body directs foreign policy in the national interest, as 
opposed to on any other ground, as a consequence of its locus as the agent of the people and 
not as a principal acting in its own right, a view he also attributes to Mahan.153 Inherent in this 
agency arrangement, is the idea that there had to be a compromise of the separate interests 
of the colonies in order to permit their coherent articulation into a set of common policy goals. 
Therefore, interest bound the government to the people, other than what Beard terms an 
insignificant minority. The representative body presented a united front, neutralising opposing 
political parties and blocs, in support of what emerged as a dominant view of interest. A single 
front was clearly a necessity, if diplomats were to be credible in international negotiations and 
not be constantly subject to the ridicule of foreign diplomats that they did not fully represent a 
nation. 
  
                                                          
 
 
151 Sharp J. R., American Politics in the Early Republic, The New Nation in Crisis, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1993), p. 19., 
explains that this interest was the core “principle” that all of the states had in common. Rakove (1979), p. 262, explains, however, 
that the fault lines in this community came to the fore as the War for Independence was coming to an end. Rakove explains that, 
whereas non-conciliation with Britain and military support from France was critical to the interest of all the states, i.e. in securing 
independence, discussions over the nature of what the peace terms would be, exposed sectional interests (for example, New 
England’s desire to protect its fishing rights set against the need of the south for a quick end to the war), hence national interest 
became harder to define as the War came to end. See also; Sharp J. R., American Politics in the Early Republic, The New Nation in 
Crisis, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1993), p. 19., in which the author describes interest as having as its focus, some 
“principle” that all of the states had in common.    
152 The framework for this analysis is based on Werner L., Ideology, Interests and Foreign Policy (International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 14 No 1, March 1970) pp. 1-31.  
153 Beard (1934). 
 
 
61 
 
Neutralisation of Dissent 
The idea of shared interest implies a high degree of unanimity of colonial inhabitants in the 
drive for independence that is clearly not the case given that up to a fifth of colonists are 
generally described as being loyalists, a greater number when compounded with those who 
wished for some sort of accommodation, for example, American representation in an Anglo 
American Parliament.154 For there to have been a legitimate delegation of responsibility for the 
national interest to Congress, minority descent had to be effectively silenced, such that the 
common interest of the colonies was free to be accepted as the shared goal of them all. It was 
resolution of the conflict between two competing groups, the radicals and the conservatives, 
that neutralised the dissent of the latter, creating the circumstances for a declaration of 
independence.155  
 
This chapter goes on to demonstrate that the three conditions for national interest described 
above had been met on the eve of the Revolution.  
The First Condition of National Interest: A Common Colonial Interest 
The autonomous government that each of the colonies wished to protect was generally 
established in the written precedent of the founding charters that provided for the formation 
of representative assemblies albeit subject to royal oversight.156 Whilst, for example, Spanish 
                                                          
 
 
154 Jasanoff Maya. Liberty’s Exiles. The Loss of America and the Remaking of the British Empire. (Harper Press: London, 2011). p 8. 
Jasanoff cites figures of between a fifth and a third of colonists as being loyal to King George III based on various sources including 
estimates given by John Adams in a letter written in 1815. The lower estimate is supported by Smith P. H.. The American Loyalists: 
Notes on their Organisation and Numerical Strength. William and Mary Quarterly. Third Series. Vol. XXV. 1968. pp 269-270. Smith 
quotes a figure of 19.8% of the white population as being loyal to the Crown. For a discussion of the motivations of loyalists, 
including to some extent Indian Tribes such as the Six Nations of the Iroquois, and their role in the Revolutionary War, see Moore 
(1984). Loyalty is attributed to a variety of factors such as “the natural condition” of British American colonists given their belief in 
their rights as Englishmen, their belief in the Crown as the “established authority”, and their desire to benefit from the security 
and opportunities afforded by membership of the British Empire.      
155 Thucydides explains that national interest is an aggregate of all sectional interests, and where there is a conflict between 
national and sectional, the former prevails, quoted in;  Clinton W.D., The Two Faces of National Interest, (Louisiana State University 
Press: Baton Rouge, 1994). 
156 It had been a fundamental precept of early colonisation that each traveller to the New World would have a say in the 
governance of the colony thus formed. See for example, Caffrey K. The Mayflower (Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 2014). p. 
45. See also, Mann C. C., 1493, How Europe’s Discovery of the America’s Revolutionised Trade, Ecology, and Life on Earth, (Grant: 
London, 2011), pp. 55. The author explains that, although funded privately, English settlement of the North American continent by 
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American colonisation is said to have generated great intellectual discussion, literature, and 
analysis on the “responsibility of one society to intervene in the internal affairs” of another, 
historians suggest that British colonisation of the North American continent did not generate 
much in the way of a national “debate about its legitimacy”.157 The difference is partly 
attributed to the growth of the Spanish university system which encouraged discussion and 
debate.158  
 
For British American colonies, the founding documents set out the most basic of the right of 
the settlers to govern themselves.159 Those for the 1609 Jamestown colony, illustrate the form 
of government that was to become common to other colonies.160 Both the companies 
established by the First Charter of Virginia, required that a local council be formed comprising 
thirteen individuals that would “govern and order all matters and causes, which shall arise, 
grow, or happen, to or within the same several colonies”.161 The council was to be supported 
                                                          
 
 
private companies, “strengthened” representation as a “check on rulers’ excesses”, see for example, the Charter of Georgia 1732 - 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga01.asp. The Georgia Charter of 1732, confers freedom on its inhabitants similar to 
those in earlier charters. It states that “the persons which shall happen to be born within the said province, and every of their 
children and posterity, shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities of free denizens and natural born subjects, 
within any of our dominions, to all intents and purposes, as if abiding and born within this our kingdom of Great-Britain, or any 
other of our dominions”.  See also, Lutz (1998), pp. xx.-xxi.     
157 English colonisation of America in the late sixteenth century, was influenced by European rivalry, and the desire for economic 
autonomy, i.e. economic self-reliance, given the European competition, see; Jernegan M. W., The American Colonies 1492-1750, 
(Frederick Ungar Publishing Co: New York, 1959), p. 16 – 19.   
158 Essay by Muldoon J. entitled Discovery Grant Charter Conquest or Purchase. John Adams on the Legal Basis for English 
Possession of North America, in; Tomlin C. L. and Mann B. H. (eds.), The Many Legalities of Early America. (University of North 
Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2001). p. 25.  
159 Rabushka A., Taxation in Colonial America (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 2008), p. 36. Rabushka states that “many of 
the provisions in the Virginia charters were standard in this [i.e. the 1620 Charter of New England] and subsequent royal charters” 
supporting this proposition at least for Royal charters. Although the literature generally accepts that the original charters were 
sometimes badly drafted, on the whole sufficient numbers of charters did confer the rights of Englishmen on the colonists that it 
may be generally accepted that the Crown did intend to confer this right on all British colonists. 
160 See for example, “10 December 1606, Orders for the Council of Virginia” in; Barbour P. L. (ed.), The Jamestown Voyages Under 
the First Charter, 1606-1609, Volume I, (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 45-54,.  
161 Charter of Virginia of 10th April 1606 - http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va01.asp. See also; Flynn C. A., American 
Constitutional Thought: Colonial Charters and Early State Constitutions (Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics Graduate Student 
Conference, Virginia, April 7, 2011), at http://www.virginia.edu/politics/system/files/Flynn.pdf.  Flynn, in describing Thomas 
Jefferson’s discussion of the constitution of Virginia in his Thirteenth Query, for example, describes how Jefferson locates the 
lineage of constitutional and therefore free thought in colonial Royal charters and not, for example, in the federal or state 
constitution. Flynn convincingly states that “these charters transcend ordinary law and elevate common statute to that of the 
fundamental and “unalienable.”  See also; the First Charter of Virginia; April 10, 1606, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va01.asp,  which states that “all and every Persons being our Subjects, which shall dwell 
and inhabit within every or any of the said several Colonies and Plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen to be 
born within any of the Limits and Precincts of the said several Colonies and Plantations, shall HAVE [sic] and enjoy all Liberties, 
Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, 
within this our Realm of England, or any other of our said Dominions”. 
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by a local assembly chosen from landowners which, with the Governor, represented the 
earliest form of colonial government.162 The colonist’s rights as an Englishman rooted his belief 
in participatory government.163 
 
Early charter governments expanded into more representative institutions on the basis of 
wider suffrage, and with greater powers.164 In Massachusetts, for example, the newly elected 
assembly was described as a reforming body prosecuting the Indian wars more efficiently and 
addressing governmental corruption.165 Expansion was led by the demands of ordinary 
colonists to have a greater say in the way that their lives were being governed. However, 
Parliament continued to attempt collective government of the New England colonies, including 
the use of the 1684 writ of quo warranto issued by King Charles II, which revoked the Royal 
charter granted to the Massachusetts Bay Company and appointed a Royal governor to 
oversee its transition to direct control by the Crown.166  
                                                          
 
 
162 Aubrey J., An Historical and Critical Essay on the Declaration of Independence, (TJ Griffiths Printer: New York, 1891). The 
thirteen colonies that came into existence at the time of America’s drive for independence were of three different types based on 
the type of governmental structure that the King sought to bestow on the founding individuals. Under the royal or provincial 
government, the authority of the Crown was delegated to a governor who was in turn supported by a council which constituted 
the governor’s cabinet. The governor was authorised to convene a local assembly comprised of individuals within a relatively 
narrow franchise – on the whole plantation owners and owners of the most perfect interest in land called socage i.e. freeholders. 
The proprietary governments conferred privileges on one or more Proprietaries. These Proprietaries were granted both rights in 
the soil and the right to govern. The Proprietaries assumed the role of the Crown and appointed a governor who was in turn 
supported by the council and local assembly. The Charter governments were corporations chartered by way of a grant from the 
Crown. The persons to whom the grants were made were also granted the right in the soil and the charter companies appointed 
the governor, council and local assemblies following elections and were therefore more democratic than the Royal governments.     
163 Maier P. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. (Bantam Classics: New York, 1998) p. 56. It 
is not entirely coincidental that the most significant expression of the colonists’ belief, the 1776 Declaration of Independence, 
specifically referred to the King’s arbitrary abolition of “the free system of English Laws” that the colonists saw as the guarantor of 
their freedoms. The fact that the rights of equality expounded by the Declaration were at odds with the treatment of say, slaves in 
American society was reconciled in the mind of Noah Webster, creator of the American Dictionary of the English Language in the 
mid eighteenth century. According to Webster, these relationships, between employed and employee, slave and slave owner, 
even child and parent were integral to a well ordered society and their removal by way of an interpretation of the Declaration that 
all men are created equal would simply “derange …the order of society”, see; Kendall J., The Forgotten Founding Father, Noah 
Webster’s Obsession and the Creation of an American Culture, (Berkley Books: New York, 2010), p. 367.       
164 Brown R. E., Democracy in Colonial Massachusetts, (The New England Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 3, September 1952), pp. 291-313. 
The open franchise referred to in the literature is some ways a misnomer. Brown explains for example that in the 1691 Charter of 
Massachusetts Bay    
the franchise was far from open requiring property ownership to the value of at least £40. However, he then goes on to illustrate 
the point that sufficient numbers of male residents qualified so as to permit fairly democratic and therefore representative 
democracy in this and therefore other colonies.  
165 Andrews C. M. The American Nation: A History Volume 5, Colonial Self Government. 1652-1689.  (Harper Brothers Publishers: 
New York and London, 1904). p. 42.  
166 Rabushka (2008) pp 89-125. The writ of quo warranto was a royal prerogative enshrined in English Law permitting the Monarch 
to forfeit any privilege, or office that had been “usurped” by a third party.   
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The use of the writ arose because of a badly drafted original Massachusetts Bay Company 
charter, failing as it did, to prevent the stockholders from relocating the place of business of 
the corporation from England to America. A lapse in drafting was taken by the colonists as 
specifically excluding the right of the British government to exercise powers over any colony 
established under the charter. Hence, a legal loop hole enabled the Puritan leadership to 
transform the colony into a “self-governing commonwealth” thereby purporting to take it out 
of the purview of Parliamentary control.167 A dispute in 1682 over which body, the general 
council or Parliament, had the power to enforce the Navigation Acts led the Crown to forfeit 
the charter and exercise more direct British control through the office of the newly appointed 
governor, Sir Edmund Andros. As will be described later, control over a governor did not assure 
control over colonial affairs.168 
 
Similarly, a bill introduced in 1701 in Parliament to render them void, recognised that 
proprietary and chartered corporations awarded the colonists an unacceptably high degree of 
autonomy and independence. The bill would assert the more direct control that would be 
afforded by royal government, causing the proprietaries to “forfeit their peculiar political 
privileges and turn over the administration of their colonies to royal governors”.169 The clear 
aim of preventing independent representative government from fully forming without the 
involvement of Parliament, was defeated as was a subsequent bill presented in 1706. Defeat 
was attributed to a combination of lobbying by William Penn, Proprietary of the Pennsylvania 
colony, with a vested interest in the land and Whig dissent based on ideological differences 
                                                          
 
 
167 Karr R. D., The Missing Clause: Myth and the Massachusetts Bay Charter of 1629, (The New England Quarterly, Vol. 77 No. 1, 
March 2004), pp. 89-107. Karr speculates in this paper whether there was a conspiracy of sorts, possibly involving a royal official, 
to provide this loop hole but fails to conclude on the evidence that this was actually the case.    
168 Dickerson O. M., American Colonial Government 1696-1765, A study of the British Board of Trade in its relation to the American 
Colonies, Political, Industrial, Administrative, (The Arthur H Clark Company: Ohio, 1912). According to Dickerson, the 
subcommittee of the Privy Council was responsible for colonial administration and took steps to exercise more direct control 
leading, as explained, to the forfeiture of the Massachusetts Bay Charter. The sub-committee of the Privy Council was replaced by 
Board of Trade on 3rd March 1696 which then took responsibility for all colonial matters until Independence.   
169 Olson A. G., William Penn, Parliament and Proprietary Government, (The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series Vol. 18 No. 2, 
April 1961), pp. 176-195. 
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with their royalist Tory opponents. Whig defence of colonial rights was also influenced by the 
fact that some were merchants with monopolies made lucrative under the mercantilist trading 
system and therefore did not wish to see the Royal Prerogative take precedence over 
commercial considerations. 170 It is ironic therefore that the very mercantilist system under 
which Britain sought to exercise its control over colonial trade contributed to the defeat of 
legislation which could have allowed Britain to take a tighter control over colonial government.  
 
While charters formed the essential foundation of autonomous government under which the 
colonial legislature was able to make laws independent of Parliamentary purview, autonomous 
government was shaped within the permissive environment of what, is commonly referred to 
as, the era of salutary neglect.171 During the early eighteenth century, colonial legislatures had 
become accustomed to a relationship with Britain which gave them wide latitude, founded in 
the imperial desire to minimise the risk of adversely affecting the economic benefits of the 
relationship. This laissez faire attitude to the colonies arose because in the early years of 
colonisation, they were not sufficiently economically valuable to warrant much attention from 
British policy makers. When the colonial economies did begin to generate an important two-
way trade with Great Britain, the emphasis was on control over this trade by way of the 
Navigation Acts, to which see further below, and not on oversight of their legislative actions. A 
relaxed approach to governance therefore allowed the colonies to develop their own assembly 
governments modelled on that of the British but to a large degree independent of it.  
 
                                                          
 
 
170 Ibid, Olson (1961). The Tories and the Whigs, the two main British political parties of the time, had opposing views on the right 
of the Crown to assert itself. The Tories, being on the whole landed gentry with close ties to the aristocracy, favoured defence of 
the royal prerogative whilst the Whigs, described as being “the party of chartered rights and freedom for dissent”, favoured far 
looser control of the colonies by Parliament.   
171 See also Moore (1984), p. 41. Moore explains that the writ of the Church of England, the official Church of Great Britain with 
the King at its head, failed to run in any of the thirteen colonies, and that this, together with the separate colonial press, existence 
of cultural and scientific societies, created a high degree of separation from Britain and therefore contributed to a lack of control 
by the latter.    
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Anglo Irish statesman and pro-American member of the Whig faction in the Commons, 
Edmund Burke’s appeal to the Commons many years later, offered an insight into how the 
policy of benign neglect had operated.172 Burke described the half a million pounds sterling of 
British trade exports in 1775 to the American continent “being equal to what this great 
commercial nation, England, carried on at the beginning of this century with the whole world”. 
Pointing out that the colonies now accounted for more than one third of the whole value of 
English exports, he explained that the value of the colonies as trading partners, and “the spirit 
.....[of their] enterprising employment”, was not unconnected to loose British government. 
Burke concluded that “………... I know that the Colonies ………………. are not squeezed into this 
happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious government, but ... through a wise 
and salutary neglect”.173 This situation, he explained as the Seven Years war came to an end, 
should be allowed to continue by way of a compromise between the colonial desire for 
continued direct representation in decisions concerning their affairs and the British need for 
revenue.174  
 
Eighteenth century mercantile policies therefore habituated the colonists into expecting little 
governmental interference from Britain, and contributed to a shift in power away from Britain 
to colonial assemblies.175 Since Britain sought to promote economic growth through 
governmental control over commercial transactions with its colonies, legislation to manage 
their internal affairs was not a priority, leaving scope in law making to the local assemblies.176 
An analysis of the 1752 session of the Virginia House of Burgesses distinctly illustrates the 
                                                          
 
 
172 Henretta (1972), p. 381  
173 Burke E. Speeches and Letters on American Affairs. (J.M. Dent & Sons: London, Reprint 1961). p. 88. 
174 Dowell S. (ed.), A History of Taxes in England: From the Earliest Times to the Year 1885. Vol 2. Taxation from the Civil War to the 
Present Day. Second Edition. (Longmans Green and Company: London,1888). p.453. The cost of the Seven Years’ war was put at 
£82.6m which added £59.6m to the national debt.  
175 Appleby J. O., Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England, (Figueroa Press: New Jersey, 1978), pp 99. 
176 Pincus S., Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire and the Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries, (The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series Vol. 69 No. 1, January 2012). pp.3– 35. Although the colonies 
played an important role within the mercantile system, Britain “expected the colonists to be self-supporting” a consequence of 
which was that the interests of the colonies were seen to be subordinate to those of Britain. 
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degree of legislative independence that was therefore achieved. Throughout the session, the 
Assembly’s resolutions were in the nature of decisions governing all aspects of colonial life.177 
The settlement of land disputes, the passage of legislation concerning the building of bridges, 
and laws to determine the correct measure by which to record imported Madeira wine. These 
legislative initiatives point to both the creation and regulation, of an order suitable to colonial 
economic conditions.178 
 
The laissez faire approach to control of the colonial legislature described by Burke, can be 
illustrated by reference to important components of it, namely, the colonial refusal to accept 
the feudal quitrents system as a mechanism for restricting land rights, and the ineffectiveness 
of the Board of Trade.  
The Quitrent as a Feudal System of Control 
The Crown’s control over the land by requiring the occupier to pay a quitrent, had been 
enshrined in founding charters to ensure that Britain would reap cash benefits from its 
colonies.179 It operated by commuting into a periodic payment, English medieval feudal 
obligations on occupants of land.180 Payment of the quitrent was to acknowledge the King’s 
sole right of ownership of the land, an inferior title in which was transferred to the payer. 
Responsibility to pay the quitrent, enabled successive monarchs that had granted colonial 
charters, to export an ancient institution of land ownership directly into colonial America, 
                                                          
 
 
177 McIlwaine H. R. (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia 1752-1755, 1756-1758. (Virginia Council, Virginia, 1909). 
pp.37-97 
178 Giesecke A. A. American Commercial Legislation Before 1789. (D. Appleton and Company: New York, 1910). pp 74-76.  The 
measure pertaining wine in particular is an example of the need to “raise or preserve the reputation of the commodities in the 
foreign market” and is an example of the Inspection Laws passed by the legislature and therefore of the economic imperative of 
this colony.   
179 See for example, the Charter of Maryland 1632 – see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma01.asp.  
180 See Grob G. N. and Billias G. A. (eds.), Interpretations of American History, Patterns and Perspectives, Volume I to 1887, 
(Macmillan: New York, 1992), p. 13., for an explanation of the rejection of feudalism from colonial times.   
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allowing them to retain superior rights in the land.181 The system failed in America because the 
colonists refused to accept that they should be forced to account for land that they themselves 
had worked and taken the risks in settling.182 Hence, by the commencement of the Revolution, 
of the total rent roll due from all of the colonies, only around half had been collected in cash.  
 
A comprehensive study of the operation of the quitrent system in the American colonies by 
historian Beverley Bond, explains that “the attempt to enforce the quit-rents, in face of the 
local opposition to such external exploitation, was really an important phase of the larger 
question of the extent to which British control might be carried, in opposition to the forces that 
favoured the development of local self-dependence.” 183 Hence, the failed quitrent system was 
only one element in a wider resistance to outside superintendence. Another aspect was a 
failure of British policy which placed emphasis on trade at the expense of governance.    
The Board of Trade as an Instrument of Colonial Government  
American trade was important to Great Britain to ensure a favourable balance of payments 
with which to finance the importation of manufactured goods.184 The massive increase in 
international trade and wealth in the first half of the eighteenth century, caused by huge 
population increases, only made this objective more compelling.185 
                                                          
 
 
181 The charters do not always explicitly refer to quitrents but rather to the “power and authority” to “receive, enjoy and to have” 
the rents. For example, see The Charter of New England 1620 – http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mass01.asp.  
182 See Burstein A. and Isenberg N., Madison and Jefferson, (Random House: New York 2013), p. 30, in which the authors argue 
that the “conquerors”, i.e. the colonists, obtained ownership rights in the land. 
183 Bond B.W., The Quitrent System in the American Colonies, (Yale University Press: Connecticut, 1918)  
184 Breen T.H. The Marketplace of Revolution. How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence. (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2004), pp 61, 97, 117. Breen explains that by 1773 the colonies were purchasing around 26% of all manufactured goods 
produced in Great Britain. This huge dependence on British manufactured goods placed a high burden on colonists because the 
value of this demand was often not matched by the value of demand for American goods and raw materials causing a chronic 
imbalance of payments. British merchants often extended large lines of credit to their important American clients in order to 
permit the trade to continue. For the importance of credit to the American trade, see; Mann B. H., Republic of Debtors, Bankruptcy 
in the Age of American Independence, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass.,2002), pp. 35-36. 
185 Galenson D. W. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. Volume 1. The Colonial Era. Chapter 4: The Settlement 
and Growth of the Colonies: Population, Labor, and Economic Development. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996.), p 
190. Galenson refers to studies comparing per capita wealth in Maryland in 1700 with that in the southern colonies in 1774. 
Adjusted real “wealth per wealth holder” is seen to be 49.8% higher. Part of the increase may be explained by the increase in 
import of slaves during the eighteenth century which would have led to an increase in wealth but, clearly, not wealth holders.   
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British trade policy in the eighteenth century was very firmly rooted in the ideas of 
mercantilism and the accumulation of specie.186 Typical of European economic policy, the 
value of commerce dictated tight governmental control over the domestic economy and of 
colonial trade, and there was a strong link between political and economic power.187 An 
increase in the colonial trade was helped in no small part by the growth of British 
manufacturing which required outlets in overseas markets.188 Hence, control of the colonies 
became less important than was maximising their commercial value, a policy change that 
occurred in 1696, when responsibility for colonial possessions was moved from the Privy 
Council to the Board of Trade.189 The Board’s founding documents made no direct reference to 
governance of the colonies, but instead gave it the responsibility of maximising the acquisition 
of raw materials and of encouraging the export of British manufactured goods.   
 
The historian Oliver Morton Dickerson in a comprehensive study of the Board explains, 
referring to the debates that took place in the House of Commons during its formation, that 
“the whole question of proper government for the colonies was considered a matter of minor 
importance that alone would not have precipitated the discussion in the House of Commons”. 
                                                          
 
 
186 See Barth J., Reconstructing Mercantilism: Consensus and Conflict in British Imperial Economy in the Seventeenth Century and 
Eighteenth Century, (William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 73, No. 2, April 2016). pp. 257 – 290.   
187 Gilbert F., The English Background of American Isolationism in the Eighteenth Century, (The William and Mary Quarterly, Third 
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The government of the colonies was not the principal function of the new organ of central 
control, “the most important duty of the Board was to make the colonies commercially 
profitable to the mother country”.190 In other words, commerce took priority over 
superintendence, a policy that was supported by the lobbying of British merchants and their 
desire for the American market for British manufactured goods.191 Hence, while the colonies as 
markets for goods increased in importance, it was their trade that was being controlled, not 
their government. Whilst mercantilist thinking dictated strong governance as the basis for 
achievement of commercial aims, British policy had turned this idea on its head.192  
 
Therefore, ironically what created the permissive environment for expansion of colonial 
representative government, was a British policy that emphasised the benefits of commerce.193 
To underpin this conclusion, British policy is regarded as having been reactive to developments 
such as the demand for tobacco, or when colonies took on a strategic importance beyond their 
economic value.194 Such a situation developed with the Dutch pre-eminence in the 
international trade and their attempts at dominance of the sea that led to passage of the 1651 
Navigation Act, requiring colonial goods to be sent to British ports in British owned ships.195  
                                                          
 
 
190 Dickerson O. M., American Colonial Government 1696-1765, A study of the British Board of Trade in its relation to the American 
Colonies, Political, Industrial, Administrative. (The Arthur H Clark Company: Ohio, 1912) 
191 Ibid, Dickerson (1912), p. 301. Policy development based on the common interest of the Crown and the merchant classes, is 
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That the Navigation Acts acted as mechanisms of control and influence over trade was clear 
from the comments of the Speaker of the House of Commons when presenting the 1660 
Navigation Bill to the King.196 The Speaker explained that the act; “will enable your Majesty to 
give the law to foreign princes abroad….[and]..enlarge your Majesty's dominions”.197 Thus the 
aim was to control trade to ensure that the British writ wherever that trade was carried on. It 
was Lord North, British Prime Minister from 1770 to 1782, who later recognised the 
unintended consequences of this policy and how, “this limited view gave rise to commercial 
restrictions which provided a perpetual cause of irritation and dissension” between the 
colonies and Britain. In other words, that the colonists wanted not just too govern themselves, 
but to control their own trade with Europe.198  
The Expansion of Representative Assembly  
Against the backdrop of a colonial refusal to recognise land restrictions, a loose control of 
them by the Board of Trade, and because of their benign neglect, the colonies were able to 
expand representative assembly.199 Expansion of local power depended on resolving the 
conflict of interest between the colonial Governor’s duty to the Crown and his duty to the 
colonies, and secondly settlement of a civil list.200  
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The Governor represented the Royal power by proxy, and the laws of the colony were to be 
subject to veto by him, and approval by Parliament. 201 Between 1696 and 1776, more than 
four hundred laws were vetoed, primarily because they purported to take away the Royal 
prerogative. Amounting to less than one law per colony per annum, demonstrates how local, 
law making had become.202 Illustrative of the primary cause of vetoes is Governor Gabriel 
Johnston's request in October 1736 to repeal the North Carolina Biennial Act of 1715, which 
was deemed unacceptable because of its provision for biennial meetings, and hence to limit 
the Governor’s power to prorogue the assembly as he saw fit.203  
 
Similarly, the Maryland Legislative Assembly proposed a bill in 1639 to expand its power 
similar to that of the House of Commons but it which failed to pass over the veto of the 
Governor. However, around 1640, based on continued attempts at encroachments by the 
Assembly, a general agreement was reached between Governor and Assembly to accept all 
bills unless specifically objectionable.204 Assembly government also flourished in colonies in 
which there was no original founding charter due to the lobbying by locals of the Crown, such 
as in the case of New York. Taken over from Dutch control in 1664, Governor Edmund Andros 
in 1674 firstly refused the request on the basis that it would “prove dangerous …………………… 
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and….disturb the peace of the province”. 205 The Duke capitulated in the spring of 1682 
providing for an assembly, subject to the veto and prorogation power of the Governor.  
 
Secondly, tensions between colony and Parliament are apparent in the latter’s attempts to 
settle a civil list, similar to that established in Britain after the end of the 1688 Glorious 
Revolution. An important part of the Parliamentary assumption of the public finance, it was 
seen by the British therefore as simply the appropriate function of a self-funding colony, and 
expected that appropriations would be made to create a permanent civil list to meet the 
salaries of governors and other royal officers. The individual colonies however reacted in 
contrary ways illustrating the underlying struggle for power. The four southern colonies made 
limited gains in making governors dependent upon the assembly for their salaries in order 
better to control them. They however resisted attempts to make available a permanent 
revenue to meet the cost for fear of emboldening the governor who, unconcerned for his 
income, would fail to support assembly initiatives.206 In other colonies, assemblies refused 
outright to accept responsibility for meeting the costs of unwanted and deemed unnecessary 
royal officers. An interest in maintaining peace in the colonies, and an unwillingness to commit 
British troops to compel compliance, handed the colonies a tacit victory when the Board of 
Trade refused to refer a failure to take responsibility for the salary of Governor Shute of 
Massachusetts Bay, to Parliament.207 Customs officers responsible for collection of import 
duties, however were to be paid by Parliament, emphasising the importance of trade over 
governance.208  
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Ultimately therefore the settlement of and responsibility for a civil list is not the issue, but it is 
rather the degree to which the local assemblies were to use the matter as the basis for a 
power struggle with the Board. The primacy that arose in the colonial assemblies by virtue of 
their passing laws that governed the lives of inhabitants and in the ongoing and largely 
successful tug of war with the British ensured their place as the “predominant political 
authority”.209 The demand for taxation receipts was however too strong given the huge budget 
deficits left after the Seven Years War and this single focus of British policy brought into sharp 
relief problems of government of the colonies as a whole that had hitherto been allowed, as a 
result of casual governance, to go unresolved.210 This is addressed under the second condition 
of national interest below. 
The Development of Colonial Autonomy  
Two counters can however be made to the above argument that colonial legislative 
independence had been achieved. Firstly, since many of the decisions of the assembly were 
juridical in nature, it is possible to view their actions as a whole as being in the nature of a 
judicial authority as opposed to a self-determining power that “would shape the future” of the 
colonies, hence distinguishing colonial government from Parliamentary government.211 
However, this view understates the true nature of colonial decision making since it disguises 
the fact that ensuring justice amongst inhabitants is a natural consequence of government. 
The logic of Emer de Vattel explains and supports this view. Justice, in de Vattel’s view, is a 
principal duty of a nation and “the nation would therefore neglect her duty to herself and 
deceive the individuals if she did not seriously endeavour to make the strictest justice 
prevail”.212 This is not to suggest that a colony was in any sense equivalent to a nation, but 
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rather to say that, like a national government, the legislative assemblies played a dual role, 
both as judiciary and a power that moulded colonial society.  
 
However, the existence of Parliament as a separate, external government, also willing and able 
to exert itself as a shaping power does complicate this position. Therefore, the second 
argument against colonial self-determination is that the power to shape the colonies as 
separate entities and as a whole, actually resided in Parliament. 
 
Whilst it is true that laws could also originate in the colonial governor as the representative of 
Parliament, and that legislation passed in the assemblies was subject to his veto, for pragmatic 
reasons it was perfectly logical for the assemblies to be permitted the latitude to make wide 
ranging decisions. The Virginia General Assembly as early as 1619, for example, resolved that a 
message be issued to the Crown pleading for laws passed in the colony to be allowed to stand. 
A local assembly had to be given the right to legislate without the fear of being overruled, for 
the simple reason that “otherwise this people would in short time grow so insolent as they 
would shake off all government and there would be no living among them”.213 In a time when 
communication between America and London could take several weeks or months, it was not 
only impractical to adopt measures which were essentially interim and subject to veto. 
Credibility of the whole assembly as an authority would be in question if citizens felt that 
legislative acts were only advisory until ratified if at all, sometime in the future by Parliament. 
 
Maintenance of local legislative integrity was clearly important if the local population was to 
accept decisions made by the assembly. Assemblies were therefore concerned to ensure that 
their assumption of power remained inviolate even as against protests from their own citizens.  
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An illustration is provided by the pyrrhic victory of the Virginian clergy in its struggle against 
the Twopenny Act of 1758 which limited salaries and was ultimately appealed to the Privy 
Council in England.214 The Assembly refused to accept the ruling leaving the plaintiffs with the 
option only of issuing an unsuccessful suit in Virginia.215  
 
Self-determination therefore sprang from failures in British policy towards its colonies due to 
an over emphasis on the control of colonial trade. An absence of a responsibility for the 
management of the minutiae of colonial existence may also be located in the original British 
settlements of the early seventeenth century. Unlike say Spanish settlers in Central and South 
America who encountered more organised indigenous populations that necessitated formal 
institutions of control, the eastern seaboard of America was populated with a much more 
fragmented native population obviating the need for the implementation of formal control 
structures.216 Either way, colonists had become habituated to conclude that membership of a 
British empire did not involve any great interference in their internal affairs but only in 
management of their external commerce. In any case, international commerce benefited 
colonial economies by providing an organised market for their raw materials, and currency 
with which to purchase British manufactured goods.  
 
This focus on commerce over governance established the groundwork of resistance to any 
future attempt at meddling in internal colonial affairs. Fortified by a decades long struggle with 
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the British Board of Trade, the principle that local matters were to be determined locally was 
well established by 1774.  
The Second Condition of National Interest: Representation 
The Catalyst for Action 
It was passage of the so called 1774 Coercive legislation aimed at reining in the excesses 
primarily of the Massachusetts Bay colony, that created the circumstances for greater colonial 
cohesion and convinced a vocal minority in each colony that action had to be taken to protect 
autonomous government. Central to effective intercolonial cooperation was the establishment 
of reliable lines of inter and intracolonial lines of communication which developed to an 
unprecedented level, and became formalised by the creation of Committees of 
Correspondence in each colony had evolved with a remarkable degree of rapidity at the parish, 
village and town level. The Committees successfully managed any intracolonial dissent, by use 
of violence, intimidation, and denunciation in the popular press. The Committees also provide 
one of the earliest illustrations of compromise, which has been such a feature of subsequent 
American political development.    
 
Although colonial cooperation was a necessary condition for the colonial rebellion, it is not 
necessary for the purposes of this argument to explore alternative views of the causes of the 
American Revolution.217 It is sufficient to state that unity of purpose across the colonies arose 
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from the aftereffects of the Boston Tea Party. The destruction of the East India tea in 
December 1773 led to the punitive Boston Port Act, the first of the Coercives, imposing 
collective punishment on all Bostonians, not just the perpetrators.218 An analysis of Committee 
correspondence, set out below, makes clear that it was the closure of the Boston Port that 
caused the greatest irritation in the colonies. This section, to explain the process by which the 
common interest of the colonies in maintaining autonomous government, came to be adopted 
on a pan-colonial basis, describes the role of the Committees in providing formal means for 
information exchange, for coordinated action, and their role in the formation of extra-legal 
forms of government, parallel to existing assemblies, and ultimately to delegate power to 
Congress.  
 
Disenfranchisement of traditional governmental authority in each colony, in favour of popular 
action, permitted separate interests to be declared as shared interests. The popular will 
however, was far from the prevalent will of the people since, not only were there loyalists to 
contend with, there were proto-patriots, and those who, whilst accepting that some sort of 
confrontation was inevitable, did not desire independence.  
 
The so called American, or [Peter] Force, Archives, describe the phenomenon that was the 
Committees, and illustrates such a degree of intercolonial agreement on the general terms of 
how resistance to British legislative attack might be framed, that one might be forgiven for 
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suspecting some bias in it.219 However, research indicates that Force was unstinting in his 
efforts to obtain any and all publications that throw light on the period.220  
 
One of the other valuable narratives of the evolution of the Committees was provided by 
Collins in 1901.221 He referred to early American historian Jared Sparks’ explanation of the 
circumstances that allowed the Committees to flourish.222 Sparks attributed the growth of the 
Committees to what became the plainly accepted truth that the Committee system was to 
promote the popular will, not just that of a governing elite. Critical to the Committees was 
what Sparks described as a “sympathetic nuclei” in each geographical area which promoted 
adoption of the Committee system.223 The system permitted intracolonial discourse with those 
in the largest towns, the standing Committees, to which the regions reported and with whom 
they shared intelligence.224 Committees were instructed to correspond with the Boston 
Committee and all other sister colonies.225 Communication evolved from province to county, 
representing local interests to the Committees of other colonies.226  
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Hence, in May 1774 the New York Committee resolved that a sub-committee of it be 
appointed to draft and circulate a letter to the different counties, acquainting them with the 
fact of its creation and appointment of its members, and inviting them to form their own 
Committees to correspond on “matters relative to the purposes for which they are 
appointed”.227 Therefore, the Committee system allowed important information to be 
communicated across the evolving union expressing the dissatisfaction of the people at the 
local level and securing popular support for Continental action.228 However, whilst there was 
broad agreement between colonies, there was by no means unanimity on all matters. Hence 
for example, in July 1774 the South Carolina delegates were granted more limited powers than 
those entrusted to their northern counterparts, who had been given the initiative to decide a 
range of matters. If southern powers were limited, it was argued, these delegates could simply 
refuse to acquiesce to northern demands, citing the need to refer back to their appointing 
Committees.229    
 
Similarly, South Carolinian delegates were in the position of having to comply with the wishes 
of Virginia, owing to the latter being in a position to control the former’s imports of goods 
through its ports. Hence at a meeting of the representatives of the various regional 
Committees in January 1775, it was made clear why the South Carolina delegates at the First 
Congress had no choice but to accept, that it should adopt 1763 as the fixed point from which 
all grievances with the British arose. There was disagreement in 1774 between those, who 
wished to draw the complaint before 1763, and those that wished to see this year as the 
essential focal point for their demands of Great Britain. Virginians regarded the distinction as 
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crucial since the complaint could then be laid fully at the feet of King George III, crowned in 
1760, whereas a longer period might complicate the essence of the American complaint by 
involving other monarchs.230  
 
There were also differences in the credentials presented to Congress by the delegates from 
each colony.231 No specific instructions were given to the delegates of New York and New 
Jersey, so as to limit their room for manoeuvre and exercise of discretion in any vote on 
Congressional initiatives. Instructions for the Maryland delegates were “to effect one general 
plan of conduct ….. for the relief of Boston and the preservation of American liberty”. However, 
these differences were essentially benign, hence, the Connecticut contingent wished “to 
consult and advise on proper measures for advancing the best good of the Colonies”.232  
 
There were more serious differences later in the South Carolina provincial session concerning a 
draft of a proposed Continental non-importation and exportation agreement which attempted 
to preclude the sale of rice to Europe. It was reported that the words led to such a clamour 
that it created an “alarming disunion throughout the whole Colony”. Despite discussions of 
creating compensation schemes to address the consequences of the exception, alarm only 
died away when a vote was taken to remove the offending article.233 
Cohesion and the Predominating Grassroots View  
Despite these differences, a description of the separate colonies as the United Colonies began 
to appear by 1775.234 It represents, the rapidly developing shared vision, articulated initially in 
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a desire amongst most to return to the situation as it existed before 1763.235 Union evolved as 
word spread of the struggles of Massachusetts.236 By the time that the First Continental 
Congress had been summoned, it was clear that there was agreement that something had to 
be done about British encroachments. Each of the delegates from the eleven colonies in 
attendance, was asked to present their credentials illustrating the wide degree to which their 
objectives were, prima facie, in agreement. New Hampshire delegates, for example, were 
empowered to devise measures aimed at extricating “the Colonies from their present 
difficulties” with the ultimate objective of returning them to the “peace, harmony and mutual 
confidence” which they enjoyed prior to the difficulties.237 However, this confidence required 
an Anglo American relationship that did not superintend commerce, nor local government. 
Hence, although emanating from Boston’s predicament, the Committees had drawn their 
grievances far wider and now questioned the very right of Parliament to exercise any form of 
control over them.238 
 
Committee correspondence illustrates how rapidly hitherto disparate colonies had developed 
this shared approach to the relationship with Britain.239 In April 1775, Mathew Tilgham, 
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Chairman of the Committee for the province of Annapolis, Maryland expressed the desire for 
“the union which has so remarkably taken place throughout the colonies” to acquire “greater 
firmness, if possible”. In other words, to solidify around agreed political objectives.240 Union 
had been made a reality because of the acceptance that what separated them, was far less 
important than the one thing that they all desired, that is a desire to protect governmental 
autonomy.241 The separate colonies were prepared to overlook their quarrels because what 
was important was a joint response to the Coercives generally, and subjugation of the Bay 
colony particularly which it was feared would eventually affect them all.242 Jefferson described 
this effect when he explained that the struggle which led to the Revolution began in each 
colony “whenever the encroachment was presented to it”.243 Jefferson’s sense was therefore 
that the perception of encroachment was sufficient to generate the necessary impetus for 
communication, not that actual British interference in the colony’s affairs was needed.244  
Facets of Pan Colonial Cooperation at the Outset of the Revolution  
Georgia was a late addition to the Congress, as explained above mainly because of a fear that 
the British troops situated on its border might be used against the population.245 However by 
December 1774 it was significantly reconciled to the patriot cause and had committed to send 
donations of rice to the inhabitants of Boston.246 Colonial cohesiveness had evolved to such an 
extent by April 1775 that the Massachusetts Bay colony was able to send requisitions to 
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Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire for a New England regional army to defend 
against British incursion.247 Although by 1775 the colonies had begun to recognise the 
importance of popular support, it was important that it not be purchased by way of armed 
force used against colonial citizens. Hence the Maryland Committee in April 1775 explicitly 
contradicted reports circulating in Baltimore that it had given instructions for the killing of 
loyalists, which had led to the latter carrying private arms.248 Reports may have been corrected 
in order to maintain civil obedience and to prevent intracolonial war. Similarly, a dispute 
between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over jurisdiction over commonly claimed land, led the 
Committee for Connecticut and for Pennsylvania to issue similar instructions to their citizens 
encouraging them to maintain peace and order to avoid disruption to the unity thus far 
achieved.249   
 
Hence a letter from the Committee in Charlestown, South Carolina in March 1775 to its 
opposite number in New York asking it to reconsider its objection to the Continental 
Association, the pan colonial agreement to stop British imports, pointed to the former’s desire 
that the Association would unite town and colony to create “one compact regularly organised 
body”.250 Similar sentiments arose within other colonies. Instructions from the inhabitants of 
Cumberland County, Virginia to their delegates to the Virginia provincial convention explicitly 
commented on the need for “unanimity, firmness and joint efforts of all the Colonies” and to 
ensure that efforts are directed at compromising the interests of the colony with the common 
safety of all of the colonies, integral to which was the need to establish a trade between 
them.251 Hence bounties were granted to encourage manufacturing in items as diverse as 
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men’s and women’s stockings at a variety of price points to meet the entire needs of the 
colonies.252 The granting of bounties was funded in whole or in part by way of subscriptions 
from inhabitants of towns and villages for the common good and indeed as an example to 
other counties.253 Vain attempts by the British to prohibit intercolonial trade by the passage of 
bills restricting trade to Britain, Ireland and the West Indies demonstrate the desperation with 
which the colonial compaction was being viewed in London.254  
 
The cooperative actions described briefly above, are an early indication of not only 
cooperation but of an acceptance of a colonial surrender of power to Congress which in turn 
reinforced the cohesion now developing by way of Congressional resolves, communicated 
across the union, and binding on the colonies.    
The Colonial Surrender of Power to Congress 
In order to encourage cohesion, the First Continental Congress  resolved in October 1774 that 
each county, town and city should appoint enforcement committees [that is, in addition to the 
Committees of Correspondence referred to above] with the sole purpose of ensuring that all 
persons “touched” by the Association but failing to comply with it should be named in county 
gazettes and thereby condemned by their fellow citizens.255 Some counties took it upon 
themselves to go further and break off dealings with those who attempted to violate the 
Association.256 Other colonies straightforwardly denounced those that were seeking to profit 
from the suffering of the people as a result of the non-importation agreement.257 However, 
some colonial regions disagreed with the growing anti-British sentiment and, whilst not 
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forming themselves into competing committees, did nevertheless meet and resolve against 
the Association, professing loyalty to the Crown.258 Dissenting towns were dealt with in a 
similar fashion to dissenting individuals, they were condemned in meetings, were resolved 
against, and ultimately gazetted.259 A meeting of loyalists, for example, in the town of 
Marshfield, Massachusetts held in February 1775 was roundly condemned by a meeting of 
sixty-four patriots held on the same day. Deriding the meeting as “craftily drawn” and not 
representing the will of the people in the town, patriots pointed to the lack of notice given and 
the passage of an earlier bill allowing for an increase in the number of Tories in the town.260   
Similarly, Committees took steps to ensure that the patriot position was presented in the most 
favourable light. When a report was published in New York in March 1775 that the Committee 
had failed to agree to the appointment of delegates to the Continental Congress, the publisher 
James Rivington was immediately censured. Rivington agreed not to rely in future on the 
“common report” of events as “sufficient authority” of the proceedings of the Committee. The 
complaint being that the report potentially exposed the Committee members to the 
“resentment of their constituents”, or more correctly that it showed discord in the patriot 
position.261   
 
Similarly, in August of 1775 the New York Committee was forced to compel the attendance of 
a Mr Archer before it to answer the charge that he had maliciously reported that Congress had 
resolved for independence. Specifically charged with attempting to create dissension in the 
colonies by making this report, it is clear that there continued to be a high degree of 
apprehension amongst some that Congress might be seen to be pushing too far, for too much, 
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and far too rapidly. This is not to say that there was wholesale disagreement between colonies 
rather that a more deliberate approach would be needed.262 As late therefore as September 
1775, provincial Committees were insisting on an attestation of loyalty to the King whilst 
maintaining the position that Parliament had no right to tax them.263 
 
Whilst this section has demonstrated the high degree of cohesion achieved by 1775, it 
disguises the underlying tension in the individual colonies between radicals in favour of action, 
and conservatives concerned with a more deliberate compromise with Britain.264 The next 
section will explain how it was a radical minority that was responsible for creating the union of 
common interests by neutralising this conservative dissent.265 
The Third Condition of National Interest: Neutralisation of Dissent 
Patriots were effectively in two camps, the conservatives who wished to leverage colonial 
cohesion as the basis for negotiating an Anglo American reconciliation, and the radicals, who 
intended to use the fact of cohesion to assert rights of self-determination and then 
independence. This radical conservative difference, is explained in two studies, in terms of pre-
existing conflicts within the colonies.266 The first deals with the development of the 
revolutionary movement in Pennsylvania and identifies the radicals as religious and lower 
middle class groups, and the conservatives as the mercantile group.267 The other study 
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considers the development of political parties in New York in the same period and essentially 
mirrors the former experience by identifying the conservatives as the landowners as against 
the radical, underprivileged classes.268 The progressive interpretation of these studies explains 
that the privileged classes, whilst initially supporting the radicals soon realised that their 
interests would be subsumed to those of wider society, and so favoured an accommodation 
with Great Britain.269 Accommodation might involve a return to the situation as it had been in 
1763 before Parliament attempted to tax the colonies to pay down the Seven Years War debt. 
Alternatively, it might involve American representation in Parliament or even an Anglo-
American Parliament comprising representatives from each colony, and from the Commons. 
According to these studies, it was only a consideration of the impact of commercial restrictions 
on colonial trade, including the monopoly imposed by the Tea Act, and the possibility that the 
southern colonies might not have to pay their large debts to British merchants and lenders in 
the event of independence, that encouraged some conservatives to join radical lines.270 
Further, it was the radical domination of the Committee system that provided an effective 
channel for Revolution as opposed to accommodation.271 
 
A Congressional debate, summarised by John Adams, that took place in September 1774 on 
the best grounds for seeking redress, gives an insight into the nature of the disagreement 
between the factions in Congress. Some pro-British delegates had questioned the right of the 
colonists to form constitutional government, that is the original charter assemblies, on 
grounds that successive monarchs did not have the power to grant founding charters, or on 
                                                          
 
 
268 Becker C. L. History of Political Parties in the Province of New York 1760 - 1776. (Madison: Wisconsin,1909).   
269 Force Archive, Volume I. p.1036. The evolution of the conservative radical split appears to have been noticed in London in 
December 1774. An unknown Englishman writing to someone unknown in New York complained that the colonists as a general 
body appeared to have hardened their position from one demanding, effectively, an end to Parliament’s attempts to tax the 
colonies internally to attempting to dent the right of Parliament’s supremacy more generally. 
270 Schlesinger A. M., The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution 1763 – 1776. (Beard Books: New York, 1918). 
271 The Committees of Correspondence are said to have been effective on their formation due in the main to the “town 
meetings……clergy….[and]….newspapers” that had laid the foundation for cooperation, see; Galvin J. R., The Minute Men, The First 
Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution, (Potomac Books: Washington D.C., 2006), p.3.  
 
 
89 
 
the ground that the colonies were only entities subsidiary to the Crown and not otherwise 
independent of it.272 Pennsylvanian member of Congress Joseph Galloway, however simply 
argued for a return to the status quo ante, on the ground that the differences between 
colonies were so significant and the peace between them so fragile, that a civil war was 
inevitable without a strong British superintendence to maintain authority.273 He explained that 
conflict was “… only suppressed by the authority of the Parent State [Great Britain] and should 
that authority be weakened or annulled, many subjects of unsettled disputes….must involve us 
in all the horrors of civil war.” 274 There was therefore a strong reason to reach a compromise 
with Britain.275     
 
What is clear is that, whilst this point of view had support, it was the vocal, impassioned and 
often violent radical minority that ensured that its aims would ultimately win out. An 
indication that dissent was effectively silenced by these radicals was explained in a post-War 
1780 publication produced by Galloway. He explained how a violent faction had taken control 
in most colonies, and obtained representation in Congress. According to Galloway, “at this 
time the republican [the patriots intent on independence] faction in Congress had provided a 
mob, ready to execute their secret orders. The cruel practice of tarring and feathering had been 
long since introduced. This lessened the firmness of some of the loyalists [which included 
conservatives], the vote was put and carried. Two of the dissenting members presumed to offer 
their protest against it in writing, which was negatived [sic]. They next insisted that the tender 
of their protest: and its negative should be entered on the minutes this was also rejected. By 
this treasonable vote the foundation of military resistance throughout America was effectually 
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laid.”276 What started out as a simple desire for redress of colonial grievances, therefore gave 
way in the face of the rise of the movement for independence. 
 
The conservative versus radical position is further exposed by John Dickinson, a Pennsylvania 
politician, in an April 1775 letter to Massachusetts London agent Arthur Lee. Giving an 
impression of an underlying current of disagreement and discord amongst the patriots it 
implies a similar sense of unease between the colonists.277 “Why have we rashly been declared 
rebels”, Dickinson asked, “why have directions been sent to disarm us?”. Dickinson’s letter 
reveals his deep felt desire to avoid a break with the British when he went on to describe how 
little scope he believed there now was for “men who think as I do” to appeal to his fellow 
countrymen.278 Dickinson had argued robustly against the British right to tax the colonies.279 
However, there was, for him, a difference between denying revenue raising powers to the 
British and an all-out desire for a break.  Dickinson’s so called Olive Branch Petition of July 1775 
to King George III, adopted by the First Continental Congress, declared his heartfelt wish to be 
reconciled with the mother country as against the position being adopted by some of his 
fellow delegates.280  
 
Jefferson’s description of voting on the Olive Branch Petition casts further light on the radical, 
conservative difference. On passage in Congress, Jefferson explained that Dickinson objected 
to the use of the word Congress.281 The inclusion of this idea would inflame British opinion 
with its connotations of the earlier so called Stamp Act Congress of 1764 and its association 
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with resistance. Consequently, its inclusion by the radicals was intended to give a clear 
message of defiance.  
 
This conception of radicalism versus conservatism was apparent in every colony and 
manifested itself as a split in the patriotic movement and not as a distinction between royalist 
and patriot. Dickinson was therefore not in a minority. In any case, the royalist position had 
been silenced by threats of tarring and feathering or gazetting, and therefore shaming into 
compliance.282  
Conclusion  
The common interest of the colonies was in their long held belief in the right to self-
determination. Liberal British mercantilist policies had emphasised the control of their 
international commerce at the expense of superintendence, leaving colonists with a greater 
sense of their independence.283 This is very much a counter intuitive outcome given the central 
control of trade, and therefore the implication of governance more generally, that is dictated 
by mercantilism, and it simply encouraged the colonists to think of themselves as 
governmentally independent.284  
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British policy since the early part of the eighteenth century, had encouraged trade because 
securing northern colonial manufactured lumber products for naval stores was crucial to Great 
Britain’s naval advantage, and the colonies were purchasers of British manufactured goods.285 
An increase in the productive colonial population through immigration, would only be 
supportive of this fact.286 The populations in the thirteen colonies almost doubled to just under 
one million by around 1740 and to almost three million by 1780.287 Growth in trade as a result 
of population increases was in turn directly related to an abundance of cheap land to newly 
arriving immigrants and therefore the facility to drive economic growth from their own 
labours, or ability to secure productive work as indentured servants.288 The practice of granting 
a fixed allotment of land, known as a headright started in Virginia as early as 1609 and 
continued until 1777.289 Headright allocations were closely tied to profitable economic activity 
because a man could become relatively wealthy in a short time, and was therefore incentivised 
to productivity .290  
 
A developing and thriving agrarian economy provided further support for a benign British 
approach to government since, without the threat of a manufacturing base which might 
threaten domestic merchants, all that was required of a trade policy was the regulation 
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exports of raw materials.291  Hence, as late as 1770 the majority of colonial exports, almost 
three million pounds, were agricultural, hunting products or derivatives thereof.292  
 
A vibrant two-way flow of trade was insufficient to cause the British to impose tighter 
restraints over colonial freedoms. Whilst important for the supply of raw materials and a 
market for manufactured goods, the colonies were not considered a sufficiently valuable pawn 
in the wider European power struggle over control of international trade.293 Further, British 
laissez faire policy was supported by the realities of colonial manufacturing, since the 
unavailability of skilled labour and capital in the northern colonies mitigated against the 
development of a colonial manufacturing base competitive to that of the large British cities.294 
Thus the risks of a competitive manufacturing economy emerging and in turn causing a rupture 
in British policy was minimal.295  
 
In conclusion, autonomous government was easily achieved because the British were 
preoccupied with grander trade strategy within which the colonies were bit players.296 The 
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point is made succinctly in the literature, “as long as what the colonists did increased the 
taxable trade of the Empire, mercantilists were content. When what the colonists were doing 
somehow competed with metropolitan businessmen, capitalists were not happy.”297 Against 
this backdrop, there was little sense of community, common voice and subrogation of interests 
amongst colonies taken together hence John Adams’ assertion that the central problem of the 
American Revolution was how to ensure that all thirteen clocks strike at the same time.298 In 
other words, how to ensure concerted colonial effort.  
 
The wholesale change in British policy attempted after the end of the Seven Years War created 
the circumstances that would ultimately give rise to this community of interests. The goal of 
the policy, within a new legislative framework, was to claw back the gains made by the 
colonies by focussing on two key objectives.299 The first was the aim of raising revenue to pay 
for the war effort and the ongoing defence of the colonies. Given the huge cash contributions 
made during the War under the direction of Prime Minister William Pitt, it was considered only 
fair that the colonies should now be made to repay their debt to the mother country.300 The 
second, was to implement a wide ranging scheme of tax compliance which would have the 
dual effect of enabling Parliament to exert control.301 Ironically therefore, it was British actions 
                                                          
 
 
agreements refusing to purchase goods from Britain until it agreed to reverse its attempts to tax the colonies. Amongst the first 
examples of the power of consumer boycotts.     
297 McCusker J. J. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, Volume 1: The Colonial Era. Chapter Title 8: British 
Mercantilist Policies and the American Colonies, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996). p 362. 
298 TWJA, Volume 10, p. 283. 
299 Chorlton T. P. The First American Republic 1774 – 1789. The First Fourteen American Presidents before Washington. (Author 
House: Indianapolis, 2011.), pp xxv - xxvi. Policies implemented to achieve these objectives are viewed as a “series of disastrous 
blunders” in which the British “seriously miscalculated” the impact that their policies would have on the Americans. The author 
quotes a tax differential between the British citizen and an American colonist of some 25 shillings per head annually a fact that 
appears to driven Parliament on with its taxation policies even as against fierce resistance.      
300 Pitt to the Governors of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, , Rhode Island, New York and New Jersey Whitehall 
Dec- 30th 1757 and Pitt to Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina and North Carolina, Whitehall, 30th 
December 1757. Kimball G. S. Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and 
Naval Commissioners in America. Volume 1. (Macmillan: London, 1906). Pitt explained that “that strong Recommendations will be 
made to Parliament in their Session next Year, to grant a proper Compensation for such Expences [sic] ......according as the active 
Vigour and strenuous Efforts of the respective Provinces shall justly appear to merit.” Pitts’ promise came not as an expression of 
British largess but in response to the realities faced by the British military in the colonies. A refusal to provide soldiers with shelter, 
provisions and finance placed colonial assemblies on a collision course with British commanders. Pitts’s offer was therefore 
intended to appease the locals by reimbursing them for the costs of meeting the logistical needs of their defenders.   
301 There is considerable cause for believing that the British intended to habituate colonists into paying taxes that would be used 
for wider purposes than simply the payment for the defence of the colonies. The British believed that the colonists should get 
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that created the political environment within the colonies that caused the hitherto separate 
colonies into a cooperative union that acted together in a representative Congress.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that American foreign policy had at its root, a practical design 
for a national interest which could trace its origin to the early founding charters that assured 
local representation and self-determination. There were no competing domestic interests in 
this design, since any dissent had for all practical purposes been eliminated by the start of the 
Revolution. The competing visions of the radicals and the conservatives of what was in the 
interests of the disparate colonies had been compromised into one discernible pan-colonial, 
later pan-state, interest.   
 
The inevitable conflict with Britain over what was in the interests of the union, independence 
as opposed to containment within the British empire, caused Congress to assert itself in 
foreign affairs. Chapter Three explains that Congress and by delegation, its plenipotentiaries, 
who were by definition vested with the power to shape policy, determined immediately that 
foreign policy would involve an active participation in the balance of power. Chapter Three 
begins by explaining that, although there was now agreement across the colonies, what was 
missing was a will to act as one nation. Congress, through its actions created the necessary will 
to act.    
  
                                                          
 
 
used to paying tax if they were to enjoy the rights of Englishmen and used the argument of virtual representation in Parliament to 
advance their argument. In other words, the colonists were represented in Parliament by virtue of being citizens of the Empire. 
They did not need to be physically represented by their agents, for example.   
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3. Chapter Three: Balance of Power Thinking in the War Years 
Congress as the Unifying Force 
Congress was the unifying force that by its “resolves and proclamations” strengthened the 
union of the states and the cohesion between its members, for example by creating the 
Continental Army.302 Cohesion, for John Adams, required not just an assertive Congress, but a 
strong figurehead with the reputation of General Washington. Adams expressed the belief that 
that the earnestness with which the original colonies had come together because of their 
shared interest, would be cemented into a closer union of states with the appointment of the 
General as commander of the army.303 The historian Jeremy Black explains that the creation of 
the Continental Army was therefore not only a military, but a unifying political act and one that 
would secure for the union, recognition and support from foreign powers. Its creation took 
military decision-making away from the colonial legislatures, by delegating to Congress control 
over the state militia.304 Hence the impression was created of a single nation, in control of 
armed forces, and able to take military action in its national interest. Such a situation was 
different from the much looser arrangements that had existed between 1757 and 1763 during 
the Seven Years War when colonial militia had been deployed, as explained in Chapter Two, in 
support of other colonies in a more ad hoc manner by order of local legislatures.  
 
In many ways therefore, cohesion was brought about as a result of the control of Congress, the 
one political body that represented all the states.305 The interstate concordance thereby 
                                                          
 
 
302 Henderson J. Party Politics and the Continental Congress. (University Press of America: Maryland, 1974). p.1. The author takes 
this view when he says that the Congress transformed “a disjointed colonial resistance into a reasonably cohesive colonial 
revolution.” 
303Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams. June 1775. Rhodehamel (2001), p. 32. By 1773 there were at least eighty committees 
in Massachusetts alone sufficient to form the basis of a colonial federation.  
304 Black (2010). p. 141. 
305 It is fairly accurate to describe the former British American colonies as states with effect from around 1775 because of the 
generally representative extra-legal committees of correspondence that took over from colonial era representative assemblies 
that have been described more particularly in Chapter Two, and then representing a union qua collective security arrangement 
with effect generally from 1776 when Congress directed the various former colonies to create their own constitutions. For a 
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brought about, was the pre-condition for a foreign policy for two reasons. Firstly, it eliminated 
the security risk inherent in the union as it entered into conflict with Britain, for the reason 
that “a basically cohesive community will remain reasonably united in a period of adversity 
while one containing divisive elements will fragment”.306 Colonial fragmentation could create 
the circumstances for foreign powers to break up the union, along trading lines. As an 
example, the Virginian delegation was fully aware of this risk when discussing, in 1774, the 
non-exportation of goods to Britain. Hence the Virginia delegation had agreed to South 
Carolina’s request to exclude rice and indigo from the ban since they were important to the 
latter’s economy and expedient in its local politics.307  
 
Secondly, the most important foreign policy act of the early Republic, that of securing the 
French alliance, depended on there being confidence that the Revolution was capable of 
succeeding given well known differences across the states. The French foreign ministry feared 
that the Revolution was simply the consequence of a fractious element in the union that had 
gained the upper hand in the states and driven them inexorably down the road to revolution. 
As explained in Chapter One, according to a late nineteenth century historian, William Gordon, 
before the French would provide support they had to be assured that the conflict was more 
than just the work of a minority that had somehow subsumed any dissent. This realisation was 
                                                          
 
 
description of what the author refers to as “the assumption of power” by the former colonies, see Adams W. P. (translated by 
Kimber R et al.), The First American Constitutions. Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the 
Revolutionary Era, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Oxford, 2001), in respectively pp.25–46, and pp.47-60. For the opposing 
viewpoint to the idea that the colonies shared a common interest, see Savelle M., The Origins of American Diplomacy, 1492 – 1763 
(Macmillan: New York, 1967) quoted in Deconde A, Historians, the War of American Independence, and the Persistence of the 
Exceptionalist Ideal. (The International History Review. Vol. 5 No.3, August 1983), pp.399-430. Savelle explains that the colonies 
had by 1776, become a people sharing a “common culture”. However, in contradistinction to Savelle, see Ammerman D., In the 
Common Cause. American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774, (University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1974). p. 89. 
Ammerman explains that a common culture as such is not entirely accurate given that it was a radical majority in the First 
Continental Congress that silenced the dissenting minority that, for example, forced adoption of the Continental Association. For 
an analysis of the radicals and conservatives see Chapter Two. It is a central argument of this thesis that the colonies shared a 
common interest by 1776.       
306 Hoffman R., (et. al.), (eds.), An Uncivil War, The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution, (The University Press of 
Virginia: Virginia, 1985), p. xii. 
307 JCC. 1774-1789. Volume I. p. 52. 
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identified in the success of the Continental Army after the 1777 battle of Saratoga.308 
According to one account of the scene “when the news of the Saratoga convention reached 
France, [it was accepted that it]…. was not owing to a faction, a few leading men that had 
gotten into power” but that there was a national resolve and support for victory.309  
 
Congress demonstrated the necessary resolve, as the one coherent, ostensibly representative 
voice, and creator of a homogenous foreign policy, that is, one representative of all of the 
states. It appointed plenipotentiaries who concentrated their efforts on the international 
aspects of the Revolution, on the consequences of diplomatic activity, and on treaty making.310 
By the very definition of their delegation as plenipotentiaries, they were vested with the 
power to shape foreign policy, based on the realities they discovered in the European nations 
they visited.    
 
The ideology that would underpin the shaping of policy was created by a Congressional 
committee and called the 1776 Model Treaty, the framework that articulated the founding 
principle that America was to remain separated from the political affairs of Europe. A key 
principle of separation was that the nation would seek military supplies but not military ties. 
However, beneath this basic expression of its foreign policy ideology, lay the one fundamental 
fact that, even the objective of non-military support, required exploitation of the French rivalry 
                                                          
 
 
308 Murphy (1982), p. 258. The author explains that George III was advised of the 6th February 1778 Franco American treaties, soon 
after they were signed, by way of a diplomatic note. The British reacted to the loss at Saratoga by considering a reconciliation with 
the colonies in order to prevent an Anglo French war, which only allowed the Americans to take advantage of European rivalries in 
order to secure French support, see; Thomas P. D. G., Lord North, (Allen Lane: London, 1976), p.108. 
309 Gordon (1788), p.96. 
310 For considerations of the importance of diplomacy, see Wharton F. (ed.), The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States. Volume I. pp 263 and 289 referred to in Deconde A., Historians, the War of American Independence, and the 
Persistence of the Exceptionalist Ideal, (The International History Review, Vol. 5 No. 3, August 1983). pp. 399 to 430. See also 
Horsman R. The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776 to 1815, (Harlan Davidson Inc.: Illinois, 1985), pp.14-15. This is also the 
general theme of Perkins J. B. France in the American Revolution, (Houghton Mifflin and Company: Boston, 1911), and of Schiff. S. 
A Great Improvisation. Franklin, France and the Birth of America, (Henry Holt and Company: New York, 2005), the latter placing 
success in winning French support for American War aims firmly with Franklin and his diplomacy. See the definition of 
plenipotentiaries in the Meriam Wester Dictionary as not “just….an agent to deal with foreign affairs but one having full power to 
act on the behalf of his or her country and government”, in https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plenipotentiary 
accessed 14th February 2017.  
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with Britain. Since rivalry arose because of a French desire to re-balance against Great Britain, 
American foreign policy would involve participation in the European equilibrium from the 
start.  
 
Ideology and Realism  
There were two features that would be important elements of this, an internationalist 
American foreign policy. Firstly, that the ideology of its desire for political separation, would be 
combined with the pragmatism dictated by its military weakness, and secondly, that those 
ideological considerations would be regarded as long-term considerations, and therefore 
traded off against short term expediencies.   
 
Firstly then, it was common some two hundred years later in the twentieth century, to think of 
American foreign affairs in terms of idealism or realism.311 However, this chapter will explain 
that Americans in the early period did not regard realism and idealism as mutually exclusive 
concepts, but were in the unique situation of being able to blend them into one coherent 
approach to foreign engagement, with a moving weight between the two depending on 
international conditions.312  
                                                          
 
 
311 See for example, Hendrickson D. G. The Lost World of the American Founding, (University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2003), p. 169; 
Gilbert (1961), p.136, in which Gilbert makes this point and also equates ideology with a quest for freedom, and realism with a 
quest for gain; For a more recent discussion of the confluence of idealism and realism in US foreign policy as respectively security 
and justice, see Nijman J. Madeleine Albright and the Geopolitics of Europe (GeoJournal, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 46: 267-278, 
1998). For further discussions of realism as a concern about security, and idealism as a concern with optimism and cooperation, 
see Wright Q, Review: Realism and Idealism in International Politics (World Politics, Vol. 5 No. 1, October 1952), pp.116-128. For 
discussions of different forms of realism see Ross A. L. and Posen B. R. Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, (International 
Security, Vol. 21 No. 3, Winter 1996-1997), pp.5-53, in which the authors talk of maximal realism (that is, primacy of a nation as 
the optimal positon) and minimal realism (engagement with the balance of power by engagement of non-hegemonic nations).  
312 For ideas of the interaction of realism with idealism (but not blending the two concepts into policy) see (i) a discussion of how 
modern US Presidents alternate between idealism and realism in their rhetoric in order to gain political advantage, Bostdorff D. M. 
and Goldzwig S. R.  Idealism and Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam 
(Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24 No. 3, Conduct of Foreign Policy, Summer, 1994), pp.515-530), (ii) a discussion of the more 
direct interaction of idealism and realism in American foreign affairs in Land D.G. and Russell G. The Ethics of Power in American 
Diplomacy: The Statecraft of John Quincy Adams (The Review of Politics, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 52 No. 1, Winter 1990), 
pp.3-31, in which the authors argue that Adams considered the application of American power (a policy of realism in support of 
security aims) would result in idealistic outcomes such as the eventual elimination of European “colonial claims” and hence of the 
pernicious effects of imperialism; and (iii) For what appears to be a confluence of realism with idealism described as “higher 
realism”, and illustrated by reference to Woodrow Wilson’s involvement in the First World War and also, related to this, as “both 
the unconscious pursuit of a (global) balance of power and [creation] of a new international order”, see Dunne M. US Foreign 
Relations in the Twentieth Century: From World Power to Global Hegemony, (International Affairs, Royal Institute of International 
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Hence, the idealistic desire for political distance from Europe and its old ways that had, for 
American statesmen, guaranteed only centuries of war, was combined with a realistic 
assessment of how Americans could take advantage of the weakness that was inherent in the 
European framework. In other words, these men accepted the fundamental ideological 
premise that there should be no political arrangement with European nations. However this 
would be subject to the overriding principle that manipulation of European rivalries, was a 
wholly logical and pragmatic choice in the national interest.313  
 
This point that the ideology of political separation from European affairs would be 
compromised if the national interest demanded it is illustrated in the first period in the free 
trade goal of the Model Treaty which mandated that America would only demand military 
supplies and loans from foreign nations. However, by the end of 1776, Congress recognised 
that without both French and Spanish military involvement, the nation could not win 
independence and there was therefore a volte face with Congress readily embracing a French 
alliance.314 Hence, whilst non-commitment would continue to be the theme of foreign policy, it 
gave way temporarily to realism.  
  
The second feature of an internationalist foreign policy, was that long term ideological 
concerns were sacrificed for short term expediency based on the reality of the international 
                                                          
 
 
Affairs, Vol. 76 No. 1, January 2000), pp.25-40, (iv) for a discussion of a concept of blending which explains that rich and militarily 
strong nations are able to combine realism and idealism, see Kupchan. C. The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (Alfred Knopf: New York, 2003) p.37.             
313 However, see Dull (1975), p.328. The author takes the view that American diplomats achieved little but happened to be more 
passive participants in the unravelling of events in 1778. 
314 For the Model Treaty as the basis for no political connections, see Le Feber W. The American Age. U.S. Foreign Policy At Home 
and Abroad, 1750 to the Present, 2nd Edition, (W. W. Norton and Company: New York, 1994), pp.23-24. For the Model Treaty as 
the basis of free trade, see Matson C.D. and Onuf P. S. A Union of Interests. Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary 
America (University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 1990), pp.34-37. Matson and Onuf explain that Franklin and Adams explained that 
free trade would encourage reciprocity and hence discourage political entanglement. This comment speaks also to the idea of 
economic interdependence which, as explained in Chapter One, was an aspect of the idea of universalism in American foreign 
affairs. See also Wood G. C., Congressional Control of Foreign Relations During the American Revolution, 1774-1789, (H. Ray Haas 
& Co: Pennsylvania, 1919), p.63, who explains that the so called radicals in Congress objected to direct French military aid since it 
would make America subject to the guidance of France in all matters related to its foreign affairs.    
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situation and America’s position in it.315 Therefore, in the War for Independence, Americans 
became habituated in seeking alliances, although not always successfully, despite their 
ideological fear of commitment, and not even a fear and dislike of Catholicism could divert 
Congressional attention from the goal of alliance creation.316 As France adopted hard balancing 
strategies of naval build up and American alliance creation to reinstate the European 
equilibrium with Britain, American statesmen willingly involved themselves in European 
rivalries. They sought a France alliance, with its potential for long term military consequences 
that could outlast War aims, because it was the most pragmatic choice given the precarious 
American military situation.317 An uncompromising and hard headed pursuit of interest, even if 
it involved dispensing with ideology, formed the underlying assumption of policy. This is 
because American statesmen of this period did not have the luxury of being able to take a long 
term perspective on extant policy choices. National interest demanded that short run 
considerations only inform policy commitments, at the expense of the long run consequences 
for a Republic that prided itself on its ideological differences with Europe. An example of such 
                                                          
 
 
315 Later, the system of separation of powers in the Constitution would be regarded as an attempt by the Framers to force 
deliberate, and therefore long term, consideration of foreign affairs even at the expense of short term expediency, see; Dumbrell 
J., American Foreign Policy, Carter to Clinton, (Macmillan: London, 1997), p. 9.   
316 This fear was brought into sharp focus just before the War by passage of the Quebec Act of 1774; Coupland R. The Quebec Act: 
A Study in Statesmanship. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1968). The author attributes the Act not to any desire by Parliament to 
affect the colonies since, it is suggested in this thesis, Parliament was concerned more with raising revenues from the colonies 
through taxation and legislation for their better control.  The author suggests that the Act had as its sole aim the prevention of the 
development of any independence movement amongst the sixty-five thousand odd Catholics in the Quebec province of Canada by 
addressing what were perceived to be French Canadian demands, free practice of the Catholic faith, the right to use of the French 
language and the application of the French legal system. The Act in fact does not go further than providing for the free practice of 
the Catholic faith.  A copy of the Act can be found at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/quebec_act_1774.asp (accessed 
8th June 2014). Parliament’s explicit permissiveness in the practice of Catholicism in Canada with the Quebec Act of 1774 was 
viewed as a threat by colonists who feared that it would be used as a way of keeping the colonies in check. One way in which the 
interests of the colonists might be threatened is by restricting their ability to expand westwards beyond the so called 1763 
Proclamation Line, that which separated Indian lands from colonial lands, see; Jennings F. (ed.), The History and Culture of Iroquois 
Diplomacy, An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League, (Syracuse University Press: New York, 
1985), p. 57. 
317 However, a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs in 1778 did not involve balancing between Britain and France, according to 
Arthur Lee, commissioner to Spain and France, “France has done us substantial benefits. Great Britain substantial injuries. France 
offers to guaranty our sovereignty, and universal freedom of Commerce. Great Britain condescends to accept of our submission and 
to monopolise our commerce…….I do not comprehend how there can be a mind so debased, or an understanding so perverted, as 
to balance between them”, To the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Paris, February 28th, 1778, DCAR, Volume II, p. 138. This idea of 
“restraint” in American foreign policy given; (i) the weakness of the American military, and, (ii) a limited understanding of balance 
of power, and (iii) and no “proper analysis of …[national interest]”, is at the centre of what is called soft realism or “greater 
patience…[and]….more expert diplomacy” in handling foreign policy, see; Combs. J. A., The History of American Foreign Policy, 
Volume II, Since 1990, (Alfred P. Knopf: New York, 1986), p. vii.  
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an unintended consequence was that the 1778 French Treaty would, in 1793, leave open the 
risk of an unwanted American involvement in a European war involving France and Britain.318 
This trade-off between long term ideological considerations against more important short run 
national objectives, was more an attribute of an emerging and weak nation than it was of 
established strong nations. For example, the French and the Spanish worried that the 
American states, so valuable to their short term interests, could in the longer term become a 
liability to them, and therefore current policy should provide for such an eventuality. Worries 
were grounded, not least, in a fear of the inevitability of westward American expansion which 
for the French represented a growing imperium, and for the Spanish a threat to their North 
American colonial system.319 Fear caused each member of this, the Family Compact, to soft 
balance America through binding strategies. The French hoped that the terms of their alliance 
with America together with reciprocal trade agreements, would be sufficient to bind America 
to a close association with France.320 For their part, the Spanish refused to offer America a 
treaty of alliance even as Congress offered valuable concessions, in the hope of being able to 
contain the emerging nation within the geography of the original thirteen states.   
 
The argument of this Chapter proceeds by demonstrating that French motivations in 
supporting Independence lay firmly in the consequences of the Seven Years War that ended in 
1763. The French defeat and expulsion from the North American continent in 1763, was the 
French incentive to re-balance against Britain adopting the hard balancing strategies of alliance 
building, which relied on an American willingness to participate in the equilibrium, and naval 
                                                          
 
 
318 Chapter Four explains the rationale adopted in 1793 to justify withdrawal from the mutual defence terms of the 1778 Treaty. 
319 Philips P. C. The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution Hardcover (Russell & Russell: New York, 1913). See also 
Faragher (1998).   
320 For a discussion of the French desire to retain America as a post War “client state” see Watson J.S. The Reign of George III, 1760 
– 1815 in Clark G. (ed.), The Oxford History of England Volume XII (Clarendon Press: Oxford,1985) pp. 253-255. 
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build up to achieve parity of forces.321 Against the backdrop of this, the traditional approach to 
the hard balancing of a balance member, is exposed the soft balancing approach of both 
France and Spain in an effort to restrain American growth. Whilst soft balancing does not 
alone explain an American participation in the equilibrium, it nevertheless does demonstrate, 
through analysis of the efforts of American Commissioners to resist its effects, the importance 
of America to the balance. Nowhere was participation by exploitation of rivalries more 
apparent than in c. 1782, when preliminaries of peace were being negotiated by American 
Commissioners with the British, leveraging the fact of the French alliance in an effort to secure 
peace and Independence. This is explored later in this Chapter.  
French Motivation in Supporting Independence 
Whilst America’s military weakness left it with no alternative but to seek foreign support, in 
many ways France was not the obvious choice.322 There were two reasons for this, firstly, the 
British American colonists had been important participants in the Seven Years’ War that had 
expelled the French from the North American continent, and hence were not obvious 
bedfellows, and secondly because of the general American distrust of Catholicism.323 Despite 
                                                          
 
 
321 Black (2010) p. 155, explains that French entry into the War “pushed naval considerations to the forefront”, and therefore 
concentrated the War, as far as the British were concerned, in Europe. Black therefore provides support for the argument that 
French entry significantly altered British strategic thinking, a consequence clearly contemplated by American policy makers.    
322 See for example, Drake J. D. The Nation’s Nature. How Continental Presumptions Gave Rise to the United States of America, 
(University of Virginia Press: Virginia, 2011). pp.172-173, and; Bowman A. H. The Struggle for Neutrality. Franco-American 
Diplomacy During the Federalist Era. (The University of Tennessee Press: Knoxville, 1974), pp. 4 to 5. See also Black (2004), pp. 
105-106, who describes the fear of France and Spain as early as 1775 that the Anglo American dispute could entangle the Bourbon 
nations, whilst trying to weaken British “economic and political strength” to their benefit, because the British might seek a 
conciliation with their colonies in order to then focus military and naval attention on the European conflict.      
323 For discussions of anti-Catholicism, its origins before the Glorious Revolution and in the colonial and early republican periods 
see; Stanwood O. The Empire Reformed. English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution. (University of Pennsylvania Press: 
Philadelphia, 2011), and; Blumenthal H. France and the United States. Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789 – 1914. (The University of 
North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1970), and Coupland (1925). For a discussion of the support of Irish Catholicism for the British in 
putting down the American rebellion, see Calder A. Revolutionary Empire. The Rise of the English Speaking Empires from the 
Fifteenth Century to the 1780s. (Random House: London, 1998). pp.499-500. For discussions of the surprising intervention of the 
Bourbon nations in the Revolutionary War, see Mapp. P. W. The Revolutionary War and Europe’s Great Powers, in OHAR, pp.311-
326. Mapp refers to the more general point that historians have placed too much emphasis on the diplomatic prowess of the 
Americans in winning a French alliance and less on the motivations caused by the problems faced by the French and Spanish after 
the end of the Seven Years War. See also; Scott. H. M. Religion and Realpolitik: The Due De Choiseul, the Bourbon Family Compact, 
and the Attack on the Society of Jesus, 1758-1775, (The International History Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2003), pp.37-62., who 
explains that Catholic support for America is even more surprising given that the Seven Years War was effectively a war of 
protestant nations (Great Britain and Prussia) against a Catholic concert involving Austria, France and Spain.   
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these worries, it was John Adams, even before independence had entered the lexicon of the 
different colonial representatives to the First Continental Congress, who identified three 
considerations that would be central to American foreign policy. Firstly, that the trade boycott 
of Britain, the 1774 Continental Association, would lead to a conflict that could only be 
prosecuted with the assistance of France and Spain. Secondly, that American and French 
interests would not be in a perfect alignment.324 Hence, that there was a risk, that if the result 
of any Anglo American conflict was deadlock, France might conclude that partition of the 
American union amongst the European powers, with some subject to Catholic monarchical 
rule, might serve French interests.325 Thirdly, that France would be motivated, above any 
consideration of religious differences or past sleights, in its overriding desire to rebalance the 
European equilibrium and to weaken Britain.326 
                                                          
 
 
324 It was Samuel Adams who, in 1779, had reluctantly recognised that no foreign nation would assist America out of any motive 
other than in its own selfish interest, and that “disinterested motives….in support of the common rights of mankind”, were not 
what generally drove foreign policy, see; Henderson (1974), pp.210-211. Adams was, determined that America was to be seen as 
an equal partner in the French treaty, an indication of his understanding of the French national interest which underpinned the 
French alliance, see Stoll I., Samuel Adams, A Life, (Free Press: New York, 2008), p.198.   
325 See Ferling J. John Adams. A Life. (Oxford University Press, 1992). The reality of the concern that France might participate in a 
European strategy aimed at partition of the American union, or a more general carving up of North America and Canada between 
the European powers, is explained in Tearle D. Barings Bank, William Bingham and the Rise of the American Nation. A 
Transatlantic Relationship from the Revolutionary War through the Louisiana Purchase, (McFarland and Co: North Carolina, 2010) 
pp.62-67 and is based on Morgan E. S. Benjamin Franklin, (New Haven: Connecticut, 2002), and Auger H. The Secret War of 
Independence, (Duell, Sloan, and Pearce: New York, 1955). See also; Ferling J., Almost A Miracle, The American Victory in the War 
of Independence, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007), p.71. 
326 Brewer J., The Sinews of Power, War, Money and the English state, 1688-1783, (Unwin Hyman: London, 1989), pp. 173-175. See 
for example, Blumenthal (1970). pp 172 to 173, for an alternative view. Blumenthal explains that France wished to exercise control 
over America, in order to prevent it from becoming “too independent” and strong, and that a consideration of French policy might 
have been to regain territories lost during the Seven Years’ War. This fear of underlying French motivations was a reason given by 
loyalists in America for opposing the Franco American alliance, see for example Davidson P. Propaganda and the American 
Revolution. 1763 – 1783, (The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1941) pp.317-320, and pp. 377-380.  For the point of 
view that the French objective of obtaining a future alliance partner willing to counterbalance the power of Great Britain but that 
this strategy largely failed because of America’s resistance to being brought into the equilibrium and also because Britain rapidly 
recovered after the end of the War, see Dirpalen. A., The European Polity: Biography of an Idea, (The Journal of Politics, 10:4, 
1948), pp.712-733. From the British perspective, the concern was not necessarily with alteration of the balance of power, but also 
the possibility of a French universal monarchy, Tucker R.W. and Hendrickson D.C., The Fall of the First British Empire, Origins of the 
War of American Independence, (The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1982), pp. 30-32. For the point of view that French 
motivations, within the balance of power framework, had been apparent as early as 1759 when the French Statesman, Due de 
Choiseul expressed a desire to restrain further British American colonial growth, see; Hatton R. and Anderson M.S., Studies in 
Diplomatic History, Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn, (Archon Books: New York, 1970), pp.194-195. For a discussion of a 
French desire to weaken Britain, see; ibid, Augur (1955), p. 302., in which the author explains that even during the War, the French 
and Spanish pursued their own aim of weakening Britain, not that of winning America its independence. See also; See Savelle M. 
The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1773 – 1778 in Morris R. B. The Era of the American Revolution (Harper 
and Row: London, 1939). Savelle sets out a thesis that explains the importance of the British American colonies, throughout the 
early and middle parts of the eighteenth century, to the European balance of power and indeed that the basis of wars in this 
period, such as the War of Jenkins Ear, were fought in maintenance and expansion of the European equilibrium. Savelle concludes 
this essay by supporting the argument that French motivation in the War for Independence was to re-establish the European 
equilibrium.     
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The nature of this, the French interest was located in the consequences of the Paris Peace 
Treaty of 1763 that brought the Seven Years War to an end.327 Having been weakened at the 
conclusion of the Seven Years War, the French were determined to reinstate the 
equilibrium.328 The peace had left a residual cause of dispute with Great Britain caused for 
example, by the existence of a British Commissioner in Dunkirk tasked with preventing French 
reinforcement, and the continued harassment of French fishermen in Newfoundland.329 
Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, Minister of Foreign Affairs was firmly committed to 
return what was termed “the alliance system”, back to its sense of equilibrium.330 French 
foreign and domestic affairs at this time were heavily influenced by Vergennes, who exerted 
greater influence on Louis XVI than did any other statesman of the day, as a member of a body 
of advisors comprising a council which enabled the King to exercise his power of the body of 
state.331  
                                                          
 
 
327 See for example Price M. The Court Nobility and the Origins of the French Revolution, and Savage G. Foreign Policy and Political 
Cultures in Later Eighteenth Century France, two essays in Scott H. et al (eds.), Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long 
Eighteenth Century. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007). However, for an alternative point of view see Hutson J. H. The 
Partition Treaty and the Declaration of American Independence, (The Journal of American History, Vol. 58, No. 4, March 1972), 
pp.877-896. Hutson’s theory that the reason that the Americans declared Independence when they did, in July 1776, was to 
forestall a British French Spanish arrangement to partition the colonies, leads to a conclusion that the American statesmen enticed 
France into an alliance as opposed to the French being driven by motivations of rebalancing. This was one of the options that was 
discussed by Adam Smith, author of the Wealth of Nations, as being available to British politicians when faced with the rebellion, 
quoted in; Skinner A. S. Adam Smith and the American Revolution, (Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2/3, Spring - Summer 
1977), pp.75-87. 
328 For a survey of archives that shed light on balance of power thinking in the eighteenth century see; Black (1983), pp. 55-61. For 
a discussion of alternative French motivations in joining the War, such as a territorial gain, commerce, and revenge, see Corwin E. 
S. The French Objective in the American Revolution, (The American Historical Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, October 1915), pp.33-61. For 
an alternative view, that is that the Americans specifically rejected European balance of power politics, see Argura T. The American 
Revolution and the Origin of American Foreign Policy, (American Studies International, Vol. 15, No. 2, Winter 1976), pp.35-42. See 
also Letter from Comte de Vergennes to Chevalier de la Luzerne. Versailles . 5th February 1780. TEN I. p. 22. The French Foreign 
Minister asked his diplomat to make it clear to the Americans that rather than look to conquer new territory they should aim to 
secure their own territory and to be cured “of the mania for conquering foreign provinces”. In this letter, the Minister also makes it 
clear that the French objectives in supporting America are not to open a market for the luxury “manufactories” of France but 
rather to achieve a “diminution of the excessive power of England and of procuring...direct commerce ......which furnishes the 
materials necessary or useful to Europe”.   
329 Dull (1975), p. 4. 
330 Black (2010). p.155. According to Black “the French Foreign Minister sought to humble Britain's colonial and maritime position 
and thus restore France's international influence. The war in North America took second place for the British, below the struggle for 
France, which itself centred on security of waters.”. For an alternative point of view, see; Scott H. M. The Importance of Bourbon 
Naval Reconstruction to the Strategy of Choiseul after the Seven Years' War, (The International History Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
January 1979), pp.17-35, Scott explains that a post Seven Years War naval build up and the desire for “revenge” was tempered to a 
degree by pacifistic tendencies.    
331 Murphy (1982), p. 211. Vergennes had over thirty-five years’ experience in international affairs and diplomacy by the time he 
became French Foreign Minister in 1774.  However, having spent so long in France’s diplomatic service in foreign courts he was 
almost totally ignorant of French domestic affairs. It is generally agreed that Vergennes’ lack of knowledge and expertise in French 
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Vergennes’ in turn was influenced, in a desire to force a rapprochement with Great Britain 
based on equality, by the 1772 partition by Austria, Russia and Prussia, of Poland, a long-time 
ally of France, together with France’s 1763 humiliation in North America, including the loss of 
French Canada.332 To achieve a rebalancing on the basis of parity, required France to “take 
from her [Britain] a share of her strength… her monopoly of American trade markets” in order 
to weaken her.333 In reaching this conclusion Vergennes, in common with many statesmen of 
the day, was influenced by two ideas of mercantilism. Firstly, that it represented an 
international zero sum game, hence that depriving a nation of its trade links meant weakening 
it on the assumption that it could not replace the lost trade. Secondly, that world trade and 
military strength were inextricably linked and therefore that depriving Britain of her colonies 
meant weakening her militarily within the European equilibrium, whilst strengthening France 
because of the consequently more favourable trade links to America. 334  
 
Therefore, although not a believer that the cost of keeping and maintaining colonies was 
economically viable especially since treaty making could provide whatever trade benefits were 
available, Vergennes nevertheless recognised that the weakening of Britain inevitably required 
attacking its colonial trade.335 These considerations underpinned a French resolve by July 1775 
on some involvement with the American cause. An agent, Achard de Bonvouloir, was therefore 
sent to America to report on conditions in the British American colonies and to advise 
Congress of French support.336 Bonvouloir’s report, a proposal for supporting the Americans, 
                                                          
 
 
domestic affairs not to mention his “professional and class bias” which “subordinated even the most serious domestic problems to 
foreign affairs” allowed him to ignore the effect on French finances of a war in America and his pre occupation with France within 
the European setting. For Vergennes’ influence on domestic affairs see Dull (1975), p.6.  
332 This analysis is from; Murphy (1982), p. 213. Vergennes regarded the partition of Poland as of particular concern to France since 
Poland had been “a long time protégé of France”.   
333 Dull (1975). pp. 7-11.  
334 Dull (1975). p. 38. 
335 Murphy (1982). p. 256.  See also See Savelle (1939), who argues that the colonies were important not only as sources of raw 
materials but also as an integral aspect of the European balance of power. 
336 Dull (1975). p. 30.  
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led to the writing by Vergennes of what were referred to as the Considerations which form the 
basis for the discussion of the equilibrium issues that follow.337 Analysis of the Considerations 
points to the adoption by France of the hard balancing strategies of alliance building and naval 
rearmament, and the soft balancing of America with the aim of containing it as an emerging 
threat, by entangling it within a political alliance to forestall its emergence as a post-War 
hegemonic threat.338 
Hard Balancing in the European Equilibrium: Alliance Building 
Hard balancing by creation of an alliance with America was not without its risks and Vergennes 
was concerned to ensure that nothing be done to cause an Anglo American rapprochement 
before full French engagement with the American cause.339 An accommodation short of 
independence, would be the worst outcome for France if it came at a time before Britain had 
incurred significant cost in men and materiel.340 This is because, far from diminishing Great 
Britain, it might leave the latter’s strength very much intact. Hence, overt assistance to 
America carried with it certain sensitivities not least because British politicians had already 
recognised that an America closely aligned to France was not in British interests and 
attempted from the start to detach America from this alliance.341 King George III, for example, 
                                                          
 
 
337 A copy of Vergennes’s Considerations on the Affairs of the English Colonies in America, dated 12th March 1776 may be found at 
Giunta M. A. (ed.), Documents of the Emerging Nation. US Foreign Relations. 1775 to 1789, (National Historical Publications and 
Records Commission: Washington D.C., 1998), pp.18-24. 
338 Saltzman I. Z. Securitising Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization. (Lexington Books: Maryland, 2011). p. 
xxviii. The author explains “hard balancing is explicit and noticeable grand strategy… soft balancing is …about the need to forestall 
…neutralise…[a] rising or potentially threatening power”.  
339 For an alternative point of view see Van Tyne C. H. Influences which Determined the French Government to Make the Treaty 
with America, 1778, (The American Historical Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, April 1916), pp. 528-541. Van Tyne explains that France 
entered the War in 1778 on the side of America because Vergennes decided that war with Great Britain was inevitable and that if 
France waited beyond 1778, there was a risk of a British American peace which would only embolden Britain in a future conflict 
with France. Alternatively, see Ross M. Teaching the Reasons for France's Participation in the American Revolution, (The French 
Review, Vol. 36, No. 5, April 1963), pp. 491-498, in which the author argues that “while American agents Franklin, Deane, and Lee 
were striving to convince Louis XVI to come  
to the aid of their country, they did not overlook the opportunity to stress the motive of revenge”.  For a discussion of the lengths 
taken by Vergennes to hide from the British, France’s real intentions, see Tearle (2010), pp.56-57.    
340 Giunta (1988), p. 18.  
341 Attempts to reconcile with American citizens continued even after the British Army arrived in the colonies and the war had 
commenced. Hence, the protection of loyalists and encouragement of what are referred to as “moderates” was an attempt to win 
“American opinion” generally, see; Fischer D. H., Washington’s Crossing, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), p. 78. See also 
Bourke (2015), p. 449. Bourke explains that the loss of the colonies for the British would represent a loss of economic benefits 
from trade which would be exploited by other European countries. The implication being that Britain would thereby be weakened.  
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firmly supported these attempts but, far from desiring a non-aligned America, even after the 
French alliance became public, he desired American states that were dependent on Britain 
and, indeed independent of each other.342 Hence, the King had written to British Lord 
Chancellor, Edward Thurlow in February 1778 suggesting that the Americans should be 
detached from France state by state, a divide and rule strategy in response to the balancing 
approach used by France.343  
 
This risk to the French balancing strategy could not be mitigated simply by an immediate entry 
into the War since it ran the risk of committing to American independence before France was 
prepared militarily. Indeed, Vergennes worried that Congress was attempting to entice France 
into giving ever greater aid, before France had sufficiently re-armed, by playing on French fears 
of an Anglo American compromise.344 As explained above, before France could overtly support 
American independence, it had to be sure that the fight had some chance of succeeding, since, 
premature support for America risked weakening further the French positon in the European 
equilibrium. On the other hand, the opportunity presented to France by the British American 
conflict should not be lost for want of French support to America.345 Hence, Congress had to be 
fortified in its independence aims in the interregnum, until France had sufficiently re-built its 
navy and was then able to join the War. The Considerations therefore proposed a two-part 
approach. For the first part, France, and its Family Compact ally Spain, should not give away 
their longer term intentions to the British. Indeed, they should give the impression that “the 
intentions of France and Spain are pacific, so that it [Britain] does not fear to embark upon the 
                                                          
 
 
342 Black (2010). p. 168. Black explains that the King was determined to continue the War even at the risk of weakening the empire 
if this meant that the American states would return to the British fold. His wish was for peace to be achieved by negotiating with 
the individual states thereby maintaining their separation.   
343 Gore-Browne R., Chancellor Thurlow. The Life and Times of a Great Eighteenth Century Lawyer. (Hamish Hamilton: London, 
1953), p.173.  
344 Letter from Chevalier de la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes. Philadelphia 6th August 1780. TEN I. p. 96. The French were aware 
that some American politicians were trying to encourage the French to provide greater aid and support for America by using the 
fear that the Americans might otherwise settle a peace with the British. 
345 Giunta (1988), p. 20. 
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operations of a brisk and expensive Campaign”.346 In other words, France wished to encourage 
a full scale and rapid British mobilisation on the American continent to tie up the British army 
in a financially costly engagement and thereby to buy time for a French naval build up.347  
For the second part, American resistance should be fortified by secret French assistance so 
that their “courage......would be sustained”. Vergennes’ clearly stated aim was to ensure that 
the Americans were emboldened in these very early days of the Revolutionary War and did 
not, for want of confidence in their ability to win against the British, seek conciliation. Such an 
assessment was based on Vergennes’ view that the “ideas of independence ...are still only 
germinating indistinctly among them [the Americans]”. It was important for the French that 
the British be confronted with a resolute American resistance since Britain would then be 
encouraged to use huge forces on the American continent to subdue the revolt. Hence, the 
French would only benefit from a weakened Britain, eventually allowing Vergennes to achieve 
his original objective of a Franco British equilibrium.348 
 
It was, however also important for France not to remain ostensibly neutral for too long 
because of the greater relative weight given by it to one of two possible outcomes of a long 
war. Whereas on the one hand, a prolonged war might lead to the reduction in the power and 
resources of both “victors and the vanquished” that is America and Britain, and hence the 
weakness of both nations could only benefit France.349 On the other hand, a long drawn out 
War might lead to some sort of conciliation between America and Britain on terms 
                                                          
 
 
346 Giunta (1988), pp. 22-23. 
347 Roberts A. Napoleon The Great (Allen Lane: London, 2014). A similar point is made by Roberts in his description of the Louisiana 
Purchase of 1803. The author explains that one consideration in Napoleon’s sale of this land was to encourage the development of 
an American military and naval power to rival Britain, hence hoping for the concentration of British forces in a future war against 
America in the North American continent, and not in Europe.   
348 Giunta (1988), p. 22. 
349 Giunta (1988), p.23. 
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unfavourable to France.350 Not only would France therefore have lost the opportunity to 
achieve equilibrium, it would have failed to demonstrate its willingness to do so by failing to 
engage Britain on the American continent, in other words, to show resolve. Worse, if they 
could conquer their former American colonies, the English might use the resources and 
manpower then available to them, to strengthen their position in Europe. Therefore, 
Vergennes reasoned that France was obliged to involve herself in the War since “the English 
respect only those who can make themselves feared” and a failure of French involvement 
might lead the English to believe that the France lacked military or political resolve for fear of 
the English.351 In any case, the colonies must not be allowed to fail since this would embolden 
Great Britain in Europe. 
Hard Balancing in the European Equilibrium: Naval Power 
Hence, for France to enter the War, it was critical that it build its naval power in sufficient time 
to forestall some sort of accommodation, short of independence between Britain and America. 
Following Louis XVI’s approval of Vergennes’s assessment of the political situation, the latter 
instructed his secretary, Joseph Mathias Gerard de Rayneval, to prepare a paper, Reflections, 
on how France could assist the colonies.352 In order to address the above problems, Rayneval 
set out two approaches to French support for America.353 Firstly, support would be secret and 
it would be in the form of barter, mainly American tobacco for French and Spanish arms. The 
Americans would ship commodities to French ports and in return would carry away arms and 
ammunition. The French government would not be involved in this trade and a suitable 
merchant would be identified to carry it out. Similarly, due to the lack of specie in the colonies, 
                                                          
 
 
350 Harvey R. A Few Bloody Noses. The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution. (The Overlook Press: New York, 
2003). The author speculates that France abandoned its earlier condition that Spain should join it, under the terms of the Family 
Compact, before France supported American independence because it feared an American British rapprochement.  
351 Giunta (1988), p.23. 
352 A copy of Rayneval’s, Reflections on the Situation in America, may be found at Giunta (1998), pp. 24-29. 
353 Giunta (1988), p. 25. 
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France would also supply other commodities demanded by the Americans in exchange for 
French goods. This ultimately involved using a sham trading company called Rodriguez 
Hortalez et Cie.354 
 
There would then be an, essentially optimum stage at which France could openly intercede on 
the side of the Americans. Rayneval made it quite clear that this point of intervention would 
come at such time as the Americans could demonstrate not resolve but actual success in the 
War. When this might happen was not spelled out but, since France did not want to 
“compromise herself either with the insurgents or with the court of London”, it would clearly be 
when a decisive blow had been struck by America. This point might, it was hoped come quite 
early on in the conflict, because “if the court [of the King in London] does not have success 
from the very beginning....one would have to conclude that Great Britain does not have 
sufficient means to accomplish this task”, and hence might reach a settlement with America.355 
 
The optimum point, accepted by some historians, is that what led to French overt involvement 
in the War was either Washington’s resounding victory at Saratoga, described above, or that 
this simply coincided with a sufficiently strong French naval build up. The historian Jonathan 
Dull, who has written extensively on this period, believes that victory at Saratoga might have 
convinced the French only that the Americans could destroy armies and win victories in battle 
against large British field deployments but did not have the resources to win against the main 
British army. Therefore, according to Dull, what might also have encouraged French support 
                                                          
 
 
354 See; Bayley R.A., The National Loans of the United States, July 4th 1776 to June 30th 1880, (Government Printing Office: 
Washington D.C., 1881), pp.5-6. Arms and materiel supplied by France would be paid for with American produce. The sham 
company in this publication is actually referred to as an “imaginary” one, indicating in other words, that the contract was with the 
French government not with a company, sham or otherwise.  
355 Giunta (1988), p.27. 
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was the visit from the American Commissioners, who threatened a conciliation with the British 
if the French did not aid America by way of a treaty.356 
 
As far as naval strength was concerned, Vergennes recognised that French naval parity would 
provide only a transitory advantage over British naval strength since the latter were able to 
produce ships in volumes far greater than the French could manage. Hence it was necessary 
for the French, that Spain also enter the War on the side of the Americans since, even if the 
Spanish navy was not fully engaged, its very presence would be sufficient to decide a conflict 
between France and England.357 Ultimately, France gave formal notice to Great Britain of its 
intentions in March 1778 that not only had the French entered into a treaty with America but 
also that it had recognised the independence of the United States.358 For France, however, 
alliance building and naval build up did not comprise the full gamut of balancing strategies 
required in engaging the British. It was not simply a question of supporting America, but just as 
importantly, of containing America as an anticipated threat to French interests, and 
prospectively to the European balance.    
Soft Balancing in the European Equilibrium: France  
For the French, an independent republican nation on the North American continent was not in 
the long term French interest. Albeit outside Europe, it would be expansionist, growing in 
economic and military strength, a competitor for international trade and continental land, and 
with dangerous republican ideas.359 A victorious America would look to conquer foreign trade 
                                                          
 
 
356 Dull (1975). pp.88-94.  
357 Dull (1975). pp.98-100.     
358 Murphy (1982). p. 258. 
359 For the British, American economic expansion, all other things being equal, would not be an altogether bad thing since a 
growing American economy would be provide demand for British manufactured goods, see; Lefer D., The Founding Conservatives, 
How a Group of Unsung American Heroes Saved the American Revolution, (Sentinel: New York, 2013), p. 258. The Revolution is 
described by other historians as being of monumental consequence of all of Europe, awakening as it did “political consciousness 
throughout …Europe”, see; Palmer R. R., The Age of the Democratic Revolution, A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-
1800, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2014), p. 139. 
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markets, particularly seeking outlets for its commodities in the Sugar Islands, and in Spanish 
colonies on the American continent.360 Trade ambitions would, however be dwarfed by the 
American hunger for land, and Rayneval recognised that a victory for the American states 
would come with a risk for all European powers with colonies in not only north but in the 
south North American continent which no doubt would become targets for the territorial 
expansionist tendencies of a newly independent America. Hence, although there would be 
benefits to France of American independence, it was just as important to have monopolistic 
access to American trade that would bind the two nations by making them interdependent 
based on their trading links.361 Therefore, a binding strategy that kept America close to France 
through alliance commitments and trade would forestall American predominance.  
 
According to Rayneval’s thinking, a binding strategy that effectively constrained America 
within French treaty commitments, rested on two assumptions. The major assumption was 
that the early days after independence were the optimum point at which to bind American 
commerce. This was because a victorious America would initially be too impoverished by war 
to be in any state to attack the trade and colonies of any other European power. Secondly, the 
optimistic assumption that Republican forms of government “rarely have the spirit of 
conquest” and chiefly the American colonies would not have the desire to do so since they 
“know the pleasures and advantages of commerce .....and industry”.362 Therefore, that 
Americans were motivated only by a desire to expand trade.   
                                                          
 
 
360 Giunta (1988), p.25. 
361 The Marquis de Layfette was instrumental in opening French markets to American trade not for political reasons but for those 
associated with his interest in seeing both nations benefit from trade, see Auricchio L., The Marquis Lafayette Reconsidered, 
(Vintage Books, New York, 2014), pp.94-96. See also, Miller, D., La Fayette, His Extraordinary Life and Legacy, (iUniverse: Indiana, 
2015), p.118 in which the authors points to La Fayette’s support for low French import tariffs as indicative of his desire to promote 
the American trade and French markets for American goods over and above those of Britain. La Fayette was an advocate of free 
trade and received an attentive audience in Vergennes, who wished to capture the American trade as the basis for restoring 
French dominance over Britain, see Unger H. G., La Fayette, (John Wiley, New York, 2002), pp. 180-181. Aside from trading links, 
France would also later expect America to be aligned with it in a future Franco British war; Gutzman K. R., James Madison and the 
Making of America, (St Martin’s Griffin: New York, 2012), p. 271. 
362 Giunta (1988), p.25. 
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However, this binding strategy was ultimately doomed to have a limited effect, because 
Rayneval had failed, at this juncture in early 1776, to appreciate that American Republicanism, 
whilst rejecting European forms of imperialism, nevertheless embraced continental territorial 
expansion as its natural right and a feature of its commitment to spreading liberty and 
freedom.363 Whether this right to westward expansion is to be found in the original charters of 
the so called landed states, those that believed that their western boundaries ended at the 
Pacific, or in the universalism of the Revolution discussed in Chapter One, the French would 
not, through a binding strategy be able to restrain American ambitions. 
 
Rayneval therefore, failed to place sufficient weight on what might be in the longer term 
American interest. Additionally, France had no choice, it had to support the Revolution as a 
bulwark to English power. It is for these reasons that the French considered but then 
disregarded the possibility of the failure of soft balancing, and therefore the longer term threat 
to French and Spanish interests in supporting America. French involvement in the War was 
hence essentially a calculation involving the relative weights to be attributed to the benefits of 
balancing against Britain as against the consequences to the balance of a strong independent 
America.   
 
Either way, that America was a participant in the European equilibrium is inferred from a 
consideration of the three incentives that encouraged France to enter the War on the side of 
America, all connected with the equilibrium. Firstly, the War would come at much greater cost 
to Britain than to France because France could count on local [American] support whereas 
British soldiers were clearly having to manage a long supply line in a hostile country. This 
                                                          
 
 
363 The right to westward expansion is referred to as the Turner Thesis after the historian Jackson Turner Maine who identified and 
explored the idea. Relevant discussion is in Chapter One. 
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would only lead to an increase in the British debt burden, and would make it incapable of 
being threatening “particularly to those who are in any degree maritime, as they are most 
exposed to British encroachment and rapacity”. Secondly, there were the benefits of trade 
with America the benefits of which they continually held to prospective allies. However, by all 
accounts the only nation to benefit significantly therefrom was Britain as trade resumed after 
the end of the War. Thirdly, as far as America as a reliable ally was concerned, France might 
one day need American support because of the “changes to which human affairs are 
subjected” and that America would be only too willing to provide that assistance.364  
 
However, by 1793, within a decade of Independence, attempts would be made by then 
President Washington to disengage from the Treaty as it threatened to involve America in an 
Anglo French war. This provides a vivid illustration of the trade-offs that were being made 
between the pragmatism of short term interests, and those long run, ostensibly ideologically 
founded interests. This trade off was possible in foreign policy terms because, from the outset 
Congress only sought to take advantage of the French belief in its military and naval inferiority 
to the British and offered its trade as compensation for French support. Hence, to make sense 
of Congress’ decision, the alliance should be viewed as a deliberate choice to involve America 
in European balance of power politics for the pragmatic reason that military aid was needed to 
achieve independence. Although some historians explain that both countries shared the 
common objective of “diminishing the power of Great Britain”, this was not the ultimate aim of 
America.365 Congress wished only to take advantage of European superpower rivalries to 
                                                          
 
 
364 Letter to M. de la Luzerne. Office of Finance. November 3rd 1781. DCAR, Volume XII, Correspondence of Robert Morris. p. 3. 
Although written some three years later, this letter that Robert Morris, commonly referred to as the financier of the American 
Revolution, sent in 1781 to Anne-César, Chevalier de la Luzerne the French minister to America, articulated what the clear benefits 
were to France in supporting America. Morris explains that it is clear to the Americans that the objects of French support of 
America is “of the last consequence to the commerce of his Majesty's [King Louis XVI] dominions” but that the monies advanced to 
America will enable France to “derive benefits from a commercial connexion with this country [America], and I hope their Sovereign 
will always find here a warm friend and a faithful ally, should any of those changes, to which human affairs are subjected, induce 
him to ask that aid, which he now bestows”. 
365 Stinchcombe (1969), pp.1-12. 
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achieve the pan-state interest described in Chapter Two. Congress was not concerned with re-
balancing the equilibrium that had existed before the Seven Years War and that had left 
France subservient to Britain. 
 
Once it had achieved its goal of independence, America wished for trade relationships to be 
resumed with British merchants and expanded to new trading partners around the world.366 
An alliance with France that went beyond this objective would not be in the American interest 
given the inequality of the two nations. It was John Adams, possibly for reasons connected 
with his intense Francophobia, who explained that a reliance on the French Treaty would mean 
that America would never be secure other than in the terms of it.367 Inherent in Adams’ 
warning was a fear that an America that was over reliant on a European power, could be 
forced to compromise the very thing that made it different, its republicanism. 
 
It is submitted that Americans may have felt vulnerable in being too closely aligned to the 
French for at least three reasons that go to the heart of the differences between monarchies 
and republics. Firstly, there was the principle, discussed amongst Americans at various times 
that monarchies when compared to republics, did not act at all times in a national interest per 
se. Therefore, America could be dragged into conflicts which arose because of the whim of a 
French sovereign and not solely on the cold calculation of national interest. This was a major 
theme of some of the Federalist Papers published a decade later, and is described in Chapter 
Four. Secondly, it was not in the interests of the French monarchy to promote republicanism 
since ideas of liberty and freedom, were incompatible with absolutism and indeed posed a 
threat to monarchies, encouraging as they did, their citizens to question the established 
                                                          
 
 
366 For example; De Madariaga I., Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780, Sir James Harris’s Mission to St Petersburg 
during the American Revolution, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1962), p. 110., the author explains that Catherine the Great of 
Russia in fact welcomed an independent America free of British restrictions on trade.   
367 Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Franklin. Amsterdam. August 17th 1780. TEN I. p. 101. 
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order.368 Finally, and of more immediate concern, the two nations would be looking for 
different outcomes as peace was being negotiated. Adams, was profoundly aware of the 
adverse political consequences of the Treaty. He worried that the French could, in theory at 
least, dictate future terms of peace with Great Britain including the way in which American 
Tories or loyalists, some of whom had actually fought on the side of the British, were to be 
compensated.369 Worse, because of its commitments under the Family Compact, France would 
be unlikely to settle a peace with the British until its ally Spain had achieved its war aims. 
French and Spanish interests were therefore clearly not aligned with those of America. 
Soft Balancing in the European Equilibrium: Spain 
 Spain had entered the War on the side of France because it was obliged to do so under its 
commitments under the 1761 Family Compact with France. However, Spain was not a natural 
ally of America and nursed two war aims of its own. Firstly, to regain territory, including 
Gibraltar, from Britain, and secondly to protect its North American colonies from British 
influence.370 Therefore, Spain had an interest in the Revolutionary War but not in American 
Independence since the expanding states constituted a threat to its North American colonial 
                                                          
 
 
368 The difference between a constitutional monarchy, such as Britain, and an absolutist one, such as France, is given by Harvey R., 
A Few Bloody Noses, The Realties and Mythologies of the American Revolution, (Overlook Press: New York, 2003), pp. 420-421, as 
the reason that George III was unable to fight on at the end of the Revolutionary War, because Parliament and “the electorate” 
would not permit him to do so. 
369 Letter from John Adams to Robert R. Livingston. 18th November 1782. pp. 677 to 678. TEN I. The people themselves were 
divided after the War had ended, as to the way in which loyalists should be treated, that is, as enemies to be excluded from 
society by deportation, or to be reinstated within society given their wealth and business acumen. A key consideration being the 
difficulty in identifying a true loyalist, as opposed to say, simply those who only sympathised with the American cause but did not 
support it. See also; Main J. T., Political Parties Before the Constitution, (W. W. Norton and Company: New York, 1974), pp. 44-78, 
and; McCullough D., John Adams, (Simon Schuster: New York, 2001), p. 281.    
370 Aiton A.S. Spanish Colonial Reorganization under the Family Compact, (The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 
August 1932), pp. 269-280. The author states that the Spanish and French had resolved as early as 1763 i.e. after the Peace of 
Paris that brought the Seven Years War to an end, that they must re-build their respective militaries for an inevitable future war 
with Great Britain. See also Gould e. H. Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish 
Periphery, (The American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3, June 2007), pp. 764-786, for an analysis of the relative balance of 
power between Spain and Great Britain in their respective colonial systems on the North American continent. See Beerman E. The 
Last Battle of the American Revolution: Yorktown. No, the Bahamas!. (The Spanish-American Expedition to Nassau in 1782), (The 
Americas, Vol. 45, No. 1, July 1988), pp.79-95) for a discussion of the motivations of the Spanish King, who whilst reluctant to wage 
war against Britain later reconciled himself to his commitments under the Family Compact. See also; Kuethe A. F. and Andrien K. 
F., The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century, War and the Bourbon Reforms 1713-1796, (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2014), p. 288, in which the authors explain that Comte de Floridablanca, Chief Spanish Minister at the time, was 
motivated by the desire to promote Spanish interests at the expense of Britain.  
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system.371 A fear of American expansion would continue long after the end of the War, in 1786 
Spain continued to insist on exclusive rights to the Mississippi and considered forcing an 
American concession by threatening to withdraw support for the protection of American 
Mediterranean trade against the Barbary Powers, as well as demanding immediate repayment 
of Revolutionary War loans.372  
 
Spanish concerns with American Independence were located in the demands faced by 
Congress from frontiersmen who continued to colonise the western territories, their threats to 
cede from the union, and to form what could be threatening independent states on the 
Spanish colonial border. For example, the colony of Kentucky, threatened to leave Virginia if 
Congress was not able to ensure safe navigation of the Mississippi and guarantee the River as a 
boundary to the United States.373    
  
                                                          
 
 
371 For an alternative point of view see, James J. A. Spanish Influence in the West During the American Revolution, (The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, September 1917), pp. 193-208, the author quotes General Charles Lee of the Virginia 
Committee of Safety in a letter to the Governor of Louisiana, in which he explained that Spain would be better off with America 
independent because then Britain would be weakened in its ability to wage war on the Spanish colonies. For other historians, 
Spain’s war aims in joining the Revolutionary War was to end the illicit trade on the banks of the Mississippi which involved British 
merchants and therefore to have the River freely available to Spanish colonists, see; Arthur P.W. (et al), The Spanish –American 
Frontier. 1783 to 1795. The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley (University of Nebraska Press: 
Nebraska, 1969), pp. 3-4, and, p.7. 
372 Don Diego de Gardoqui to John Jay. 25th May 1786. TEN III, pp. 181 to 183. The problem involved the Barbary pirate attacks on 
American shipping which had afflicted all European powers, requiring them to pay tribute to secure safe passage in the 
Mediterranean. The Barbary Pirates represented the North African Mediterranean states Tunisia, Algeria and Tripoli, and 
continued to cause problems until well into the early nineteenth century. The Barbary issue led high insurance premiums, capture 
and enslavement of American sailors, and the demand for tribute to ensure safe passage, see; Congressional Resolution Regarding 
Funding of Barbary Negotiations. 14th February 1785. TEN II, p. 553. In directions to its Ministers to form treaties with the Barbary 
powers, Congress appropriated $80,000 from a recent Dutch loan for use as tribute.  By February 1786, Congress was considering 
where it might raise a further pounds sterling hundred and twenty thousand in order to effectively treat with all the Barbary 
powers. Failure to conclude treaties would lead to a greater cost in fighting a war, losing commerce, and paying higher insurance 
premiums, see; John Adams to John Jay. 22nd February 1786, TEN III. pp.104-106. The price to be paid for protecting American 
shipping was in raising foreign loans with which to pay tributes, and in political alliances, see; Letter from John Lamb to Thomas 
Jefferson. 20th May 1786. TEN III, pp. 171-174. The cost of a ransom for 21 sailors, including three captains, and two passengers, 
was put at just under sixty thousand Spanish milled dollars. What prevented the formation of a European alliance against the 
Barbary States was the prospect of huge profits for those neutral European nations that stayed out of any conflict with the Barbary 
States, and absorbed the cost of tribute as a necessary price for conducting trade, leaving others to bear the brunt of naval 
disputes, see; Letter from Richard O’Brien, Zaccheus Coffin and Isaac Stephens to Thomas Jefferson. 8th June 1786.  TEN III. pp.192-
199. Americans suspected that Great Britain had hardened the Dey of Algiers to expect a tribute of fifty thousand dollars as 
opposed to the three thousand three hundred offered by John Adams. 
373 Stagg (2009). p. 28. 
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It was for these reasons that, throughout the War as the Americans for reasons of military 
need, sought a treaty alliance, Spain responded by using all means at its disposal to contain 
what it deemed was the pernicious influence of republicanism and a fear that it would lead 
inevitably to westward expansion.374 Saltzman explains this neutralising of an emerging power 
as a balancing strategy founded it is submitted, in the case of Spain, in its interest in protecting 
a colonial system that was valuable to its standing in the European equilibrium.375  
 
It is for this reason that, in response to American diplomatic initiatives for a Spanish alliance, 
Spain demanded the exclusive right to navigation of the Mississippi River, that is, to the 
exclusion of American merchants and western settlers, who relied on it for trade.376 Such a 
concession would assure the demarcation of Spanish territories at the River, and hence assure 
their protection.377 Fears of encroachment on the Spanish colonies were well founded in the 
continued expansion west of the thirteen former colonies.378 A situation exacerbated by the 
thinly settled Spanish borders, and the creation of Bourbon County by Georgia, which aimed at 
settling a border dispute with the Indians which almost led to conflict with Spain.379  
 
                                                          
 
 
374 See for example, Stagg (2009); Morgan E.S. The Birth of the Republic, 1763 to 1789 (4th edition), (University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, 2013); Jones M.A. The Limits of Liberty, American History 1607 to 1992 (Second Edition), (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2007); Drake (2011); Griffin P., America’s Revolution, (Oxford University Press: Oxford,, 2013); and Blumenthal (1970). For a 
discussion of the inevitability of American expansion west even as early as the start of the Seven Years War in 1756, see Hart W. B. 
The Unsettled Periphery: The Backcountry on the Eve of the American Revolution, in OHAR pp. 30 to 46.   
375 Saltzman (2011). p. xxviii. For an alternative point of view, i.e. that the Spanish did not conceive of the threat of an independent 
America to their colonial system even as late as 1786, see McDonald F., E Pluribus Unum. The Formation of the American Republic, 
1776 – 1790, (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, 1965), pp.81-82. The author explains that the Spanish, more generally for want 
of analytical rigour in their considerations, failed to perceive of the alternative outcomes of a successful Revolution.  
376 Instructions to John Jay Continental Congress. Boundaries and Free Navigation of the Mississippi. 17th October 1780, Hunt 
(1900), p. 82. Jay was to “insist on the navigation of the Mississippi for the Citizens of the United States in common with the 
subjects of his Catholic Majesty.” Hence, an exclusive right to navigation was not to be conceded.  
377 Murphy (1982), pp.261-264. See also; Letter from Chevalier de la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes. Philadelphia 13th March 
1780. TEN I. p. 43. This letter explains the River issue in some detail and the disappointment of Congress following capture of the 
lands that the Americans had sought to sell to land speculators.  The Mississippi question continued to plague American Spanish 
relations throughout the Revolutionary War and was not ultimately settled until Thomas Jefferson negotiated the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1803. 
378 Letter from Francois Barbe de Marbois to Comte de Vergennes. 17th November 1784. TEN II, pp. 500-502. The end of 1784 was 
witnessing an expansion into the Kentucky region which might not only lead to a penetration into Spanish colonies but ultimately 
also to a demand for unrestricted access to the Mississippi River itself to facilitate American trade 
379 Stagg (2009). pp. 30 to 31.  
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Congressional willingness to surrender rights to the free navigation of the River despite there 
being at least three strong grounds upon which the states could claim rights to it, 
demonstrates its desperation for a Spanish alliance in the short term quest for independence, 
even at the expense of the longer term consequences for westward continental expansion.380 
The first ground was to be found in the terms of the 1763 Peace Treaty.381 The French had 
ceded the Eastern bank of the River to Great Britain in Article Seven of the 1763 Treaty.382 The 
Americans adopted the point of view that all the land that was held by the British after the 
successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War, including that which had been obtained by 
virtue of the 1763 Treaty, would naturally devolve to America.383 It was only natural in the 
optimistic view at this time that independence was inevitable, that navigation rights had 
already vested in America.  
 
If this proposition was difficult to sustain in the absence of actual victory in the Revolutionary 
War, the alternative view that seventeenth century colonial charters defined the borders of 
the thirteen states at least as far as the Western bank of the Mississippi could be relied on 
instead. In fact, some American statesmen took the view that they had been rather 
constrained, in the interpretation they placed on their charter rights. Strictly read, it was the 
                                                          
 
 
380 Letter from Chevalier de la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes. Philadelphia 11th June 1780. TEN I. p. 75. In this letter the French 
also demonstrate their cognisance of the difficulty that an American government will have in governing “too far flung 
possessions”. The French perceived that whilst there was a difference between the states as to whether or not they would support 
Spanish rights to lands on the east Bank of the Mississippi based on either their geographical distance, i.e. New Jersey, Delaware 
and Pennsylvania or their stated disinterest as in the case of Maryland,  the French believed that sectional interests and 
disinterestedness would give way to political expediency as the northern states supported the claims to the Mississippi of the 
southern states in return for, for example, New York’s claim over lands in Canada. 
381 Hunt (1900). p. 82. Congressional instructions to John Jay of 17th October 1780 explain that he is to rely on the rights vested by 
virtue of the 1763 Treaty on the grounds that those territories in any case “accrued to him [King George III] from the enterprises, 
the risks, the sacrifices, the expence [sic] in blood and treasure of the present inhabitants and their progenitors”. Further that “it is 
sufficient that by the definitive treaty of Paris 1763 Art. 7 all the territory now claimed by the United States was expressly and 
irrevocably ceded to the King of G. Britain—and that the United States are in consequence of revolution in their Government 
entitled to the benefits of that cession”. 
382 The Paris Peace Treaty 1763 states in Article VII that “the Most Christian King cedes in full right, and guaranties to his Britannick 
[sic] Majesty the river and port of the Mobile, and everything which he possesses, or ought to possess, on the left side of the river 
Mississippi”. See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris763.asp (accessed 15th June 2014).  
383 Francois Barbe de Marbois to Comte de Vergennes. 23rd February 1785. TEN II, pp 560-562. The Spanish suspected that the 
British had deliberately conceded the Mississippi territory to the Americans, knowing that it did not have the right to do so, in 
order to create “a real cause of jealousy and of quarrel”.   
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belief of certain delegates to the Continental Congress that the real western boundary of the 
United States lie at the Pacific Ocean “through regions till unknown”.384 Finally, there was the 
declaratory right inherent in the 1776 Model Treaty that placed the union as the successor 
state to Great Britain and consequently the heir to all of its possessions in North America, viz, 
East and West Florida, Canada as well as all the islands near to the North American 
continent.385 However, ultimately the states might have little response if Spain were to take by 
force lands to the Eastern bank of the River, and hence, under the ancient rule of uti 
possedetis, become the possessor by virtue of occupation at the end of hostilities.386  
 
In justifying American rights to the Mississippi River, Congress in its letter to its minister to 
Spain John Jay, made four important points that explain why Spanish diplomats had good 
cause to be concerned that Americans had expansionist tendencies. Firstly, Congress was 
concerned to ensure that the westward boundary of the United States be determined in a 
clear and unequivocal a way as possible to avoid future disputes, hence its insistence that the 
river was “a more natural, more distinguishable and more precise boundary”. Secondly the 
fertile land on the banks of the river could not be ceded to the Spanish since this would only 
encourage Spanish settlement and thus an “interruption of that harmony which it is so much to 
the interest and wish of both”. Hence Congress wished to contain Spanish colonial expansion. 
Thirdly, given the charter rights of states, Congress, by giving up these rights would excite 
“discussions [with the states and]..... embarrass the public councils of the United States and 
give advantage to the common enemy. In other words, although Congress was making a prima 
facie case for stability within its state system, it also did not wish to prevent frontier 
settlements which were already well underway at this time. This was apparent from the fourth 
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consideration, viz that the territories were occupied by Americans who could not be “subjected 
to a foreign jurisdiction without manifest violation of the common rights of mankind”. Such a 
violation of the rights of frontiersmen would pose a threat of rebellion to the existing 
American states.387  
 
Notwithstanding the American belief in its rights to the River, John Jay’s secretary William 
Carmichael, was instructed to present himself in Madrid to the Spanish Minister Don Jose de 
Galvez to seek a Spanish alliance and war loans in exchange for exclusivity of navigation.388 
Carmichael was to make much of the French alliance to encourage the belief in the Minister of 
an American victory, but not so much as to give the impression that Americans were guided by 
the French because this might cause de Galvez to conclude that Spain could indirectly exert 
influence. Jay, in an effort to demonstrate an American resolve and to forestall a fear of an 
early Anglo American rapprochement, instructed his secretary to mention the “cruelties of the 
enemy”, to demonstrate a lack of any emotional attachment to Britain.389  
 
However, the Spanish Minister was not to be so easily convinced and, in an illustration of 
Spanish unwillingness to encourage independence, demanded that the Spanish King “should 
be exactly informed of the civil and military state of the American Provinces” before Spain 
should contemplate recognition of America and indeed before it should enter into an alliance. 
This should include not only details of American military dispositions but also of the political 
                                                          
 
 
387 Hunt (1900). pp. 85-90. 
388 In the belief of American rights, American negotiations with the Spanish during the years 1775 to 1782 offered to cede rights 
over land on both banks of the River as well as exclusive rights of access over it. Anne-Cesar Luzerne, French Minister to America, 
expressed what was probably the view of many European diplomats, that the Americans had an arrogant and unrealistic view of 
their political and military situation even at the height of the Revolutionary War. He described it “a strange delusion to think that 
the thirteen States, which are unable to drive the enemy from their own territory, would be capable of making conquests from 
him”. The Americans were, however, taking a realistic view of their situation and, in common with any military and economically 
weak power, trying to make the best of the hand dealt to them by offering territorial concessions in exchange for a military 
alliance, see; Letter of Chevalier de la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes. 18th March 1780. TEN I, pp. 49 to 52. However, also see; 
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton. 5th December 1780Hunt (1900), p.107. Congress was resigned early on that it 
would not receive cash from Spain on account of its “finances & credit being scarcely adequate to her own necessities”. 
389 John Jay’s instructions to William Carmichael. Cadis 27th January 1780. TEN I. p. 17.   
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climate in each of the states, in particular public opinion and whether “there is any powerful 
party in favor [sic] of England”.390 Spanish equivocation demonstrated its unwillingness to 
encourage independence for fear of permitting a similar outcome in its colonies, cloaked 
within a desire not to recognise an independent America before it had won actual 
independence.391  
 
A Spanish treaty would ultimately prove elusive, although financial aid would not and would 
continue until 1780 as negotiations over navigation rights continued.392 However, by 1782 as 
peace and independence came into sharper focus, and the preliminaries of peace were being 
worked out by American Peace Commissioners, Congress instructed its minister, John Jay, not 
to progress further negotiations on terms that involved any surrender of navigation rights.393 
Therefore, whilst American offers to cede rights over the River had been predicated on 
condition of a Spanish alliance, as the benefit of such an alliance fell away, the offer was 
withdrawn.394   
 
In many ways therefore, a Spanish refusal to treat with America represents the success of soft 
balancing in the sense that, as far as the Spanish North American colonial system was 
concerned, a refusal to negotiate over the River, protected the system from American 
expansion. The above analysis also underlines the pragmatic approach of American statesmen 
of the period. Whereas it was not in the long term interest of the union for there to be a 
                                                          
 
 
390 Conde de Floridablanca’s Questions for John Jay. Pardo. 9th March 1780. TEN I. p. 41.   
391 Letter from Don Juan de Miralles to Don Jose de Galvez. Philadelphia 1st February 1780. TEN I. p. 19. The Spanish diplomat 
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surrender of navigation rights over the River, short term expediency demanded its 
compromise in favour of what was immediately important to the union, its survival.  
America as a Balance Participant in the Second Period 
Survival of the union would be ensured in the second period by virtue of a judicious 
exploitation of Franco-British rivalries.  As the preliminaries of a peace were being worked out, 
the 1778 Treaty was being used as a lever to secure concessions from Britain. Hence, whilst 
the 1778 Treaty had provided that America could not seek a peace separate from France, a 
provision strongly supported by Congress, American Commissioners negotiated peace 
preliminaries, one year before the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 that brought the War to an end, 
independently of the French with the threat of an ever closer union with France.395  
 
American Commissioners tried to rationalise this tactic of exploiting rivalries through separate 
negotiation despite American commitments under the 1778 Treaty.396 For example, Benjamin 
Franklin, Ambassador to France (1778 to 1785), suggested the approach to be the most 
efficient way in which to establish a general peace since issues that might otherwise be 
entwined could be kept separate.397 One such unintended consequence of an alliance with 
France was that America might never achieve its independence until Britain had handed back 
Gibraltar to Spain. Americans were keenly aware that France’s relationship with Spain under 
the Family Compact, would always influence the former to respect and support Spain’s 
demands for the borders of its North American continental possessions to be delimited at the 
                                                          
 
 
395 Letter from Comte de Vergennes to Chevalier de la Luzerne. 9th March 1781. TEN I, pp. 152 to 155. Some early signs of the 
French concern that the Americans would negotiate separately or in a way that was contrary to French interests can be found in 
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east bank of the Mississippi River.398 It was for this reason that, for example, Franklin 
expressed a desire to separate America from European superpower concerns.  
What are known as the Rayneval Shelburne talks that took place in 1782, provide further 
evidence of the conflicts in the interests of the French and American demands in peace 
negotiations. Rayneval in talks with First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Shelburne, made clear that 
the French not only supported Spanish claims to the boundary but also opposed American 
claims to fish off the Grand Bank.399 
 
Despite Franklyn’s desire to separate America from European concerns, American 
Commissioners in the negotiations attempted to re-build relations with Britain within a 
framework that did not sever Franco-American ties, since this might deprive America of its 
bargaining strength. If the Commissioners were to be successful, they must first overcome, 
what this thesis refers to as the obstacle of credibility, that threatened future national prestige. 
 
Success in overcoming the obstacle of credibility required the American Commissioners to 
balance American interests, against the risk of appearing to the world as an unreliable ally by 
virtue of violating the strict terms of the French treaty. Vergennes, recognised the American 
predicament and expressed the hope that this one truism would convince Congress not to 
seek to end the War without recourse to the French. In a letter to Luzerne in early 1782, 
Vergennes explained that the French should have nothing to fear because if the Americans 
made a separate peace with Great Britain, they would be “branded a perfidious nation from 
their debut in the political world, and they would sooner or later suffer the penalty”.400 
Vergennes therefore reasoned that since the Americans had entered into the political alliance, 
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they would have little choice but to adhere as strictly as possible to the terms and spirit of it.401 
Failure to do so would have left America without the credibility it needed as it inevitably 
sought post-War treaties, and importantly would leave the union vulnerable, in the event of 
post-War British armed conflict without the prospect of a strong foreign ally. This is why 
successive British parliaments in turn throughout the War, and particularly as peace 
negotiations were underway, continued to seek ways in which to detach the Americans from 
their French alliance.402  
 
To overcome the obstacle of credibility, required the American Commissioners to recognise 
that French and American national interests were not aligned. The British Foreign Minister 
Charles James Fox had already reasoned that Americans would soon come to the realisation 
that its [French] allies would never negotiate a peace favourable to America until such time as 
the powers of Europe “had settled all the claims and differences which they have one with the 
other”.403 For Fox, as soon as it accepted this point, America would realise that its treaty 
obligations did not preclude it from negotiating a peace with Britain as it saw fit because the 
former’s interests were now different from those of its ally. Hence its treaty obligations did not 
mean that America should hold out until all French demands of Britain had been met. In a clear 
illustration of the balance rivalries that had manifest at this time, Fox might have been 
influenced, in this point of view not just in a desire to separate America from France but also 
because of a belief that France was emboldened in its demands of the British as a result of its 
alliance with America.404 Indeed, it suited the British to take the view that once America had 
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404 Letter from Charles James Fox to Thomas Grenville. 26th May 1782. TEN I, pp. 403 to 404. 
 
 
127 
 
achieved its independence, it should assume that the objective of its treaty with France had 
been fulfilled entirely and Americans should therefore be free to act in their own interests.405  
 
For Americans, as an end to hostilities with Britain were being contemplated, the French treaty 
would not be allowed to stand in the way of developing a closer trading relationship with 
Britain. However, this did not mean that it was lost on American Commissioners that much of 
the respect as a sovereign nation that America had from its former colonial master came about 
as a consequence of its alliance with France, the realisation of which, Adams described as her 
“temper of wisdom”. 406 In other words, America hoped to negotiate not just peace terms but a 
future trade agreement with Britain by virtue of leverage of the alliance by playing to British 
fears of a post-War Franco-American closeness which would not be in British interests.  
 
Separate negotiations were not just restricted to favourable trade or to emotional links with 
Britain, there were two other issues that went to the heart of national interest.407 Firstly, after 
the War had ended American diplomats were to be actively involved in international politics 
and to be fully cognisant with the affairs of Europe and their consequences for American 
interests.408 Britain’s free press meant that it would be a convenient and useful place at which 
to base American diplomats intent on gathering news about European if not world events and 
its reliable “postal” service would permit safe transit of letters between London, Paris and the 
                                                          
 
 
405 Letter from Lord Shelburne to Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Robert Digby. 5th June 1782. TEN I, pp.421-426. Indeed, America 
would then be subject to British influence and an important ally against the French, see also; Jasanoff (2011), p.80. 
406 However, also see; TWJA, Volume VIII, pp. 255 to 259. Adam’s account of his meeting, as Minister Plenipotentiary, with King 
George III on 1st June 1785 provides an illustration of a feeling that appears to have been prevalent amongst British diplomats and 
indeed with the King. Adams recounts that the King stated “there is an opinion among some people that you are not the most 
attached of all your countrymen to the manners of France. “Adams explains that he replied “I must avow to your Majesty, I have 
no attachment but to my own country."   
407 On the positive post-War effect of the loss of the American trade to Britain because of the increased competition, see Crowley 
J. E. Neo-Mercantilism and the Wealth of Nations: British Commercial Policy after the American Revolution, (The Historical Journal, 
Vol. 33, No. 2, June 1990), pp.339-360.  
408 Foner E., The Story of American Freedom, (W. W. Norton and Company: New York, 1998), p. 24., men such as Hamilton and 
Madison are described as “nation builders”, intent on ensuring that America was actively involved in foreign affairs.  
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Hague.409 Secondly, domestically Congress was in a hurry. This is because of the poor financial 
situation of the southern states, and the generally poor state of the national economy, in 
particular the devaluation of the paper money. Congress therefore concerned itself with 
dangers to interstate cohesion if Britain should attempt to entice one or more states away into 
a separate confederation.410 Therefore, the union could not hold on for a peace that might be 
subject to prolonged negotiations to enable the French, and therefore the Spanish, to achieve 
their aims.411 For example, influential in French peace negotiations was the desire for 
favourable commercial terms with not only Great Britain but also with her overseas territories, 
in particular, the West Indies.412  
 
Hence, although a Congressional resolution adopted in May 1782, advised Robert Livingston, 
the first Secretary of Foreign Affairs, of Congress’ desires to adhere to the French alliance, 
Congress was keenly aware of the limitations it confronted given the separateness, i.e. lack of 
cohesion of the states.413 Such was the fear that the union might be torn asunder, as peace 
negotiations got underway, Livingston wrote to the Governors of each of the thirteen states 
appealing to them not to entertain British overtures of peace other than when communicated 
through the Continental Congress.414 Livingston was influenced in giving this instruction by the 
fear of foreign intrigue and interference in domestic politics and its influence on the American 
people.415  
 
                                                          
 
 
409 Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress. TEN I, 5th February 1783. pp.761-763.   
410 Such an outcome would have been possible if Britain had been permitted to negotiate with the separate states independently 
of Congress, as had been proposed by Russia and Austria, the countries involved in trying to negotiate a peace between Britain 
and America; Morris R. B., The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789, (Harper and Row: New York, 1987), p.66 
411 James Madison’s Notes of Debates. 30th December 1782. TEN I, pp.737-739.  
412 Ibid, TEN. I., pp.743-744.  
413 Congressional Resolution. 31st May 1782. TENI, p. 413.  
414 Letter from Robert R. Livingston to the Governors of the States. 2nd May 1782. TEN I, pp 369-371.  
415 Letter from John Jay to Robert Livingston. 28th June 1782. TEN I, pp.442-443. Jay expressed this fear when he suggested to 
Livingston that British Peace Commissioners not be allowed within the states more generally but should be confined to New York 
from whence they “write .........whatever they may have to propose and may receive Answers [sic] in the same manner”.    
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This is why, towards the end of 1782 and against its general sense that the 1778 Treaty should 
be closely adhered to, a motion was being considered by Congress to permit American Peace 
Commissioners to conduct their own negotiations without recourse to the advice and direction 
of France. However, the resolution to permit separate peace negotiations was postponed and 
ultimately not adopted by Congress although American Commissioners to Britain unilaterally 
decided to open and conclude the preliminaries of peace without recourse to either the 
French or Congress.  
 
By March 1783, when the separately negotiated peace preliminaries reached Congress, some 
Congressional delegates indicated their displeasure that the matter had been concluded 
without recourse to French guidance and direction, as Congress had originally instructed its 
ministers.416 Not only did these delegates take the view that the spirit of the French alliance 
had somehow been tested but also that the Americans had been duped by the British into 
weakening their French alliance.417 The actions of American diplomats left Congress in a 
difficult position, because if it ratified the preliminaries, it would be seen to be in agreement 
with these actions which had clearly offended the French. Congress therefore directed that the 
French King be informed that the preliminaries would not “take place” until such time as “a 
peace shall have been actually signed between their most Christian & britanic [sic] 
majesties”.418 Notwithstanding this, by design or otherwise, acceptable peace terms had been 
negotiated by taking advantage of superpower rivalries.   
 
The question then is, why did the French not object to American tactics to a far greater degree 
and indeed threaten treaty cessation or at least brand America a “perfidious nation”, as 
                                                          
 
 
416 Stagg (2009). p. 26. The decision to treat separately with Great Britain, is attributed to John Jay’s belief that France would 
always support Spain in preference to Great Britain when it came to a discussion of boundaries.  
417 James Madison’s Notes of Debates. 15th March 1783. TEN I, pp.779-781.  
418 Robert R. Livingston to the President of Congress. 18th March 1782. TEN I, pp.790-793.  
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Vergennes had warned. The answer may be found in a memorandum that appeared in France 
some five months after peace preliminaries had been signed. French ministers had begun to 
realise that the end of the Revolutionary War was witnessing the creation of a new political 
order in America which would require France to develop “principles of conduct” in relation to 
foreign affairs more appropriate to a republican as opposed to a monarchical state.419 Amongst 
the twenty such considerations outlined in the April 1783 memorandum on this subject, 
included one which distinguished the efficacy of a treaty made with a monarchical government 
to one which is made with a republican one. The latter, explained the memorandum, required 
influence amongst the people as opposed to a monarch or his courtiers, for its adoption.420 The 
French had an overweening view of the antipathy towards them that remained in America, 
particularly amongst some loyalists, and even amongst some patriots. To the extent that 
loyalists did not emigrate from the states, they would remain as “emissaries constantly 
working to cause old prejudices [against France] to revive....not in the chimerical intention of 
restoring America to English domination, but in the view of uniting it with England by a social 
contract, on equal terms and for mutual advantage”.421 Therefore French concerns were also 
with the degree of post-War closeness of America with it, not only with whether it would 
continue to comply with the terms of treaty obligations. An expected increase in post-War 
emigration from England to America would only heighten the sense of the weakening of the 
ties between the two nations. The French worried therefore that old animosities held over 
from the War, would soon give way as the generation of Americans that held hostile views to 
                                                          
 
 
419 Observations on the Principles of Conduct to Maintain towards the Americans. 30th April 1783. TEN I, pp. 839.  
420 However see; Hobbes T., Leviathan, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996), pp. 124-126., who portrays a monarch as being 
closer to the needs of the public because of his inability to govern or to go to war, for example, without the support of his people. 
This, however, does not preclude a monarch from pursuing his own ends at the expense of his public, provided that he can garner 
their support in doing so.     
421 Gouverneur Morris to John Jay. 10th January 1784. TEN II, pp. 273-274. For a discussion of this issue see Ritcheson C. R. Loyalist 
Influence on British Policy Toward the United States After the American Revolution, (Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 7 No. 1, 
Autumn 1973), pp.1-17. 
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Great Britain as a colonial power would one day pass leaving American citizens who, because 
they did not experience that conflict, were more likely to see Britain as a friend.  
 
The strong ties that existed between British and American merchants under the pre-War 
“regular [trading] system” would also revive themselves much more quickly and effectively 
than would the development of commerce with France.422 French concerns were proven to be 
well founded because of the ease with which Americans after the War, even given the losses 
suffered by British merchants during it and the difficulties they experienced trying to enforce 
pre War debts in the American courts, were able to secure long term credit with British 
merchants. This may be due to the shared connections of “the same manners, the same habits, 
and the same language”, shared with the mother country.423 It was also due to the size of the 
American market for British goods and the ease of securing long term credit.  
 
French diplomats were keenly aware of the questions that Americans would be asking 
themselves as the Revolutionary War came to a conclusion and therefore the risks that faced 
the Franco-American special relationship. This partly influenced French willingness to advance 
yet further funds to support the union. Vergennes explained, in a letter of February 1783 to his 
foreign minister, that America would be trying to fix the principles “that should serve as the 
basis for relations as much political as mercantile, which they will seek to establish everywhere, 
                                                          
 
 
422 Marquis de Lafayette: Observations on Commerce between France and the United States. 26th December 1783. TEN II., pp. 261-
268. Central to the idea of there being a “regular” trading system with the British was the ease with which British merchants were 
prepared to extend credit to American merchants. This document cites the English mills which were prepared after the War to 
extend longer credit terms than French merchants. Against this, was the advantage enjoyed by French merchants in the provision 
of fine wines and brandies.  La Fayette was however also fully aware that it was the French trading system that failed to encourage 
American trade. He referred to the complexity of the system of trade rules under which American merchants can unwittingly fall 
foul as well as the difficulties in recovering import duties on goods that enter French ports but are destined for re-export. Ports 
that the French had agreed to open to American shipping, particularly, L’Orient and Bayonne, still remained closed.  At the same 
time as Lafayette was extolling the virtues of a freer trade with America, French merchants in Quercy were complaining to 
Vergennes of the cheap American flour that was pouring into French colonies in the West Indies; see Letter from Moissac 
Merchants to Comte de Vergennes. 1st January 1784. TEN II, pp. 270-272.  
423 Observations on the Principles of Conduct to Maintain towards the Americans. 30th April 1783. TEN I, pp. 839-844. 
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and principally with their former metropolis”.424  He wished to be acquitted of this model in 
order that French policies should then conform to this new American order. The effectiveness 
of this French policy towards America was however constrained by two important factors. 
Firstly, the refusal of the French to advance further funds to augment the 1783 funding of six 
million livres to America, was not because French diplomats failed to appreciate the risk of a 
possible rapprochement between Britain and America but because of France’s precarious 
financial state.425 Secondly, French merchants complained bitterly about the value of American 
trade. Soon after the opening of the L’Orient free port to American shipping, merchants in 
Nantes and Bordeaux were complaining about the losses being suffered on American trade 
due in the main to the lack of American specie.426 However, French policy remained the same 
as it had been at the outbreak of the War, to weaken Britain and to keep it weak and it 
continued to support American independence for this reason alone.427  
Conclusion   
The existence of a balance of power relationship between European nations in the eighteenth 
century was propitious to the American ambition for independence. The very fact that nations 
fought wars to reinstate the equilibrium, created the circumstances for an effective American 
policy that took advantage of rivalries between those nations. The unique approach that 
blended the pragmatism so important to an emerging state, with the idealism of a republican 
nation that feared the consequences of European political involvement, was remarkably 
effective because of this rivalry. Hence, although political commitment was a stark feature of 
the French alliance, the American ideological refusal to accept the long term consequences of 
                                                          
 
 
424 Comte de Vergennes to Chevalier de la Luzerne, 27th February 1783, TEN I, p. 772.  
425 Comte de Vergennes to Chevalier de la Luzerne. 27th February 1783. TEN I, pp. 772-773. 
426 Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Vergennes. 30th June 1785., TEN II, pp. 676-677.  
427 Lyon E W., Louisiana in French Diplomacy. (The University of Oklahoma Press: Oklahoma, 1974). p. 57. According to the author, 
“France's aim in the war of the American Revolution was recovery of European prestige through humbling England. The French 
ministers of the time did not believe in the permanence of colonies and Vergennes’ prime consideration was the independence of 
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this responsibility was only made possible because the French did not wish to run the risk that 
there would be a post-War British American rapprochement. Such a risk was real given the 
close cultural ties, common language, the willingness of British merchants to extend credit, 
and the affections that some American still held for Britain.  
 
Whereas in the War period rivalries would be easily exploited, the post-War period required a 
far more subtle approach to foreign affairs and to the European balance. Given that it was in 
the interests of both Britain and France to constrain American economic and territorial growth, 
and to prevent an American alignment with any European power, which would be an early 
indicator of a change in the balance, American foreign affairs dictated an ostensible neutrality. 
For American policy makers, adoption of a neutrality in foreign affairs was more accurately the 
acceptance of a transitory state that would treat Britain and France equally in order to secure 
valuable concessions from one or both. It is because of the apparent refusal at alignment 
implied by this transitory state, that an American neutrality has become conflated with 
isolationism and remained a feature of the American foreign policy discourse since the 
eighteenth century.   
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4. Chapter Four: Balance of Power Thinking in the Post War Years  
The Conflation of Neutrality and Isolation within the Farewell Address  
Chapter One explained that an American isolation is generally taken to have its origins in the 
very early days of the Republic, and has influenced foreign affairs into the early twentieth 
century, only to be exploded as a fundamental ideological assumption on America’s entry into 
the world wars.428 As explained above, the origins of this isolationism are generally located by 
historians in the Farewell Address and its warning against entangling alliances.429 The political 
separation from the European nations that is implied by this isolationism has come to mean a 
refusal to engage militarily on behalf of alliance partners, to participate in the balance of 
power, or to accept that political obligations will arise from trading relationships.430 Whereas 
                                                          
 
 
428 Other historians argue however, that far from a desire to be isolationist in this period, the aim of American foreign policy was 
to extend influence and power abroad, see; Williams A. W. The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920's. (Science & Society, Guildford 
Press, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter, 1954), pp. 1-20.   
429 De Conde A. Washington's Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796. (The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
Organization of American Historians, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Mar., 1957), pp. 641-658., and see Nau. H. R. Conservative internationalism. 
Armed diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman and Reagan. (Princeton University Press: Princeton. 2013). See also, Ellis J. J., 
Founding Brothers, The Revolutionary Generation, (Alfred P. Knopf, New York, 2001), p.129. See also, (i) The Farewell Address as 
the origin of isolationist thought in American foreign affairs is rejected by Dunn D. H. Isolationism Revisited, Seven Persistent 
Myths in the Contemporary American Foreign Policy Debate. (Review of International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 31. 
No. 2. April 2005). Pp. 237 – 261., (ii) Mead. W. R. Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World. 
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J. American Isolationism. A Response to David Hastings Dunn. (Review of International Studies. Cambridge University Press. 
Volume 31. No. 4, October 2005), pp. 699-700., (iv) for the view that American foreign policy has been continuously expansionist 
in both territory and trade, since the eighteenth century, see Thompson J. A. William Appleman Williams and the American 
Empire, (Journal of American Studies, Cambridge University Press. Vol. 7, No. 1, April 1973), pp. 91-104., (v) for the view that 
isolationism has its antecedents in the seventeenth century in the Puritan desire to create a settlement separate from Europe, and 
in the sixteenth century doctrine of the “two spheres”, that is that America was a legally different world, which Europe had no 
right to control, see Savelle M. Colonial Origins of American Diplomatic Principles, (Pacific Historical Review, University of California 
Press, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1934), pp. 334-350., (vi) see also Rossignol M. J., Early Isolationism Revisited: Neutrality and 
Beyond in the 1790s, (Journal of American Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 1995), pp. 215-227, who 
explains that the isolationism of the Proclamation, should not be equated with “an idealistic desire to establish peace and 
neutrality with all nations”., finally, for the view that the real message of the address is avoidance of wars, see Curti M., Peace or 
War, The American Struggle, 1636-1936, (W. W. Norton and Company: New York, 1936), pp.23-24. 
430 See for example Braumoellor B. F. The Myth of American Isolationism, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., Draft 
Version 1.2). See also Osgood R. Ideals and Self Interest in American Foreign Relations. (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 
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Policy Journal, Volume 12. No. 2. Summer. Duke University Press. 1995). pp. 52-54., in which the author describes the period 
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more extreme interpretations of isolationism demand that a society be totally closed to 
international trade, isolation generally accommodates trading relationships but draws the line 
at overt military or political involvement.431  
 
Given these ideas, the isolationism said to have been mandated by Washington in 1796, has 
much in common with neutrality, describing, as it does, non-entangling alliances as the basis of 
foreign policy.432 For example, Grotius describes neutral nations as having a duty to “do 
nothing towards increasing the strength of a [belligerent]…….nor to impede the measures of 
[another]… power”.433 In other words, neutral nations remain impartial and do not engage in 
actions that alter the relative power between two belligerents, a key facet of Washington’s 
warning to avoid alliances that might obligate America to enter a war on the side of one or 
other belligerent. A point reinforced by de Vattel in his comment that neutral nations “do not 
take part in the contest”.434 Hence, the isolationism of Washington’s warning against avoiding 
                                                          
 
 
comprised military involvement overseas, the periods before being described as internationalist on the basis predominantly of 
American involvement in international trade. A similar argument as regards the relationship of colonial Massachusetts with 
neighbouring colonies, particularly in New France, is made in; Buffington A. H. The Isolationist Policy of Colonial Massachusetts. 
(The New England Quarterly, Volume 11. No 3. April 1928). pp. 158-179. However, the colony was unable to maintain its isolation 
because the growth of its economy led to economic interconnectedness within the colonial system. The importance of trade in 
American foreign affairs since 1778 is made in Straus O. S. American Commercial Diplomacy (The North American Review, 
University of Northern Iowa, Volume 194, No. 669, August 1911), pp. 218-225. See also; Letter from John Adams to The President 
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431 Morison S. E. The Origin of the Monroe Doctrine, 1775-1823, (Economica, Wiley, No. 10, February 1924), pp. 27-51. However, 
Margold S. K. in The Beginnings of the American Policy of Isolation, (World Affairs, World Affairs Institute, Vol. 97, No. 2, June 
1934), pp. 89-95, based on a reading of The Federalist Papers, the Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, and 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America from the Signing of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, September 10, 1783, 
to the Adoption of the Constitution, explains how the ideas of no-political involvement, and separation from Europe came to be 
distinctly formed in the period to 1787, as American statesmen formed treaties of amity and commerce. For a discussion of the 
idea that a nation could never conceive of itself as truly isolated whilst professing interest in international trade, see Williams W. 
A. The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s. (Science and Society, 18:1, 1954). pp. 19-35.), who states “that the absence of genuine 
economic isolationism demonstrates the mythical nature of the entire concept [of isolationism]".   
432 However, for the point of view that neutrality can only be fixed by reference to the general law of nations, in other words that 
neutrality must be accepted by other nations as a proclaimed or treaty based state, i.e. in order to achieve neutrality as a “binding 
force”, see Washburn A. H., The American View of Neutrality, (Virginia Law Review, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, December 
1914), pp. 165-177. 
433 Grotius (1901), p. 377. 
434 Haakonssen (2008), pp. 523-525. 
 
 
136 
 
alliances, has much in common with an American neutrality. Central to the idea of neutrality 
was the belief that, provided America posed no threat to Europe, it had little to fear from it. A 
natural isolation would therefore prevail from eighteenth century European nations who, too 
preoccupied with their own arguments and “……pitted against each other”, would not have an 
interest for “adventures” in America” hence leaving America free from European military 
interest.435  
 
This chapter will demonstrate that the American neutrality that would underpin the approach 
to post-War foreign affairs, the proxy of isolationism, was heavily qualified by considerations 
of the European equilibrium.   
A Qualified American Neutrality  
The American idea of neutrality was subject to four qualifications that together mandated a 
policy of active involvement in the equilibrium.436 The first recognised the reality that the 
sought after separation could never include a situation in which America was cut off from the 
outside world, since insularity could not then achieve national goals, for example, the 
expansion of trade.437 American diplomats would therefore be instructed in the art of active 
foreign engagement by negotiation and treaty creation, and in agreeing the rules of 
engagement of an ostensibly neutral America.   
                                                          
 
 
435 Morgenthau (1952), pp. 1-7. This assessment is attributed to Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, and John Quincy Adams. One of 
the ways in which this intrigue might manifest was in the foreign influence on treaty making. However, American statesmen such 
as Hamilton rejected this claim as preposterous on the grounds of what he referred to as “the advantage of numbers”, that is, the 
Constitutional requirement that treaty formation requires a two thirds majority in the senate, see; Meyerson M. I, Liberty’s 
Blueprint. How Madison and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the Constitution, and Made Democracy Safe for the 
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Secondly, there was an acceptance that the very existence of American as an independent 
regional power threatened disequilibrium causing European nations to desire to destabilise 
it.438 Americans would therefore naturally engage the European balance of power, and would 
sidestep the generally accepted idea that a nation intent on neutrality would establish this 
position within treaty commitments, hence rejecting the notion that international norms on 
foreign engagement would apply to them.439 Thirdly, the belief that geography protected 
America from European affairs, could never be a serious consideration given the presence of 
Spain and Britain in the American sphere of interest and influence, the western territory.  
 
Fourthly, the central ideological plank of pre-War foreign policy, the no political connections 
requirement of the 1776 Model Treaty, would not be set in stone, and could be compromised 
if the national interest demanded it. Hence, John Adams accepted that there should be 
military or other alliances to protect the Mediterranean trade, and a military alliance with 
France, to encourage Britain to treat with it.440 Therefore, a neutrality would not preclude 
using the French alliance to secure valuable concessions from Britain.441 As John Jay explained, 
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holding out the prospect that there could be an American inspired “defensive alliance” 
involving France, Spain and Holland would be “longer and more sensibly felt by Britain”, i.e. 
have more effect on it than even conceding American independence, and that this might 
encourage favourable trade arrangements and vacation of the western forts.442    
 
Hence foreign policy was predicated on a unique form of neutrality, within which diplomats 
were free to participate in the balance of power.443 The effectiveness of this approach would 
be founded in the fear of European nations, “apprehensive” that “notwithstanding.. 
professions” of neutrality, America might find its national interests better served by an alliance 
with one of them at the expense of the other.444  
                                                          
 
 
Confederation Series, vol. 2, 18 July 1784 – 18 May 1785, Abbot W. W. (ed.), (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia: Virginia, 
1992), pp. 465–467. FONA. Adams was suspicious that the Europeans were playing the same game and he described the 
“hypocrisy” of France and Britain each of which was “professing desires of friendship” with the other, in order to provoke a 
“jealousy” in America that would encourage an alliance with one or other of them, see; “John Adams to John Jay, 27 Oct. 1786,” 
Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0792 [last update: 2015-12-30]). 
Source: this is an Early Access document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. 
442 John Adams to John Jay, 15 Oct. 1785, Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0322 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access 
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. For the idea that trade duties would have the 
effect of forcing a favourable Anglo America treaty, see also Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 19 Nov. 1785, Founders Online, 
National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0376 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an 
Early Access document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. Although there remained both 
Anglophile, and Francophile factions in Congress throughout this period, conflicts over which faction would influence America 
foreign policy, i.e. whether there would be an alignment between America and one or of these nations, was not a serious issue 
until about 1793 when Washington issued, what is referred to as the, Neutrality Declaration. It is at this time that there was 
argument over whether a French alliance should dominate (the desire of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, and of James 
Madison, Virginia Representative in the House), or a British alliance should (the desire of Alexander Hamilton, Treasury Secretary), 
see Meyerson (2008), p.125.      
443 Bukovansky M., American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812 (International Organization, 51, 
1997) p. 210. The author supports the idea that neutrality in the pre and immediately post-independence years was highly 
nuanced but restricts this concept to maritime neutrality only and describes it as a more liberal neutrality based on American 
demands for the more expanded rights of the ships of non-belligerents, for example, in relation to the what could be defined as 
contraband. Such liberal rights were demanded by the United States even when they were usually only secured by a combination 
of a strong navy and defined closely within treaty commitments. For the value of America to the European balance, see; From 
George Washington to Lafayette, 15 August 1786, The Papers of George Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 4, 2 April 1786 –
 31 January 1787, Abbot W. W. (ed.), (University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1995), pp. 214–216. FONA., in which Washington 
explains that “While connected with us as Colonies only, was not Britain the first power in the World? Since the dissolution of that 
connexion, does not France occupy the same illustrious place?”. This summary of what neutrality meant to Americans of this 
period chimes with that used as the definition of isolationism by Doenecke J. D. in The Literature of Isolationism. A Guide to Non-
Interventionist Scholarship 1930-1972, (Ralph Myles, Colorado Springs, CO, 1972), p. 5, who defines isolation as “a unilateral 
foreign policy….unhindered by restraining commitments……aimed primarily at avoiding conflict [with Germany]….[and is] 
noninterventionist”. 
444 This is the argument made by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper Eleven, TFP, pp. 55-59, when he explained that Great 
Britain is worried that America will create a navy and begin to compete directly with them in the carrying trade. Therefore, it is in 
the interests of Europe to “foster division” amongst the states. Hence a price would be set on neutrality as America focussed its 
resources on a common interest. See also; Letter from John Adams to Secretary Jay. Grosvenor Square. 17th October, 1785, TWJA, 
Volume VIII, p. 322. Adams explained to Jay how “it is natural for England and France to be jealous of our neutrality, and 
apprehensive that, notwithstanding our professions, we may be induced to connect ourselves with one against the other. While 
such uncertainties and suspicions continue, we may find that each of these rival kingdoms will be disposed to stint our growth and 
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The Post-War National Interest  
In the post-War period, the union of the states that had been so critical to securing 
independence, would now become an end in itself, in other words, the union was central to 
the three great planks of the national interest, viz; security, territorial expansion, and trade.  
 
The security of the union was a problem brought into sharp relief by the fear of foreign 
interference in the affairs of the states.445 Fears of foreign influence played a significant role in 
subsequent debates over the Constitution. Generally, the concern was that European nations 
were aware of the fractures in the union and were willing to take advantage of any division 
amongst the states, in order to destabilise it.446 Such a fear would be well founded given that, 
whereas before the War, the states had formed a collective security union to secure 
independence, after the War, there was disagreement as to how close the union should be to 
protect itself against foreign intrigue.447 One indicator of a lack of post-War state cohesion was 
the selfishness of the states in the international carrying trade.448 Hence, whilst the states had 
                                                          
 
 
diminish our power, from a fear that it will be employed against itself, and in favor of its enemy. If France could be sure of our 
perpetual alliance, it is to be supposed she would favor our increase in everything which could be reconciled to her own interest”. 
445 The nature of foreign intrigue is explained in; Boyd J. P., Number 7, Alexander Hamilton’s Secret Attempts to Control Foreign 
Policy, (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1964), pp. xii.-xiii., as the involvement of foreign nations in America, against which 
America is said to have adopted a positon of neutrality and a policy of retaliatory tariffs. Neutrality in foreign affairs is linked 
closely with the avoidance of faction in domestic politics albeit created by foreign intrigue, see; Hunt M. H., Ideology and US 
Foreign Policy, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2009), p.26. 
446 Letter from John Adams to Secretary Jay. Grosvenor Square, 24th November 1785. The divisions were put down to the infancy of 
America a consequence of which would be petty divisions as a consequence of the people having “too much given up to the 
government of their passions” in the current Articles of Confederation. In other words, the people were unaccustomed to living 
within large communities but took a very much parochial approach, interfering in local government. TWJA, Volume VIII, p. 347. 
See also; (i) John Adams to John Jay, 15 December. 1785, (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0429 [last 
update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. 
FONA. The fear of foreign intrigue was genuine, not restricted only to Britain, and indeed went beyond diplomatic involvement. 
Adams had reported the disinformation being spread in many European countries about the state of America with the sole aim of 
discouraging emigration to it; (ii) On the dangers to the union see for example the short hand notes of William Paterson New 
Jersey delegate to the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand, Volume I. p. 273., when he refers to; “No Provision agt. foreign 
Powers or Invasions”. For the point of view that such intrigue already existed in Congress, see the comments of Rufus King 
Delegate for Massachusetts, Farrand, Volume I. p. 263., who explained “Every one [sic] is impressed with the idea of a general 
regulation of trade and commerce. Can congress do this? when [sic] from the nature of their institution they are so subject to cabal 
and intrigue?”. 
447 See Nagel P. C., One Nation Indivisible, The Union in American Thought 1776-1861, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1961), 
p.14 in which the author describes post-independence union as an “expedient [in response to a] crisis”, as opposed to what it had 
been, that is part of a strategic plan of the colonies.  
448 Hunt (1900). See also; To Thomas Jefferson. Philadelphia, April 16, 1781; “The situation of most of the States is such, that two 
or three vessels of force employed against their trade will make it their interest to yield prompt obedience to all just requisitions on 
them. With respect to those States that have little or no foreign trade of their own, it is provided that all inland trade with such 
States as supply them with foreign merchandize may be interdicted, and the concurrence of the latter may be enforced, in case of 
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achieved the shared goal of independence, they viewed their position in the post-War union 
not through the lenses of nationalism but of parochialism. Jefferson attributed this localism to 
be symptomatic of a union that, whilst it had the cynosure of independence in the War years, 
now struggled to support the common purpose.449 Later in this period, a consolidation of the 
states under a Constitutional union would, it was hoped provide the missing focus.450 For 
example, in discussions of the power of the President within a constitutional framework, the 
necessity of ensuring that he retained a “permanent stake” in the public as opposed to his 
personal interest was considered crucial to cementing state cohesion.451  
 
Secondly, interest was located in the desire for westward expansion which came up against 
Spanish and British interests. Americans considered themselves as masters of the whole 
                                                          
 
 
refusal, by operations on their foreign trade”, and ; To George Washington from Unknown Author, 15 July 1784, The Papers of 
George Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 1, 1 January 1784 – 17 July 1784, ed. W. W. Abbot. (Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 1992), pp. 504–526. FONA. The idea that a concept of national interest had been accepted during the War years but 
that it became more difficult to define a national interest after the War is a theme of this letter, which attributes the post War 
difficulty to the selfish interest of the states which overtook matters of “National Importance [sic]” which the author also equates 
with a failure of patriotism. The point is repeated by Washington in; To George Washington from John Jay, 27 June 1786, The 
Papers of George Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 4, 2 April 1786 – 31 January 1787, ed. W. W. Abbot. (University Press of 
Virginia: Charlottesville,1995), pp. 130–132. FONA. In this letter, Washington attributes selfishness to the unrestrained desire for 
personal gain, primarily through acquisition of land, at the expense of “public considerations” and “national interests”. See also 
James Madison’s Version, 18 June 1787, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 4, January 1787 – May 1788, ed. Harold C. Syrett. 
(Columbia University Press:, New York, 1962), pp. 187–195. FONA. The idea of selfishness of states (as opposed to individuals 
pursing land interests) is also made in; Salaries for Congress and Eligibility for Federal Offices, [14 June] 1788, The Papers of James 
Madison, vol. 11, 7 March 1788–1 March 1789, ed. Robert A. Rutland and Charles F. Hobson. (University Press of Virginia: 
Charlottesville,1977), pp. 140–142. FONA. See also; Farrand. Madison, Monday June 18., in Committee of the whole, on the 
propositions of Mr. Patterson & Mr. Randolph. (On motion of Mr. Dickinson to postpone the xst. Resolution). p. 284. In which 
Madison explains “The great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government. Are I. an active & constant interest in 
supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States in favor of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit 
de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts--their particular 
plans of finance &c”. 
449 Jefferson explained that a two way trade should be the interest all of the states, and a nation that was incapable of retaliating 
against European trade restrictions would inevitably find itself “in the situation [in the interests of Europe] as unimportant 
consumers of her manufactures…. and useful labourers to furnish her raw materials”.  From Thomas Jefferson to Edmund 
Pendleton, 16 December 1783, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6, 21 May 1781–1 March 1784, ed. Julian P. Boyd. (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton,1952), pp. 385–388. FONA. British negotiators were also frustrated with trade negotiations and 
demanded clarity on the power of Congress to enter into trade agreements given the separate interests of the states, see The 
Duke of Dorset to the American Commissioners, 26 March 1785, The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 16, February 1784–
March 1785, ed. Gregg L. Lint, et al. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 577–578. FONA. 
450 To Thomas Jefferson from John Jay, 9 February 1787, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 11, 1 January–6 August 1787, ed. 
Julian P. Boyd. (Princeton University Press: Princeton,1955), pp. 129–132.  FONA. The idea of the Constitution as being in the 
national interest was discussed in; To George Washington from David Humphreys, 24 March 1787, The Papers of George 
Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 5, 1 February 1787 – 31 December 1787, ed. W. W. Abbot. (University Press of Virginia: 
Charlottesville, 1997), pp. 102–104. FONA., in which Washington’s attendance at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was 
discussed.    
451 Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, [6 June] 1787, The Papers of James Madison, vol. 10, 27 May 1787–3 
March 1788, ed. Robert A. Rutland, et al. (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago,1977), pp. 35–36. FONA. 
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continent, in contrast to a pre-War contextualisation of colonists as members of a British 
Empire. These so called meta-geographies, or ways of defining one’s environment by reference 
to geographical constructs, which, for example could also include middle states, northern 
states and southern states, caused Americans to think of westward expansion, and control of 
the entire continent, as inevitable.452 The possibilities for the union from westward expansion 
had grown stronger as a result of victory in the Revolutionary War. Rakove explains that 
creation of a national domain, the opening of the west to American settlement, articulated a 
clear view of the national interest creating a “stronger set of shared concerns” and therefore a 
more sophisticated view of national interest than had been the case with the outbreak of the 
War. He explains that sale of the western lands was critical in creating economic stability and 
providing badly needed funds with which to pay down the national debt. However, in order to 
organise the lands for gain, a stronger central government than that under the Confederacy 
was needed otherwise the continent would fall to the influence of Spain and Britain leaving 
America within the confines of the original thirteen states.453  
 
Hence, a Congressional failure to allow newly formed western quasi-states into the union, 
once they had met some minimal criteria, and more importantly guaranteeing them a 
republican form of government, would not only limit economic growth, it would ultimately 
weaken the union leaving it vulnerable to European interests. Foreign influence was keenly felt 
in the north as well as in the southwest, for example, Jefferson feared that the Vermont 
territory preferred a closer connection to Britain, and that it was in British interests to nurture 
                                                          
 
 
452 Drake (2011). pp.2-10. Earlier chapters discuss the so called Turner Thesis of inevitable westward expansion.   
453 Essay; Rakove Jack N. Ambiguous Achievement. The Northwest Ordinance, in; Williams F. D. (ed.). Northwest Ordinance. Essays 
on its Formulation, Provisions and Legacy. (Michigan State University Press: Michigan, 1989). pp.1-17. Vices of the Political System 
of the United States, April 1787, The Papers of James Madison, vol. 9, 9 April 1786 – 24 May 1787 and supplement 1781–1784, 
Rutland R. A. (et. Al), (eds.), (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1975), pp. 345–358. FONA. Reference to the pre-
Constitutional union as the “Confederacy” appears, for example, in this document. 
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this tension.454 By 1787 negotiations were already underway between Britain and Vermont 
which might cause the latter to cede from the union.455  
 
It was Spanish interests in the southwest that created the greatest vulnerability to the union, 
and Madison, worried whether the American settlements on the banks of the Mississippi 
would “.. consist of a hostile or a foreign people, or will they not be a bone of our bones, and 
flesh of our flesh?”.456 In other words, settlers might see themselves as Spanish, not American. 
Hence, western settlers might seek Spanish protection in the south, reach agreement with the 
Spanish to close off the Mississippi River to other American traffic, and establish a union 
separate from that of the thirteen states.457 Hostile American settlers allied with the Spanish 
colonial system, and a Britain in control of parts of Florida threatened to create a buffer 
against further America expansion.458 The historian James Lewis refers to this risk as the 
                                                          
 
 
454 To Thomas Jefferson from John Jay, 14 December 1786, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 10, 22 June–31 December 1786, 
Boyd J. P. (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1954), pp. 596–599. FONA.  
455 New York Assembly. Remarks on an Act Acknowledging the Independence of Vermont, 14 March 1787 The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton, vol. 4, January 1787 – May 1788, Syrett H. C. (ed.), (Columbia University Press: New York, 1962), pp. 115–118. 
456 From James Madison to Lafayette, 20 March 1785, The Papers of James Madison, vol. 8, 10 March 1784 – 28 March 1786, 
Rutland R. A.  and Rachal W. M.E., (eds.), (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago), 1973, pp. 250–255. FONA. Although the 1783 
Paris Treaty had placed the American boundary at the Mississippi River, with the exception of the Kentucky territory, Americans 
were mostly settled east of the Appalachians, see; http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris.asp (accessed 22 June 2014 at 
13.21). Article II in relation to the boundary, states inter alia; “by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river Mississippi”. 
See also; Whittaker A. P. and Morison S. E. The Spanish-American frontier. 1783 to 1795. The Westward Movement and the 
Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley. (The Riverside Press Cambridge: New York,1927). p. 9. 
457 However, ibid, Whittaker (1927), p. 28. Whittaker states that the frontiersmen, without the support of a militarily strong 
Congress, were in no position to threaten Spanish possessions in North America. See also; Burstein A. and Isenberg N. Madison 
and Jefferson, (Random House, New York, 2010). p. 130. However, see; Witcover J. Party of the People. A History of the Democrats. 
(Random House: New York, 2003). pp. 4-14. The formation of parties and in particular the Democratic Party after 1787 are 
attributed to the Jeffersonian defence of the “pioneer spirit “or the tension that was evident in 1787 between the settled thirteen 
states and the frontiersmen. The tension was a very real one because frontier settlements such as Kentucky, Cumberland, and 
Holston counties, having common cause with the Spanish in terms of an Indian threat, interest in land speculation, and a desire for 
free navigation of the Mississippi, as well as their isolation from the American union of states, made those counties more likely to 
cede from the union. By 1787, Spain was considering attracting settlers in these counties into the Spanish colonial system by 
offering a twenty-five percent duty on products traded with Spanish colonists, considered sufficiently low to be attractive, see; 
ibid, Whitaker. pp. 31, 79, and 92.  
458 Cowans (2003), p.234. Aranda, a Spanish diplomat, explained his view, not necessarily widely shared, that France had acted 
against her interests in supporting the America colonies in their fight for independence. Although the French had few colonies on 
the American continent they did appreciate the security risks to the Spanish colonies from an independent America. Further, he 
took the view that it would have been in France’s best interests to allow America and Britain to destroy each other but that the 
French had been “blinded” by their hatred of Britain into supporting the Americans. The concern was therefore that, although 
born small, America would grow into a major international power and would then threaten the Spanish colonies which, in any case 
were difficult to manage from such a great distance. In order to mitigate the risk, three princes should be appointed over the 
Spanish territories in order to create three kingdoms. This would then prevent American growth into the west and through trade, 
the three kingdoms and Spain would grow stronger, leading to the growth of a navy which itself would alter the balance of power 
in Europe vis a vis the British.   
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problem of neighbourhood, or the military and economic competition from new states. 
However, managed properly, expansion west, the guarantee of a republican form of 
government to the newly formed states, and a general economic growth, were regarded by 
Lewis as fundamental to the survival of the union.459 Hence, it was imperative that new 
territories, be accommodated within the union lest they align to a European power in the 
western boundary.   
 
A similar situation was developing in the northwest. Congress, to ward off an American Indian 
war, had issued a proclamation in September 1783 preventing the occupation of any land that 
was claimed by Indians, not already within the boundary of the states.460 Jefferson however, 
believed that the Americans would soon be at war with an Indian confederacy supported by 
the British.461 Originally, employment of the Indian tribes on the side of British troops in the 
Revolutionary War had been widely supported in the British Cabinet, despite being greeted 
with horror when initially proposed due in the main to their method of waging war.462 After 
                                                          
 
 
459 Lewis J. E. Jr. The States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire. The American Union and the Problem of Neighbourhood. 1783 
to 1829, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1998). 
460 Horsman R., Expansion and American Indian policy 1783 to 1812. (Oklahoma University Press: Oklahoma, 1992). pp.3-74. 
461 To Thomas Jefferson from John Jay, 14 December 1786, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 10, 22 June–31 December 1786, 
Boyd J. P, (ed.), (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1954), pp.596–599. FONA. See also; Richter D. K. Ordeals of the 
Longhouse. The Five Nations in Early American History. (The University of North Carolina Press@ North Carolina, 1994). The Six 
Nations of the Iroquois comprised the Iroquois Great League, a cultural institution, and the Iroquois Confederacy, which 
represented the political and war making arm. It was this essential collective security body that gave the tribes their power and 
allowed individual tribes, by virtue of their membership of the confederacy, to enhance their negotiating position with the British 
American colonies.   
462 Gore-Browne (1953). p. 111. The Northwest Indian tribes under the Six Nations of the Iroquois had originally joined the British 
side in the Revolutionary War risking their lands on the presumption that a strong independent American nation to their east 
would represent a more significant and immediate threat to their security than would the British, see; Richter D. K. and Merrell 
J.H. (eds.), Beyond the Covenant Chain. The Iroquois and Their Neighbours in Indian North America 1600 to 1800, (Penn State 
University Press: Philadelphia, 2003). The Iroquois tribes exerted greater influence than their size, put by the author at some 
10,000, as a result of what is known as the covenant chain, a series of alliances between the Iroquois tribes and European settlers, 
agreements that compensated for their lack of diplomatic skills. The covenant chain contributed to perceptions amongst the 
Americans, British, Dutch etc. of the dominance of the Iroquois. The Oneidas Indians, as a result of an invasion of their lands by 
British commander, Barrymore St Leger in 1777, was one of the few north eastern tribe to join the Revolutionary cause, see; 
Glatthaar J.T. and Martin James Kirby, Forgotten Allies. The Oneida Indians and the American Revolution, (Hill and Wang: New 
York, 2006). pp.85-150.   
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the end of the War the Indians were once again important in a British policy that was 
essentially hostile to an America that was not in control of the strategically important west.463 
Although the Indian tribes had been ignored in the 1783 Peace Treaty, compared to for 
example British support for restitution to the loyalists remaining in America, it was not in the 
interests of Britain to completely forsake them because of their continued usefulness in 
containing American post-War expansion.464 Britain therefore adopted a strategy towards the 
Indians that encouraged the Indian fur trade, to prevent American influence in these north-
western territories. For example, although initially neutral and assured that no side would 
attack them or invade their lands for fear of driving them into the camp of the enemy, Iroquois 
neutrality was compromised by the fear, encouraged by British commanders, that an 
undefeated America would represent a prospective land hungry adversary.465 Although the 
British Forts in the northwest were garrisoned, Britain could not, without being charged with 
violation of the 1783 Peace, deploy its troops to support these strategic objectives. Hence, the 
British occupation of the western forts that were reinforced with loyalists based in Quebec, 
allowed them to continue with a strategy of trying to weaken America on its own continent.466  
 
National interest was thirdly located in the international trade and the desire of the states to 
sustain access to, primarily British markets and to the financial credit available from British 
                                                          
 
 
463 John Adams to John Jay, 15 Dec. 1785, Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0429 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access 
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. 
464 Downes R. C. Council Fires on the Upper Ohio. (University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh,1977). pp.278-282. Although 
attempts were made by Joseph Brant, representative of the Six Nations of the Iroquois, to form this Confederacy ultimately such a 
collaborative approach to Indian security was to fail and lead to the Battle of the fallen Timbers in 1794 without any British 
military support.   
465 See Haan R.L. Covenants and Consensus. Iroquois in English 1676 to 1760, p. 41., in Richter Daniel K. and Merrell James H. 
(eds.), Beyond the Covenant Chain. The Iroquois and Their Neighbours in Indian North America 1600 to 1800, (Penn State 
University Press: Philadelphia, 2003). The covenant chain should be viewed not as a centralisation of control of the Indians by 
European powers but as a means of “sharing power with Iroquois over other indigenous peoples”. 
466 Essay by Stewart Gordon T. The Northwest Ordinance and the Balance of Power in North America in; Williams F. D. (ed.). 
Northwest Ordinance. Essays on its Formulation, Provisions and Legacy. (Michigan State University Press: Michigan, 1989). pp.21-
33.  
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merchants.467 The value that Americans placed on their trade and their perception of the value 
that other nations would place on it played an important part in early American foreign affairs. 
Congress had first passed a resolution in April 1776 opening American ports suggesting that 
local assemblies appoint officers to “observe the regulations made by Congress”.468 It has been 
suggested that this Congressional resolution had the aim of encouraging the importation of 
materials to support the War and, separately, that it also symbolised also a revolution in 
international trade from that of a “corrupt mercantile system” to one of free trade.469  
Historians disagree on the extent to which the concept of mercantilism was generally 
understood as a single generally accepted doctrine, and a whether it represented a political 
approach or an economic one. However, there is agreement on some fundamental concepts, 
for example that it was the state that controlled trade, with its interests being superior to that 
of the individual, and that trade represented a zero sum game and therefore that the control 
by one nation of foreign markets implied their loss to another nation.470 Either way, a 
victorious post-War America desired trade agreements with as many nations as possible and to 
protect that trade, by insisting in bilateral trade agreements that imports be carried only in 
American ships.471   
Neutrality and the Balance of Power 
The national interest described above, required the continued exploitation of the rivalries 
between France and Britain, a policy founded in the fear of both nations for their West Indian 
trade, and in England from losses it would suffer from “a heavy land war on the [American] 
                                                          
 
 
467 Schlesinger (1918) pp. 15-19. See also; Beard et.al., 1934). Charles Beard describes these national interests as arising from 
economic factors and from domestic conflict between rival economic groups. 
468 Resolution of the Continental Congress. 9th April 1776. JCC, Volume IV p. 257 
469 McCoy D. R. The Elusive Republic. Political Economy in Jeffersonian America. (University of North Carolina Press: North 
Carolina, 1980), p. 76. The author explains that the Resolution reflected a view that “since the Revolutionaries viewed traditional 
restraints on trade as symptoms of British corruption” their vision of an independent republican future “encompassed vigorous 
commercial expansion”.    
470 Anderson (1961), pp.72 to 124.  
471 Letter to Secretary Jay. Grosvenor Square, 26th February 1786, TWJA, Volume III. p. 380. See also Marshall (2012). p. 99. 
Marshall explains that regulation of trade, as opposed to laissez faire free trade was adopted by the Americans. 
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continent” if it had to fight to protect this trade.472 However, a policy that did not treat French 
and British trade equally, through the imposition for example of reduced imposts, would run 
the risk of diminishing one or other of these nations within the European equilibrium.473 
France and England, were closely interested in any appearance of an American partiality 
towards the other that could be seized upon as a cause for complaint.474 This is why Adams 
recommended to Congress that ministers be sent to each of these nations to deal with any 
trade or other dispute arising as a prima facie means of demonstrating the lengths that 
Americans were prepared to go to treat each nation equally. The refusal of smaller nations to 
treat with America was influenced by the same idea of impartial dealings. Hence, when 
Commissioners sought treaties of commerce with Sardinia and Naples, both refused Adams 
suspected, because of their close ties to respectively France and Spain.475  
 
However, America could never adopt the impartiality that was implied by traditional ideas of 
neutrality because its very existence as an emerging nation made it an important balance 
participant. As America grew stronger it would give ever greater cause for concern that it 
                                                          
 
 
472 From Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, 15 December 1787, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12, 7 August 1787 – 31 
March 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1955, pp. 423–427. FONA. See also; Lycan G. L., Alexander 
Hamilton and American Foreign Policy, (University of Oklahoma Press: Oklahoma, 1961), p. 71., Hamilton laid the foundation of 
neutrality soon after the War ended when he expressed concern that there were men in both camps, the pro French and the pro-
British, that would cause factional dissent which would be counter to American national interests.   
473 See the point (described above in Chapter One) made by the early eighteenth century Spanish diplomat Jose Campillo y Cossio 
in Cowans (2003). Essay by y Cossio Jose Campillo. A New Economic Policy for America. 1762. p. 217. 
474 John Adams to John Jay, 25 Aug. 1785, Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0200 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access 
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. Pitt asked Adams if there were any concessions 
that Americans were prepared to offer to Great Britain that they would not then feel obliged to offer to the French. Adams said 
that both nations had to be treated equally, however he indicated that on “so free a footing” British trade would benefit much 
more than would the French trade because Americans were attracted to the more favourable credit terms available from British 
merchants. The neutrality that Adams proposed is that accepted by jurists since the seventeenth century, see; Grotius (2005), pp. 
377 to 378, who explains that “those who profess neutrality” must do nothing to assist any other belligerent, whether it is involved 
in a just or an unjust war. Put another way, the guarantee of neutral rights was a guarantee also that America would not be 
involved in European wars, for an early twentieth century acceptance of this tenet, see; Van Alsytne, R.W., American Crisis 
Diplomacy, The Quest for Collective Security, 1918-1952, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1952), p.43.     
475 Adams had described neutrality as “a perfect impartiality” since close attachment to any nation simply endangered America. 
John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, 9 March 1785, The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 16, February 1784–March 1785, ed. 
Gregg L. Lint et al. (Harvard University Press: Mass., 2012), pp. 551–553. FONA. Since the international system was fraught with 
uncertainty, it was necessary to “limit the behaviour of the ambitious”; hence John Adams’ belief in the benefit to America of the 
tension between the French and the British see; Graebner et. al. (2011), pp. xii. to 130. 
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might ally with either France or Britain creating disequilibrium.476 This could happen sooner, 
for example if Americans could not protect their Mediterranean trade and were forced to seek 
alliances. Hence in early 1785, the America Commissioners, writing to Vergennes, explained 
that Congress had resolved that, if the French were unwilling to renew their expiring treaty of 
1684 with Algiers and wished for war with the Barbary states to protect their trade, then 
Congress was willing and indeed preferred to “join in the war, rather than treat with”, what 
were regarded as, barbarous nations [Algiers].477 Hence the comments of the Commissioners 
point to a strong desire to expand the meaning of an American neutrality to include an 
offensive alliance at least as far as the Mediterranean trade was concerned.478  
 
Therefore, equilibrium considerations that had become so powerful in the foreign affairs 
thinking of American statesmen during the War years, were just as powerful, but they were 
                                                          
 
 
476 John Adams to Samuel Adams, 26 Jan. 1786, Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0479 [last update: 2015-12-30]). This is an Early Access document 
from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. 
477 The American Commissioners to the Comte de Vergennes, 28 March 1785, The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 16, 
February 1784–March 1785, Lint G. L., (et.al.), (eds.), (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 579–581. FONA. 
478 This is despite the Congressional Resolution of June 1783 instructing its ministers to avoid any alliance commitments that 
might require America to “support those stipulations by force of arms” and is therefore representative of realism in foreign affairs 
at this time; see, Continental Congress Report on American Participation in a European Neutral Confederacy, 12 June 1783, The 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 3, 1782–1786, Syrett H. C. (ed.), (Columbia University Press: New York, 1962), pp. 377–378. 
FONA. Stephen Higginson to John Adams, 30 Dec. 1785, (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0448 [last 
update: 2015-12-30]). This is an Early Access document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA The 
importance of America in the post War European balance is a major theme of this letter, in which Higginson explains that the very 
fact that European rivalry will be decided by “dominion of the Sea [sic]” means that America will have a major part in the contest. 
Even though America does not currently have the naval power, it will eventually have it, in the interim, American “ports, our 
Supplies and our Men” will be of sufficient weight to decide balance conflicts. More importantly, this letter exposes the fact that 
statesmen were clearly thinking in terms of an American interest which would not be constrained by wartime obligations. Hence, 
Higginson went on to explain that British fears of a Franco American friendship could be easily allayed by a British American 
“offensive and defensive” alliance which, aside from its military benefits would also bring trade benefits to the two nations that 
were connected by “language, habits, manners”. Indeed, such were the benefits of a British alliance, it was in the national interest 
that it be pursued, at the expense of France, by America offering itself as a balancing participant. A discussion of an alliance being 
in the national interest of both Britain and America is continued in Stephen Higginson to John Adams, July. 1786, 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0708 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access 
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. This latter correspondence is surprising for its 
candour since Higginson talks of playing “one [France and Great Britain] off against another” in the American interest.  See also; To 
Thomas Jefferson from James Madison, 19 March 1787, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 11, 1 January–6 August 1787, ed. 
Julian P. Boyd. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 219–225. FONA. The British, for example, were causing “great 
agitation” with western settlers with promises of joining a British colonial system in order to be free from the taxation and 
governmental “burdens” of being a state in the union. Jefferson described the problem as being the equivalent of the Vermont 
cessation issue but “on a larger [western] theatre”. For the idea that Jefferson not only believed in but actively tried to maintain a 
North American continental expansion policy in 1790, see; Bowman A. H. Jefferson, Hamilton and American Foreign Policy, 
(Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 1, March 1956), pp. 18-41. This paper also explains Jefferson’s willingness to exploit the 
European balance of power in 1803 in order to secure the Louisiana Purchase. 
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now no longer thousands of miles away in Europe, but firmly embedded in considerations of 
the western frontier with Spain in the southwest and with Britain in the northwest. Both 
nations anxious to restrain the American ambition for continental expansion.479  
Exploiting Superpower Rivalries  
Rivalries would be exploited by taking advantage of the continuing distrust between France 
and Great Britain, and the 1778 French alliance would be central to this policy.480 Military 
commitments within the 1778 French treaty had left a dilemma in American foreign policy 
making given the imperative that reciprocal military obligations must be avoided at all costs.481 
Whilst an ostensible American commitment to French aims of reinstating the equilibrium 
during the War had been a perfectly acceptable price to pay for that nation’s support in 
winning independence, after the War the obligation required reassessment, something that 
would not happen until 1793 when America would be called to declare its interest in an Anglo 
French war.482  
                                                          
 
 
479 Lang (1985). pp. 67 to 68. Therefore, Lang asserts that the international setting is the correct context within which to view the 
American constitution and its creation. To American thinking, vacation of the western forts sought from Britain would only be 
possible if Britain could be convinced that the only feasible alternative for Americans was a closer relationship with France. In the 
south west, it was the struggle over whether the western settled territories would be tied to Spain or to the United States, see; 
Stagg (2009). pp. 4-15. 
480 Marshall (2012). p. 55. Alternatively, the author takes the view that once American Peace Commissioners had negotiated 
separate peace preliminaries without recourse to the French, America as well as Britain, could be assured that the French alliance 
had ruptured, implying that it was not then available as a lever.  
481 Some Americans were not, even out of gratitude for French support during hostilities with Britain, prepared to adhere strictly 
to the terms of the Alliance; Wood G. S., Empire of Liberty, A History of the Early Republic, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009), 
p. 184. 
482 Hence, the British worried that the United States would continue to align with the French after the War, and therefore desired 
a neutral America, see, Ritcheson C. R., Aftermath of Revolution, British Policy Toward the United States, 1783-1795, (Southern 
Methodist University Press: Dallas, 1969), p.273. A full re-assessment of the Franco American relationship would not take place 
until about 1793 with Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality, see; Morton F. J. (ed.). The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-
1794. Toward the Completion of the American Founding. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 
2007). Morton, in the introduction, argues that opposition to the Proclamation came not only from those opposed to neutrality 
per se, but from those, primarily in Congress, that opposed on the grounds that the Executive was assuming more power than the 
founders had ever intended.  These debates are generally, according to the author, regarded as having confirmed the power in the 
executive by virtue of the general grant of powers of the Constitution. The idea of neutrality legislation as a restraint on the 
powers of the Executive are also illustrated by reference to a Congressional neutrality resolution proposed to Franklin Roosevelt in 
the 1940s, in; Schlesinger A. M. Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Houghton Mifflin and Company: Boston, 1973), pp.96-97. For an 
alternative point of view, that Washington feared pernicious French influence in Republican Party politics, see Wood. G. S. 
Revolutionary Characters. What Made the Founders Different, (Penguin: New York, 2006). pp.61 to 62. Further, for Hamilton’s 
view that the usurpation of the French monarchy by the French Revolution invalidated the Treaty because it had originally been 
made by the American states with Louis XVI, see; Jones (2007), p. 82. However, Hamilton might have been influenced in his view 
by his hatred of the French Revolution, quoted in Palmer (2014), p. 756. In any case in 1793, there were two camps, one led by 
Hamilton and the other by Jefferson, which respectively promoted a neutrality more in favour of either Britain or France, see; 
Casto W. R., The Supreme Court in the Early Republic, The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth, (University of South 
Carolina Press: South Carolina, 1995), p.74. 
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In the immediate post-Revolutionary War era the national interest would instead shape the 
Franco American relationship.483 The post-War basis of this relationship would be based on 
equality, that is, America as a sovereign nation with interests distinct from those of France.484 
Taken together therefore, there were two fundamental facets of American foreign policy. 
Firstly, at one level, an American commitment to the Treaty and hence the law of nations, and 
secondly a commitment to a national interest.485  
 
It was important to maintain the appearance of closeness to France and the promise of an ever 
greater alliance, especially the promise of ever increasing commerce, since this is the only 
thing that would, In Adams’ words, bring the “British to terms”.486 A belief in the value of the 
1778 French alliance went so far as to create a commitment on the part of the American 
Commissioners to support a European war provided that there was the “clearest conviction of 
the justice of the cause…and [America’s] real interest” was at stake. A point that was made by 
Adams when discussing with John Jay the possibility that there might be an English, Dutch, 
Prussian campaign against the Bourbon nations in 1787 which might require American to join 
France pursuant to the 1778 alliance.487 However, if Britain were to agree to relinquish the 
Western forts and open trade in the West Indies, Americans would favour Britain. Jefferson 
                                                          
 
 
483 The Pacificus (in the Pacificus Helvidius Debates) approach to disengagement with the 1778 Treaty can be regarded as 
sidestepping the legal obligation, by relying instead on “economic, ideological, and political considerations”, as being why the 
Americans could no longer support the 1778 Treaty, see; Blumenthal (1970), p.9.     
484 The principle being explained here is an instance that arises by virtue of there being an unequal treaty between two parties as 
opposed to an equal treaty. This was explained by Grotius, see; Grotius (2005), p. 184. An unequal treaty, according to Grotius, 
requires one partner to a treaty to require the consent of the other before waging war. However, Americans regarded themselves 
as equal partners in the 1778 alliance, not the junior subject to the instructions of the more senior, that is, that they were parties 
to an equal treaty. See also Adams C. F. The Struggle for Neutrality in America: An Address Delivered before the New York Historical 
Society at their 66th Anniversary. December 13th 1870. (University of Michigan Library: Michigan, 2005). Adams explains that the 
gift of sovereignty is the right to remain in peace while other states are at war.  
485 See for example, La Feber W. The US Rise to World Power 1776 – 1945, in Cox M. and Stokes D. (eds.) US Foreign Policy. 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), and; Cooper P. J., By Order of the President, The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, 
(University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2002), pp.122-123. 
486 Stephen Higginson to John Adams, Jul. 1786, Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0708 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access 
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. 
487 From John Adams to John Jay, 15 November 1787, Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0270 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access 
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version. FONA. 
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explained that Americans desired this outcome but were prevented from it by the “stupid 
king” of Great Britain.488 A king who refused to vacate the western forts and whose 
government continued to harass American shipping.489 It was therefore, for the British to lose 
the opportunity of an American alliance by their ill-judged desire for revenge for the loss of 
their former colonies.490 If Britain could not be made to see sense, then Americans would be 
tied much closer to the Bourbon nations by enforced “closer connections of alliance and 
commerce” as Adams explained it.491 Americans would not however, necessarily need to 
threaten a defensive military alliance, by directly engaging militarily with Britain’s enemies. 
Instead Britain could be deprived of her power by simply weakening her trade. Such a situation 
could be achieved by declaring French manufactured goods exempt from a proportion of, or all 
American imposts. Since these might include naval products, America hoped to threaten 
Britain with a commercial, and therefore a naval decline because it would only be France that 
benefitted from competitively priced naval stores.492 A close post-War relationship with France 
would therefore provide America with the basis of a military and naval strength it could not 
achieve alone.  
 
However, this policy of leveraging the French alliance came with the risk that Americans would 
be associated in foreign affairs as the close ally, pupil and even the spy of French interests in 
Europe. Hence, John Adams observed that in gatherings of foreign diplomats from Sweden, 
                                                          
 
 
488 From Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 28 September 1787, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12, 7 August 1787 – 31 March 
1788, Boyd J. P. (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton,1955), pp. 189–190. FONA. 
489 From Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, 8 October 1787, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12, 7 August 1787 – 31 March 1788, 
Boyd J. P. (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton,1955), pp. 214–217. FONA. 
490 John Adams to John Jay, 17 Oct. 1785, Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0325 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: this is an Early Access 
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Prussia and Holland at Versailles, foreign representatives were circumspect in the presence of 
Americans lest the latter were to report “a look or a word” to the French.493 The impartiality 
that Adams had proclaimed therefore based itself in the inescapable fact of the French 
alliance, but carried risk that American interests might be subordinated to those of France.494  
 
Therefore, it remained in American interests not to become too closely associated with France 
for the simple reason that such a relationship would cause other nations to assume that the 
Americans were in thrall to French ministers and therefore not to be trusted. In other words, 
that American and French interests were either aligned, or that American interests had been 
so degraded in priority, that, now, naïve American diplomats were reliant on French guidance 
in international affairs.495  
 
There was, however, a feeling amongst some in America that there was a strong Anglo anti-
Americanism.496 Therefore, Jefferson believed that, despite jealousy of the French alliance, 
Britain  had no intention of entering into an alliance with America and simply wished to “keep 
up an existence with” it in which the latter retained its sovereignty distinct from France, and 
                                                          
 
 
493 John Adams to Tristram Dalton, 5 March 1785, The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 16, February 1784–March 1785, 
(ed.) Gregg L. L. (et. Al), (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 542–543. FONA. However, at least to nations such as 
Russia, the strict rules of neutrality applied, and hence the Empress, refused to accept an envoy from the United States until the 
articles of the 1783 Peace Treaty had been ratified in Congress, since this was the final step in the formal independence of 
America, see; Letter from Messrs Ellery and Howell, to Governor Greene, September 8th 1783, in Guild A. R., Rhode Island in the 
Continental Congress, with the Journal of the convention that adopted the Constitution. 1765-1790, (Providence Press Company: 
Providence, 1870), pp. 442-443.   
494 For the point of view that Americans were not prepared to accept that their leverage of the 1778 Alliance permitted the 
French to reciprocate, see Bemis (1957), p. 182., who explains that the Americans were not prepared to disavow alliance 
commitments but took the point of view that an independent America was sovereign and "that the French republic could not use 
in America .......the lever of a political opposition to overthrow any government that stood in the way of French policy, purpose and 
interest".   
495 John Adams to Tristram Dalton, 5 March 1785, The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 16, February 1784–March 1785, 
Lint G.L. (et. Al) (eds.), (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 542–543. FONA.   
496 Joseph Reed to John Adams, 7 May 1784, The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 16, February 1784–March 1785, ed. 
Gregg L. Lint G. L. (et. al.), (ed.), (Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 2012). pp. 191–193. FONA. This letter exposes the 
underlying anti-Americanism in Britain; Reed, a Pennsylvania politician visiting England for health reasons, commented on its 
prevalence, especially in the areas of trade (access to the West Indies trade) and how such attitudes would simply encourage a 
closer American alliance with the French.         
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should be restrained in its growth and certainly not be assisted by access to British ports 
around the world.497  
 
Hence, as Americans tried to treat with the Six Nations of the Iroquois, they suspected that the 
British were trying to frustrate any agreement by suggesting to the Indians that “the alliance 
between the United States and France was insecure and transitory”, and hence that the Indians 
need not respect their American interlocutors because they did not represent to, or were 
associated with, a nation anywhere as powerful as France.498 Evidently, British negotiators 
believed that their post-War strategic aims could be better achieved by attempting to entice 
the Iroquois Indian tribes on the northwestern frontier into an anti-American confederacy, 
despite having betrayed their wartime loyalty by ignoring them in the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty. 
 
Given British antagonism, Americans were prepared to strengthen the French arrangement. To 
keep alive this possibility, Washington was at pains to explain to the French that it was British 
acts and omissions, the failure to vacate the western forts and to agree a trade treaty, that was 
causing America to look to its France alliance, and to “strengthen” it to “promote” mutual 
interests.499 To underline this commitment and to qualify what neutrality meant, Washington 
took a very specific view of the rights and obligations of non-belligerents in times of conflict. 
Hence, a non-belligerent America was entitled to “such a neutrality as will actually help her 
[America’s] allies, and increase her [America’s] own wealth”.500 Washington explained that 
while America would not involve itself in any future Franco British war, it did expect to take 
                                                          
 
 
497 From Thomas Jefferson to James Currie, 27 September 1785, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 8, 25 February–31 October 
1785, Boyd J. P., (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1953), pp. 558–560. FONA. 
498 From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1784, The Papers of James Madison, vol. 8, 10 March 1784 – 28 March 
1786, ed. Rutland R. A.  and Rachal W. M. E., (eds.) (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1973), pp.118–122. FONA. 
499 From George Washington to La Luzerne, 1 August 1786, The Papers of George Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 4, 2 April 
1786 – 31 January 1787, (ed.), Abbot W. W., (University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1995), pp. 185–187. FONA. 
500 To George Washington from Lafayette, 9 October 1787, The Papers of George Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 5, 1 
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advantage of the consequences of naval combat particularly where this involved the sale of 
captured prizes in American forts, and the revenues that would be associated with repair and 
refitting of French ships. Washington’s comments imply that American willingness to work on 
French naval ships in times of conflict arose directly from the 1778 alliance and hence indicate 
a rather peculiar view of what neutrality was meant to be. Alexander Hamilton’s comments 
that American neutrality was intended to be “useful to France, profitable to the United States, 
and perfectly safe on the footing of the treaties”, provides a rather clearer explanation that 
what was intended was a neutrality that suited American interests.501  
 
There are three illustrations of this qualified neutrality in post-War American foreign policy as 
equilibrium participation, briefly explained in the sections that follow, as exploitation of 
balance rivalries in the three pillars of national interest .    
National Interest in Security: Military Alliances 
In the first instance, then, the American response to the Barbary pirate attacks on its shipping 
in the Mediterranean illustrates both the clear willingness to qualify neutrality through alliance 
creation and direct threats to the balance.502  
 
The desire to protect the Mediterranean trade involved consideration of a mutual defence 
alliance with Portugal. The Portuguese Queen had offered to protect American shipping 
against the Barbary Pirates, Adams however worried that such an offer might involve 
obligations to enter into treaty commitments and, in his letter to John Jay, American Foreign 
                                                          
 
 
501 To Alexander Hamilton from Marquis de Lafayette, 15 October 1787, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 4, January 1787 –
 May 1788, Syrett H. C. (ed.), (Columbia University Press: New York, 1962), pp. 282–284. FONA. 
502 Letter from John Adams to Secretary Jay. Auteil. 15th December, 1784, TWJA, Volume VIII. Adams reported that a Virginian ship 
had been captured by Algeria and this had raised insurance premiums and would raise the cost of American goods thereby making 
them uncompetitive.  At this early stage he was convinced that the payment of tribute was the only option available to Congress 
and indeed would be a more cost effective outcome than paying ransom for enslaved sailors.   
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Secretary, made the point that if the United States were to agree to pay taxes and build a navy, 
that such alliances would not be needed.503 However, Jefferson by the summer of 1786 had 
resigned himself to seeking a naval or military solution to the continued attack on American 
commerce. He therefore proposed to Adams that a three-way mutual defence treaty involving 
Naples and Portugal would enable America to share the burden of a war with Algiers. Jefferson 
much preferred “obtaining it [the peace] by war” since “it will procure us respect on Europe 
and respect is a safeguard to interest”.504 Hence, Jefferson articulated the fourth qualification 
of an American neutrality. That when faced with crises of magnitude, defined as those that 
required America to demonstrate to protagonists that it had the ability to act to protect its 
interests, it would not hesitate to enter into military commitments to protect its trade.  
 
That the Barbary attacks were a crisis of magnitude was clear by about 1785 when American 
shipping in the Mediterranean had all but ceased.505 However, Congress, reluctant to enter 
into an alliance, was left with only two options with which to deal with the Barbary threat. 
Firstly, to build a navy that would be able to wage war on and protect American shipping from 
the pirates or, secondly to succumb to the threat and pay the tribute demanded.506 John 
Adams explained these alternatives when he reported the view of the Comte de Vergennes to 
Jefferson in the middle of 1786 that it was greed and fear that formed the basis of Algerian 
                                                          
 
 
503 Letter from John Adams to John Jay. 27th June 1786. TEN III, p. 206. 
504 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams. 11th July 1786. TEN III, pp. 220 to 222. See also Nau. H. R., Conservative 
internationalism. Armed diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman and Reagan, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2013). pp.88 
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505 Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson. London. 18th September. 1785, TWJA, Volume X, p. 314. Adams reported that 
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stake in local society. For this idea of this, the virtuous soldier, see Niemeyer C. P., America Goes to War, A Social History of the 
Continental Army, (New York University Press: New York, 1996), p. xiv. 
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insecurity.  The cost of tribute was put at between two hundred and five hundred thousand 
pounds sterling, the upper range of which was estimated to be the cost of building and 
maintaining a navy. Compared to this Adams estimated the cost of the extra insurance 
premiums and the loss of up to half the Mediterranean trade. This calculation led Adams to 
conclude that tribute would be the best of all of the worst options since Congress could 
borrow the entire sum and therefore the cost would be the annual interest on the debt, put at 
most thirty thousand pounds sterling, compared to a destructive and costly sea war.507  
 
Although Jefferson had believed that a concert of European nations could be arranged to 
provide mutual protection in the Mediterranean, the scheme ultimately failed for lack of 
French and British involvement, only Spain was willing to intervene on behalf of the Americans 
and this was because of its interest in seeing Britain leave continental North America.508 The 
very proposal to enter into an alliance with the European nations thereby creating a two or 
three way alliance illustrates the willingness of American statesmen to pursue national interest 
even at the expense of entangling alliances and coalitions that might threaten the existing 
balance.     
National Interest in Trade: Leveraging the 1778 French Alliance  
In the second instance, the 1778 Alliance was used directly to obtain trade concessions. 
American merchants preferred trade with the British over the French, attributed by Jefferson 
to nothing more than financial considerations since the British merchant was more willing to 
extend credit than was the French merchant. In addition, it made no commercial sense for an 
American merchant, able to sell at a profit in British ports, to make his way to France with 
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commodities landed in Britain. However, if the British were unwilling to provide Americans 
with reciprocal trade concessions, particularly access to the West Indies, then Jefferson 
submitted that America should commit itself “unequivocally” to France and seek protection for 
American trade.509 This view was reinforced by Ralph Izzard, a member of the Continental 
Congress, who explained that irrespective of whether Congress was given greater powers in 
the forthcoming Philadelphia Convention of 1787, America should align itself with France, from 
whom it had secured great advantage. For France, American trade carried with it the 
guarantee that it would benefit greatly, to a value that could be easily measured when 
compared to the trade with England, an equilibrium consideration.510 Hence, Americans 
carried with them the firm belief that the assurance of their trade carried with it the power to 
determine the equilibrium in Europe between the two great superpowers.511   
 
For Adams, if Britain were to offer terms, it could be assured of an American “impartiality and 
neutrality”, if not then Britain would only encourage “closer connections of alliance and 
commerce with France, Spain, and Holland”. 512 What is important is that Adams was 
contemplating, if America were forced into alliance with France, two important principles. That 
there should be a new defensive alliance, and secondly that commercial considerations should 
                                                          
 
 
509 Enclosure: Jefferson’s Report on Conversations with Vergennes, [December 1785], The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 9, 1 
November 1785 – 22 June 1786, Boyd J. P. (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1954), pp. 139–146. FONA. 
510 For the opposing view, that the American trade was of little consequence to any of the powers of Europe, not to Britain if the 
latter could not control it, nor to Spain and France who would, in the event of an American independence, take control of some or 
all of the colonies, see Letter of Massachusettenis [being Daniel Leonard, a Massachusetts based lawyer] No. VIII, To the 
Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, in Wood G. (ed.), John Adams, Revolutionary Writings, 1755-1775, (The Library 
of America: New York, 2011), pp. 392-396.  
511 To Thomas Jefferson from Ralph Izard, 4 April 1787, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 11, 1 January–6 August 1787, Boyd J. 
P. (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1955), pp. 262–266. FONA. See also the desire to replace goods no longer available 
from Britain with French products; To George Washington from George Mason, 19 June 1789, The Papers of George Washington, 
Presidential Series, vol. 3, 15 June 1789–5 September 1789, Twohig D. (ed.), (University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1989), pp. 
49–55. FONA. See also; John Adams to the president of Congress, 13 May 1784. The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 16, 
February 1784–March 1785, ed. Lint G. L. (et. al.), (eds.), (Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 2012), pp. 211–213., in which 
Adams advocates a closer relationship with France because of the “coldness and distance” of the British.   
512 Bragg C. L., Crescent Moon over Carolina, William Moultrie and American Liberty, (The University of South Carolina Press: 
Chapel Hill, 2013), p. 256., the French Alliance continued to affect American foreign affairs thinking after the War had ended. 
Hence, in South Carolina, the Governor continued to follow the terms of the Alliance by allowing French ships to operate from 
Charleston Harbour after France went to war with Britain in 1793. 
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be inextricably entwined with it, to the extent that favourable trade terms should persist into 
perpetuity. Adams likened such an arrangement to the 1703 treaty between Britain and 
Portugal which had provided for the trade of woollens and wines, uninterrupted even by war 
between the two nations.  
 
Whilst discussing the possibility that Americans might contemplate a French commercial and 
defensive alliance, Adams was at pains to point out that America “cherished” its impartiality 
and neutrality but would consider it abandoned only if compelled to by the actions of the 
British. For example, Britain had adopted a strategy of harassment, refusing trade concessions, 
or to vacate its western forts, and impressing American sailors into the British navy.513 The 
British had attributed this conduct to the actions of the individual American states which had 
passed stay laws preventing British creditors from being able to enforce pre-War debts. 
 
The above analysis indicates that the threat of a French alignment was being used as a lever to 
secure British concessions, only possible because of European rivalries. Indeed, it was precisely 
the favourable terms that would be offered to France in such circumstances, possibly in 
perpetuity, which would have the effect of causing a decline in British manufacturing. This is 
because French treaty terms would no doubt require that punitive tariffs be levied on British 
trade making the manufactured goods of the latter less competitive.514 
                                                          
 
 
513 A Memorial. 30th November 1785. The posts included Oswegatchy, Oswego, Niagara, Presque Isle, Sandusky, Detroit, 
Michilimackinac and surrounding land garrisoned by British forces, TWJA, Volume III. p. 357.  See also; Letter from John Adams to 
The Marquis of Carmarthen. London.  3 October, 1787, TWJA, Volume VIII, pp. 456 to 457. Problems with the British did not just 
involve the British Forts but also complaints about the impressment of American sailors. Adams complained about an American 
citizen and sailor, Charles Baldwin, who been removed from the ship Favourite and put on a boat to Sheerness. Baldwin had 
explained in his letter, claimed Adams, that “there are six or seven others, American citizens, on board the same ship in similar 
circumstances”. See also Marshall (2012). p. 89. The author explains that the British were busy trying to tempt the Vermont 
settlers to a closer connection to Quebec, and to separate Kentucky from the American union by developing a separate trade with 
them.  
513 Letter to Secretary Jay. Grosvenor Square, 26th February 1786, TWJA, Volume III, p. 380. See also Marshall (2012). p. 99. 
Marshall explains that regulation of trade, as opposed to laissez faire free trade was adopted by the Americans. 
514 TWJA, Volume VIII, p. 322. 
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National Interest in Territory: A Balance of Power Consideration 
Finally, the political relationship between the Americans and the Creek Indians in the 
southwest illustrates the American participation in a North American continental system that 
depended on maintaining a balance between Spain and the American union in which the Creek 
Indians were an important consideration.  
   
In the southwest, the Creek Indians were keenly aware that the Americans simply wanted their 
lands, after the War, had been abandoned to their fate by the British.515 The Creeks were 
having to content with conflicting offers of alliance from the American states, and from 
Spanish Commissioners eager to create a buffer between the Spanish colonies and the 
American union. However, Creek strategic interests lay in resuming trade with either of these 
neighbours whilst at the same time securing land rights to the Creek people.516 Their lands 
were more at risk from American expansion than they were from existing Spanish colonists 
intent not on expansion but protection within their current territorial envelope, albeit subject 
to the creation of buffer territories described above. 517 This situation may be attributed in part 
to the uneconomic Spanish colonial system which barely paid for itself without Spanish 
subsidy, and therefore obviated further expansion especially at the expense of treasure.518 
Therefore, the Creeks tended towards a Spanish alliance, associated not just with the feelings 
                                                          
 
 
515 Letter of Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. MoG. p. 90. McGillivray, in this letter, recognised that the 
Americans wanted free access not only to their lands but also to the Mississippi. See also; Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, 
Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. MoG. p. 84. After the 1784 Treaty of Pensacola, British merchants in West Florida did 
resume trading with the Creeks and the Spanish.   
516 Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. 20th March 1784. MoG. p. 73. McGillivray 
claims to have established that there was a possibility of America gaining her independence and therefore to seek Spanish 
protection in the event that the “British nation has been compelled to withdraw its protection from us. She has no right to give up 
a country she never coud [sic] call her own. Therefore, as a free nation we have an undoubted right to choose what protection we 
think proper”. 
517 For the Spanish, their North American colonies might similarly come under threat from an expanding America as the failure to 
reach agreement on navigation rights to the Mississippi had shown. It might also be possible to tempt some loyalists from America 
to the Spanish colonies, see; Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. 5th February 1784. 
MoG. p. 69 
518 Whittaker (1927). p. 22. The Spanish colonies produced products such as indigo, rice and tobacco, only the latter of which had 
a ready market in Spain. The Spanish colonies required annual funding of some one million dollars and produced a net income to 
Spain of some fifty thousand dollars per annum. 
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of Alexander McGillivray, de facto diplomat of the Creek nation and a half Creek half Scotsman 
whose father had been a loyalist, and who felt antipathy to the Americans for the way his 
father had been treated.519  
 
American expansion west was already underway, and indeed had barely stopped during the 
Revolutionary War. The Creeks therefore had much to fear from armed frontiersmen, some 
former soldiers, who complaining about unfair Congressional taxes, were looking for land free 
from Congressional interference.520 Therefore, by the middle of 1784, the Treaty of Pensacola, 
a treaty of peace and commerce, had been entered into between Spain and the Creek nations, 
guaranteeing the integrity of Creek lands.521 The Creeks sought to cement their protective 
relationship with the Spanish by resuming as soon as possible their trade and also denied 
outright the claims of the Americans to their lands, claimed simply by virtue of the American 
claim that any lands apparently ceded to the British after the end of her Seven Years War were 
automatically those of the American union.522  
 
Americans continued to attempt to lure the Creeks to their sphere of influence by offering free 
trade, particularly their almost exclusive access to London merchants.523 By 1786, American 
efforts at encouraging a Creek alignment took on greater impetus following the appointment 
by Congress of Commissioners to settle the western boundary, forcing McGillivray to meet 
with them and thereby causing concern to Spain of an impending American Creek 
                                                          
 
 
519 See generally; MoG. 
520 Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. January 1, 1784. MoG. p. 64. McGillivray 
sought Spanish protection from the westward expansion of Americans in Georgia. He attributed American expansion to 
Congressional requisitions of the several states with which to meet the war debt put by him at some $42 million attracting interest 
at $2.5m per annum. Americans were therefore, according to McGillivray, attempting to escape the reaches of Congress by 
seeking new lands in the west.  
521 A copy of the Treaty of Pensacola. 1st June 1784. may be found at p. 75. MoG.  
522 Letter from McGillivray to [this letter is not signed addressed or dated but was probably written shortly after the Congress of 
Pensacola]. MoG. p. 77. McGillivray wrote “In order to secure firmly .... to the Crown Spain the first measure that ought to be 
adopted is by a well regulated trade upon as reasonable terms”. 
523 Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. 24th of July 1785, MoG. p. 93.    
 
 
160 
 
rapprochement.524 Despite the possibility for negotiations, and encouraged by Spain to 
“oppose vigorously” American expansion into Creek lands, by early 1786, it was clear to the 
Creeks that settlers from Georgia could not be easily constrained in their demand for lands and 
that “the miseries and horrors of the savage” war were being contemplated.525  
 
However, the Spanish, anxious to avoid an American Creek conflict, explained to McGillivray, 
that they would not, in offering their Royal protection to the Creeks, do “prejudice to the good 
harmony that exists at present between Spain and the United States of America”.526 Further, 
the Spanish counselled that the Creek Indians should be circumspect when considering how to 
respond to American encroachments in order to avoid open hostilities since, “if they 
exasperate the Georgians with new hostilities all the states will make common cause” and the 
Creeks would not be able to “resist them”.527 Hence in many ways the Creek Indian 
relationship with Spain and America is representative of wider European balance of power 
considerations. This is because, after the War had ended, in the southwest at least, America 
and Spain were the chief participants in the  equilibrium in which the Creek Indians were an 
important balancing consideration. In other words, Spain and America tried to balance each 
other’s power by attempting a Creek alliance.  
                                                          
 
 
524 Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. 14 September 1785. MoG. p. 97. McGillivray 
placed this obligation to meet with the Americans on the desire to do all that he could to avoid an American Indian war.  American 
negotiations with the Creeks also had the necessary but risky effect of creating an Indian confederacy since boundary negotiations 
would only be effective if all Indian nations agreed. This was made clear in a Letter from Benjamin Hawkins, American 
Commissioner to McGillivray. 8th January 1786. p. 101. in which Hawkins explained “The commissioners would not treat with a few 
of your nation who met them I'm since informed that the agents of Georgia did treat with them and.... there were not twenty 
Indians ....” that went to the negotiations which is clearly not regarded as representative of all Indians nor likely to bind them.  
525 Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida 1st May 1786. MoG, p.106. Complaints were 
made about the continued encroachment on Indian hunting lands by Americans generally but specifically the Georgians and 
McGillivray was asking for Spanish military aid. (see Letter of McGillivray to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West 
Florida. 20th June 1786. p. 177., the Indians were seeking five thousand pounds of powder and balls). The American 
Commissioners, for their part, insisted that any such encroachments were “strictly forbidden” and subject to punishment – see 
Letter from the Georgia Commissioners to McGillivray. 15th August 1786. p. 129. See also Tomlins C.L. et al, (2001), p.123.  Essay 
Hermes Katherine. Justice Will Be Done Us. Algonquian Demands for Reciprocity in the Courts of European Settlers. The Indians and 
the English agreed that when colonists hurt Indians colonial courts would punish the offender.  During the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries Algonquian’s ruled themselves but also came to French and English colonial courts in certain matters. See 
also; Letter of Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida to Jose de Galvez, Marques de Sonora (Minister of the 
Indies). 10th August 1786. MoG, p. 125. 
526 Letter of Vincent Manuel Zespedes to McGillivray 3rd February 1787. MoG, p. 143. 
527 Letter of Estevan Miro to Arturo O'Neil, Spanish Governor of Spanish West Florida. 24th March 1787. MoG, p. 145. 
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Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated the continuing affect that balance of power considerations had 
on shaping American foreign policy even after the War for Independence had come to a 
conclusion. In the post-War years, equilibrium thinking was wrapped within a very specific 
version of the idea of neutrality in foreign affairs. In essence, America would treat Britain and 
France impartially only in so far as it suited the national interest. Profession of neutrality would 
therefore provide a safe haven from which to take advantage of balance rivalries, even if this 
meant compromising the ideology of no political connections. Separately from the adoption of 
this nuanced form of neutrality, American statesmen continued to be drawn into the 
consideration of equilibrium issues because of the existence of the Spanish and British 
presence in the west, both nations interested in reigning in American expansion. Hence, had 
American statesmen wished for some form of isolation from Europe, this was just not possible 
given its continued importance to the balance participants.         
 
This argument, presented in Chapters One to Four, essentially rejects the idea that there was 
isolationism in early American foreign affairs, by explaining that a pragmatic foreign policy 
involved an active participation in the European balance of power, the definition adopted of 
internationalism in foreign affairs. To complete the argument, the next chapter directly 
confronts ideas of isolationism as they manifest in eighteenth century American foreign affairs, 
and explains either their impracticality as policy, or that they were nothing more than 
essentially bit parts in overall arguments against Constitutional reform. 
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5. Chapter Five: The Eighteenth Century Meaning of Isolationism  
Introduction  
Isolationism as a concept in this period, is regarded as a non-sequitur by some historians, due 
in large part to the connections brought about by the substantial flow of migrants to America, 
and European connections through trade.528 Thomas Paine had explained in his famous 
publication, Common Sense in 1776 that immigration was important because it had resulted in 
close ties with Europe owing to those familial and other relationships that immigrants still had 
in European countries.529 For Paine, ties with Europe would act as a balance to a hostile Britain, 
which, because of its previous colonial relationship would always interfere in America 
domestic politics.530  
 
Kaplan, for example, explains that the importance to America of France as a “counterweight” 
to Britain, the negotiations with Spain over trade and navigation of the Mississippi River, as 
well as trade concessions with the British, all show that the “bonds of Europe were difficult to 
break”. 531 Kaplan further explains that ideas of isolationism if they existed at all in American 
foreign affairs, should be regarded as more a freedom to act as the Americans wished than it 
was a desire to separate the new world from the old. As explained in Chapter One, this is the 
                                                          
 
 
528 These trade links re-commenced immediately after the War with the purchase and sale, between American and British 
merchants, of dry goods see; Bezanson A., Prices and Inflation During the American Revolution, Pennsylvania, 1770-1790, 
(University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 1951), pp. 6-7. For American merchant efforts to reinstate the pre-War Anglo 
American trade, see; Buel R. Jr., In Irons, Britain’s Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy, (Yale University 
Press: New Haven, 1998), pp. 240-245., and Bowling K. R., The Creation of Washington D.C., The Idea and Location of the American 
Capital, (George Mason University Press: Virginia, 1991), p.24., who describes it as being in the national interest to reinstate and 
develop trade with Europe.  
529 TWTP, Common Sense. pp.35-49. See also; Foner E., Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1976), p. 79., the author explains that Common Sense had been read across the colonies “by all sorts of people”.  
530 See; The Crisis II. p 13, The Crisis III. pp 36 to 37, The Crisis VI. pp. 92 to 93, and The Crisis VII. pp. 97 to 116. For Paine’s belief in 
the idea that Britain would attempt to entice America away from, for example, its French alliance, see The Crisis XII, p. 176., all 
references to TWTP. 
531 Kaplan L. S. Entangling Alliances with None. American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson. (The Kent State University Press: 
Kent, Ohio. 1787).  
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view of Morgenthau that an American separation could not be achieved by doing nothing.532 
For Kaplan, this freedom to act was the freedom not only from allegiance to any one nation, 
but the freedom to visit any international port, and the adoption of the idea that free ports 
make for free trade. Hence, according to La Feber, and attributed to Benjamin Franklin, there 
was a “dilemma [in] American isolationism” reflected in the desire to seek international 
commercial arrangements, without incurring the expense of political alliances.533 In other 
words, the desire to remain separate from political Europe given that trade implied economic 
interdependence which in turn might lead to foreign engagement.   
 
Notwithstanding the views of Kaplan and La Feber, the argument of this Chapter is made by 
considering two other possible interpretations of isolation. Firstly, the closed agricultural 
society of Jefferson, an ultimately theoretical construct, that was not adopted as a serious 
alternative to international trade. Secondly in the arguments of the Anti-Federalists, who 
opposed constitutional reform in 1787, and the Federalists who supported it. In foreign affairs 
terms, Anti-Federalists believed that geographical distance isolated America from the ills of 
Europe, but constitutional change that centralised power, would create the circumstances for 
European nations to send its diplomats and agents to influence domestic politics, destroying 
the tranquillity afforded by virtue of geography. Hence, Anti-Federalists demanded that the 
liberty afforded by distance be protected by maintaining the current state system and the 
loose arrangements of the Articles of Confederation.   
 
For Federalists, however, the creation of a powerful, centralised concentration of power held 
out the prospect of a more cohesive union better equipped to engage in foreign affairs, and 
                                                          
 
 
532 Morgenthau (1952), pp. 1-7 
533 La Feber. W. Foreign Policies of a New Nation: Franklin, Madison, and the “Dream of a New Land to Fulfil of American Foreign 
Relations. (John Wiley and Sons Inc.: New York, 1972). 
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more immune from foreign intermeddling. Hence, Federalists rejected the isolationist 
tendencies of their constitutional detractors and looked to the delegation of power to a 
federal government that would create in America, a representative sovereign nation 
equivalent, in foreign affairs terms, to other nations.   
 
This Chapter begins with a brief review of the idea of the isolationism afforded by an 
economically closed society. It then explores the Federalist and Anti-Federalist writings to 
uncover the arguments for and against isolationism.  
The Agri-Idealism of Jefferson 
The Jeffersonian ideal was one of a society that operated an agriculture economy, with limited 
domestic manufacturing, not reliant on overseas trade.534 Jeffersonian agri-idealism lay in the 
belief that the American union would have little need for overseas markets for agricultural 
surpluses since farmers would be encouraged to produce only what the nation needed, that is, 
there would be no surplus.535 A closed economy would rely on American consumers 
conditioned to deny themselves the manufactured luxuries of Europe, other than those that 
could be encouraged at home by the payment of bounties.536 The idea of agricultural economic 
isolation can be found in Jefferson’s 1781 Notes on the State of Virginia, in which he implies 
that the loss of revenue from international trade will be made up by the contentment felt by 
                                                          
 
 
534 See; Kulikofff A., From British Peasants to Colonial Farmers, (The University of North Carolina Press: North Carolina, 2000), pp. 
289-291. The author explains that before the Revolutionary War, and until circa. 1840, America was a rural based economy with 
only between 3.5% and 8.5% of people living in cities. The author also clarifies the idea of manufacturing in the early Republic to 
comprise not just luxury manufactured products, but large scale agricultural production at the expense of the smaller farmer. 
However, other historians regard what they refer to as “Jeffersonian political economy” as being a belief in an agricultural 
economy but with American farm surpluses sold abroad and used to buy European manufactures, in the Adam Smith free market 
style, see; Gibson A., Interpreting the Founding, Guide to the Enduring Debates over the Origins and Foundations of the American 
Republic, (University Press of Kansas: Kanas, 2006), pp. 58-59. 
535 Cogliano F. D., Emperor of Liberty, Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy, (Yale University Press: New York, 2014), p.5. As to 
Jeffersonian agriculturally inspired isolationism, see Tucker (1990), pp. 30 – 32., and also Malone D., Jefferson and His Time, The 
Sage of Monticello, (Little, Brown and Company: New York, 1970), p. 146.  
536 Alexander Hamilton is regarded by some as having led Americans from agriculture to a manufacturing based economy built on 
transport and banking, see Rossiter C., Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution, (Harcourt, Brace and World: New York, 1964), p. 
9. For a discussion of the conflict between Hamilton, who promoted a manufacturing economy, and Jefferson, who favoured 
agriculture, see; Reynolds, D., America, Empire of Liberty, A New History, (Allen Lane: London, 2009), pp. 86-87.  
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Americans from stable governments of virtuous men.537 This agri-idealism is reflective of a 
wider Jeffersonian belief in the rejection in America of the European ideas of class, hence that 
the American farmer was as deserving of civilisation as those in the so called “polished 
societies” of Europe, and indeed possessing greater morality, and worth to society because of 
his honest labour.538 To emphasise the point, for James Madison, the creation of a 
manufacturing base was causative of a loss of personal liberty, and destructive of virtue. 
Madison  attributed this undesirable outcome to what would be the inevitable rise in mass 
production, the export of surpluses, and therefore the rise of interest groups attracted by 
commercial profits, pernicious to the general welfare.539 Since, international trade inevitably 
required active involvement with European nations in pursuit of markets for surpluses, it 
would expose the American economy to fluctuations in European demand, and European 
economic policies.540  
 
In a variation of Jefferson’s idea, Benjamin Franklin mused about a mixed manufacturing and 
agricultural economy, politically isolated from Europe, with markets only in an ever expanding 
American nation. Franklin had formed a view of the unsettled western territories of North 
America as being a natural part of the original thirteen states, and a large future consumer of 
American manufactured and agricultural products. However, he recognised that output would 
                                                          
 
 
537 Jefferson T., Basic Writings, (Konecky and Konecky: Connecticut, 2005), pp. 163-164. Essay by Banning L., Political Economy and 
the Federal Republic, in; Konig (1995) pp.32–34. Jefferson generally sought to reduce reliance on foreign nations; Ellis J. J., 
American Sphinx, The Character of Thomas Jefferson, (Random House, New York, 1998), p. 308. See also; Ekbladh D., The Great 
American Mission. Modernisation and the Construction of an American World Order, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2010) 
p.15, in which the author explains that in this period “frugality and industry” were to be encouraged. 
538 Tucker R. W. et. al., (1990), p.6. The farmer citizen would naturally oppose centralised power and desire his personal 
independence against its usurpation by a Federal government, see; Breen T. H., Tobacco Culture, The Mentality of the Great 
Tidewater Planters on the Eve of Revolution, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1985), pp. 9-12. However, Pennsylvania 
Quakers believed that international trade, by creating domestic employment, laid the foundation for a society of virtuous men, 
usefully engaged in valuable economic output to the betterment of themselves and of society, see;  Crowley (1974), p. 39.  
539 Banning L., The Sacred Fire of Liberty, James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic, (Cornell University Press: 
Ithaca and London, 1995), pp. 61-65. But also see Pocock J. G. A., The Machiavellian Moment, Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1975), p. 539, in which the author argues that Jefferson 
believed that the vast continent could easily subsume the worst effects of commerce within an agrarian society. 
540 Beard C.A. and Beard M. R., The Rise of American Civilisation, Volume I, The Agricultural Era, (Johnathan Cape: London, 1927), 
p.391. 
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eventually find a natural limit in domestic demand, requiring overseas markets and hence 
foreign alliances in support of trade.541  
 
These ideas owed more to ideology than they did to pragmatic policy making not least because 
of their economic infeasibility. The idea that America might become a closed society, is 
exposed as deeply impractical by the eighteenth century economic thinker, Adam Smith. Smith 
explains that a nation that attempts to protect its economy from imports, or tries to restrict 
exports, runs the risk of coming up against a natural constraint to its growth unrelated to the 
size of its consumer base.542 A closed society, according to Smith, has limited access to capital 
with which to invest in agriculture and manufacturing, because of the unattractiveness to 
overseas merchants and prospective buyers of the nation’s financial securities. Limited access 
to capital in turn limits employment opportunities for the indigenous population and clearly 
therefore limits demand for immigrant labour, and therefore production output. Smith 
explains this outcome as a consequence of the constant relationship that labour bears to 
capital. Therefore, restricted access to cash capital with which to meet costs and make 
investments, limits economic growth as well as restraining the creation of a domestic 
manufacturing base. A society unable to produce sufficient to feed its population, never mind 
provide manufactured luxury goods, would inevitably turn to overseas markets from which to 
meet domestic needs.543 
 
                                                          
 
 
541 Williams (1972).  
542 Smith A, The Wealth of Nations, Books 4-5, (Readaclassic: London, 2009), pp.16-17. 
543 Some economic writers however question Smith as a thinker in matters of international trade, especially because he had not 
appreciated the idea of comparative advantage, that is, the theory that nations should concentrate on production in which they 
experience a comparative cost advantage vis a vis other nations, see; Myint H., Adam Smith's Theory of International Trade in the 
Perspective of Economic Development, (Economica, New Series, Vol. 44, No. 175, August 1977), pp. 231-248. This is to say that 
Smith concentrated on absolute advantage as the basis of production and trade, as opposed to trade only in goods in which a 
nation has a relative (comparative) advantage, see; Porter M. E., The Comparative Advantage of Nations, (Macmillan: London, 
1990), p.11.    
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This chapter does not explore further the above ideas of American isolationism, not only 
because of the comments made above, but because both Jefferson and Franklin were 
American statesmen dedicated to the proposition of an active American foreign policy, 
whether or not one equates their thinking with balance of power or internationalism more 
generally.544 These ideas were therefore not ultimately adopted as policy.545 Jefferson and 
Franklin tacitly recognised that a policy that closed the American economy to outside trade, 
would not be a practical consideration for a nation already immersed in foreign treaties.  
 
This Chapter instead postulates that ideas akin to isolationism and internationalism, are 
exposed as key debating points between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, after the 
draft of the Constitution was sent to the several states for ratification in 1787.546 One of the 
planks of Anti-Federalist objection to the Constitution was that, by centralising power, it would 
create the circumstances for foreign interference in the affairs of the union. Hence, the safety 
that the states enjoyed by virtue of distance from Europe, would be immediately 
compromised. Therefore, the  existing state system, that guaranteed the essential 
separateness of the states, offered the best protection to them.547 This argument was in stark 
                                                          
 
 
544 Jefferson for example is regarded as a “modern …agrarian”, dedicated to the idea of international trade, thereby reflecting the 
desires and hopes of Americans wishing for limited government and private success, see; Wood (2006), pp. 98-99.  See also Tucker 
R. W. and Hendrickson D. C., Empire of Liberty, The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson, (Oxford University Press: Oxford,1990), p. 88 
for the explanation of a Jeffersonian belief, in 1800, in small government centred around a predominantly agricultural economy 
selling its surpluses abroad, albeit with a limited domestic manufacturing base and overseas trade playing only “an auxiliary role”. 
See also; Smith J. M., (ed.), The Republic of Letters, The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776-
1826, Volume One, 1776-1790, (W. W. Norton and Company: New York, 1995), p. 440., in a which the editor describes Jefferson’s 
tendency to view even domestic affairs from an “international perspective”, given his experience in France.    
545 Indeed, see; Crockett T. and Wallis B. C., North America During the Eighteenth Century: A Geographical History, (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1915), pp. 104-110, for an explanation of a burgeoning manufacturing and agricultural base in 
America.    
546 After the constitution had been drafted by the Convention the delegates returned to their states to seek its ratification with 
James Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton writing articles in the New York papers in favour of the Federal Constitution. 
Called the Federalist Papers, these 85 essays addressed some of the key aspects of the Constitution making the case for adoption. 
At the same time Anti-Federalist papers were being written under the pseudonyms Centinel, Cato, Brutus, the Federal Farmer, 
John de Witt and others in papers in Philadelphia and New York and then reprinted throughout the states. I refer to the Federalists 
as being the three authors of the Federalist Papers viz Hamilton, Jay and Madison as opposed to members of the Federalist Party 
formed some years later, or indeed to the founding fathers more generally.  
547 The foreign recognition of the states as separate entities was evident in both the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 and the 1778 
French alliance, both of which, when describing the nation, list the individual states, thereby accepting their separateness, see; 
McDonald F., States’ Rights and the Union, Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876, (University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2000), pp.10-11. 
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contrast to that of the Federalists, who in many ways supported an internationalist foreign 
policy, as will be described below.   
 
This chapter explains these arguments for internationalism and for isolationism in four major 
heads. The first, locates the idea of foreign interference in the literature that describes the 
origin of the Constitution. This section concludes by explaining that both the Federalists and 
the Anti-Federalists perceived that the motivation for foreign nations to interfere in the union 
was in the jealously that monarchical nations held for republican nations. The second major 
heading, describes the permissive environment of the state system which, it was believed, 
created the conditions that had the potential to make foreign intrigue successful. These 
circumstances formed the basis for the Federalist and Anti- Federalist arguments for 
internationalism and isolationism in foreign affairs, respectively the third and fourth major 
headings of this chapter.   
Location in the Literature of Foreign Influence 
The fear that the European nations would interfere in the union, destabilising and creating 
separate confederacies of the member states, was central to the desire to centralise power in 
a Constitutional government, according to Marks.548 The union was susceptible to outside 
influence because of what Marks refers to as “the delinquent states”, that acted according to 
local as opposed to national considerations, and the failure of the Articles of Confederation to 
reign in their excesses.549 Dougherty explains this failure of the states to comprehend what 
was generally in the national good by using the economic theory of public goods to explain 
that, states could withhold contributions to Congress in the expectation that other states 
                                                          
 
 
548 Marks (1997). pp. x-xxi.   
549 Alternatively, McAfee. et. al.  attribute the post-War independence of the states to their constitutions and reluctance to give 
up powers to a national government, see; McAfee T. B. (et. al.) Powers Reserved for the People and the States. A History of the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution. (Praeger: Connecticut, 1952). 
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would make good the demands placed on them. Since the common good produced by 
Congress, primarily defence of the union, could not be withheld by Congress from a delinquent 
state, there was no incentive to act in the national interest.550 Hence, coercive powers were 
needed that only constitutional reform could achieve. Holton supports Dougherty’s conclusion 
that the states required coercion to act in the national interest, but explains that the failure of 
the states to protect property rights, indulging recalcitrant debtors, and laxity in tax policy and 
revenue collection, were the real causes of reform, as opposed to the catalyst being foreign 
dangers.551   
 
These interpretations that generally refer to either personal interests or the incompetence of 
the state legislatures as the catalyst for reform, owe at least a passing debt to Charles Beard’s 
seminal study, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States first 
published in 1903.552 Whilst Beard placed emphasis on the men of property with a vested 
interest in there being effective federal laws to protect those interests, he also made the direct 
correlation with foreign dangers. Relying on Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Four, he 
explained that territorial disputes, competition for commerce between the states, and the 
public debt of the union were possible causes of economic state conflict. However, the greater 
risk lay in the exploitation of these fault lines by foreign powers anxious to restrain American 
growth.553 Therefore, the creation of the Constitution was also a foreign policy act, one 
                                                          
 
 
550 Dougherty K. L. Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001).  
551 This connection made by Marks between domestic instability and foreign affairs is a step too far for Holton who regards state 
failures alone, that is not external danger, as causative of a call for reform, see; Holton W. Unruly Americans and the Origins of the 
Constitution. (Hill and Wang: New York, 2007). In support for the thesis that protection of property rights, consistent laws for 
dealing with recalcitrant debtors and a common tax policy were the real causes of reform, Holton refers to two publications;  
Miracle at Philadelphia and The Summer of 1787, which point to the imbecility of the Articles in reigning in the imprudence of the 
states, requiring the greater centralisation of power of the Constitution, see; Bowen-Drinker C. Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story 
of the Constitutional Convention. May to September 1787. (Little Brown: Boston MA, 1986), and Stewart D. O. The Men Who 
Invented the Constitution. The Summer of 1787. (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2007). 
552 Beard (1986).  
547 Schachner N. The Founding Fathers. (Putnam: New York, 1954). According to the author, Washington’s farewell address 
addressed just this risk of foreign intrigue some years later in 1796. Schachner explains that Washington believed the threat to the 
union to be from external sources, and that it was the schemes of “designing men” who tried to create “a real difference of local 
interests and views based on geographic distribution”. Pole hones the argument somewhat by referring not to an elite, but to 
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designed to protect the affairs of the states as a whole, by creating a representative 
government capable of addressing these domestic ills, and creating a more cohesive union.554  
 
The creation of representative government under the Constitution made possible by surrender 
of state sovereignty, in itself provided protection to the union. Hence, McDonald, in E Pluribus 
Unum, The Formation of the American Republic, explains the importance of national 
representative government by giving the example of the leadership of the Continental 
Congress, without which the states would not have provided the men and treasure with which 
to prosecute the Revolutionary War.555 Waldstreicher provides support for the importance of 
representative government and for it as the goal of reform, quoting two eminent historians of 
the period, Bailyn and Wood that the populism of the War years gave way to a more reasoned 
approach to post War government.556 Bailyn, for example, believed that the Constitution 
created a strong national government that served economic factions through concentrated 
power.557   
 
The incentive to surrender sovereignty to create this government, important to concentrating 
power in a federal government came, according to Hendrickson, from a realisation of external 
dangers. He explains a willingness to submit to a national government, in terms of what he 
calls a unionist paradigm at the core of which, was a belief that Americans created a union that 
                                                          
 
 
factions; the military, agricultural, legal, commercial interest groups, that were the main gainers from centralisation of power, see; 
Pole J R (ed.) The American Constitution. The Federalist and the Anti-Federalist Papers, (Hackett Classics: Indianapolis, 2005). 
554 Barrow C. W., and Beard C.A. More Than a Historian: The Political and Economic Thought of Charles A. Beard, (Blaser: Kent, 
2000). 
555 McDonald (1965). In Novus Ordo Seclorum. The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution, McDonald explains that the mandate 
under which Congress had originally assumed the powers of, for example, raising the Continental Army, resided only in the 
willingness of the colonies to grant them. The War over, there was little cause for union and hence, it was external dangers that 
convinced the states that governmental reform was necessary, see; McDonald F.  Novus Ordo Seclorum. The Intellectual Origins of 
the Constitution, (The University of Kansas Press: Kansas, 1985). 
556 Waldstreicher D. Slavery's Constitution. From Revolution to Ratification. (Hill and Wang: New York, 2009). p. 10. 
557 Bernard B. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. (Belknap Press: London, 1992).  
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solved two problems. Firstly, it preserved “peace within its zone", and secondly it offered 
protection to the union from external threats.558  
 
For Constitutional reformists, therefore, success for foreign nations, intent on ambitions 
pernicious to the general good of the union, would be made possible by weaknesses in the 
state system, attributed in turn to a failure of the Articles to provide an effective schema for 
government. The fact that the states freely ignored national treaty commitments, which an 
ineffective Congress was powerless to enforce, provided even more fertile ground for foreign 
complaint, and therefore for the union to apprehend dangers to its survival from the 
monarchical states of Europe.   
Republican and Monarchical Interest 
For Americans, foreign nations were motivated in their propensity to interfere in America, not 
by hard headed assessments of their national interest but often on a whim of the monarch 
intent on achieving personal ambition. Monarchical ambition was truly dangerous to the union 
since it could not be restrained until it had settled a score, or corrected an imagined sleight.559 
This is the argument of Federalist Four, that monarchies were sometimes motivated by 
jealously, sentiment and greed, and would seek war for reasons that had no connection to the 
                                                          
 
 
558 Hendrickson D. Peace Pact. (University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2003). Heideking furthers the argument that external threats 
provided the catalyst for change, to include a wider problem of the lack of virtue, regarded as critical to the success of republican 
forms of government, see; Heideking J. The Constitution Before the Judgement Seat. The Prehistory and Ratification of the 
American Constitution. 1787-1791. (University of Virginia Press: Virginia, 2012). Consequently, nationalists were influenced to 
create a form of government that would obliterate the causes of poor moral rectitude, as they saw it, a change that could not be 
achieved by a simple amendment to the Articles. If external dangers, poor morals and the selfishness of the states contributed to a 
sense of a national crisis, Wood locates the cause in what he calls “good old American popular politics”, see; Wood G. S. The Idea 
of America. Reflections on the Birth of the United States, (Penguin Books: New York, 2011). He accepts that the Articles failed to 
give Congress sufficient power to address the humiliation of the nation in international relations, but maintains that the Articles 
could have been amended. Their defects were not therefore the sole cause of the crisis, it was state defects, such as paper money 
laws, and stay laws that gave relief to debtors but infringed property rights. Amendment of the Articles was also an objective of 
the Federal Convention, but within the overall aim of reform, see; Resolution of the Committee of the Whole, Monday 18th June 
1787. Farrand. p.281. By the middle of June 1787 the delegates had agreed, ten votes to zero, that the purpose of the Convention 
was to revise and amend the Articles so as to strengthen the government in order to make it more able to preserve the union and 
to ensure its prosperity, an objective carried over to discussion of the new Constitution. 
559 The Crisis VII. TWTP, p. 102. Paine made a similar accusation against Great Britain accusing it of waging war for national honour 
and conquest and not in the national interest.  
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interests of security and economy, but for vainglorious concerns.560 America therefore had 
much to fear in its republican ideals since it afforded monarchical nations with abundant 
pretext for waging conflict. Whether it was inconsistent state adherence to treaty obligations, 
the idealism of free trade, or jealously of cheap American manufactures, they were all possible 
causes of war which only a strong national government, made up of men more inclined to 
reign in the effect of these monarchical tendencies.561 The loose arrangements of the Articles 
permitted the states, as sovereign delegates to an ineffective Congress, wide latitude of action 
and did not create a compact sufficiently powerful to protect the union, it only made the 
states more susceptible to intrigue.562 
The Permissive Environment of the State System 
Incompetence of the Articles  
Therefore, reform, for the Framers of the Constitution, would provide protection from foreign 
interference and the domestic upset it would cause.563 This was because Congress had been 
unable to protect the Mediterranean trade from the Barbary pirates, organise the western 
settlements, or indeed regulate the international trade.564 This failure to govern had led to 
                                                          
 
 
560 Federalist Four, TFP. pp.22-24.  
561 Federalist Seventy Five. TFP, 366-370. Hamilton explains the power to make treaties should be allocated between the President 
and Senate to guard against “an avaricious man who might be influenced by foreign powers”. Foreign nations would not be 
deterred by a stronger Constitutional union, but it would make them more circumspect when considering interference in 
American domestic affairs, see; Epstein D. F., The Political Theory of The Federalist, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1984), p. 
27.   
562 La Feber W., The Constitution and the United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, (The Journal of American History, Dec 
1987), pp.695-717.   
563 Diamond M., Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framer’s Intent, (The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 53. No 1, March 1959), pp.52-68.   
564 Farrand. p. 204. Pierce Butler, the South Carolina delegate to the Convention of 1787 made the rather obvious connection 
between the power to raise money and the ability to exercise the war power. Butler thought that representation in the national 
legislature ought to be determined in proportion to state wealth. He further explained that “when a boy he read this as one of the 
remarks of Julius Cesar, who declared if he had but money he would find soldiers, and everything necessary to carry on a war”. This 
comment should, however, be read as an explanation of the importance of reserving the war power to the congressional 
government than in the states with their self-interest. See also; Rossiter C., The Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison, Jay, (New 
American Library, New York, 2003), pp. 144-146. The foreign dangers would come not just from abroad but also from hostile 
settlements in the western territories, not only because of foreign interference with those settlements but also if there were to be 
a congressional failure to integrate those territories into the union, see; Lewis J. E. Jr., The American Union and The Problem of 
Neighbourhood, The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829, (The University of North Carolina Press: 
North Carolina, 1998), pp.14-15. 
 
 
173 
 
threats by Kentucky and Vermont, to align themselves to the adjoining British and Spanish 
settlements.565 A Constitution was therefore needed to give the Federal government the 
powers to provide for the protection of the union and its trade.566 Such a government would 
be more than a “mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties”, that is, the Articles, 
but a “compleat [sic] and compulsive operation” that the Constitution would provide.567 For 
Federalists, it was not possible to achieve this end by amending the Articles, and by giving 
Congress the power to raise a standing army to force state compliance with Congressional 
requisitions, since the use of a national army on the states, would inevitably lead to civil 
war.568 Instead, the states had to be subordinated to the government, so that the government 
might defend the national interest, which required,  not coercion, but delegation of political 
power.569 Hence, the ability of the states to ignore Congressionally agreed treaties had to be 
restrained in the national interest.570 To achieve this, the federal government must be 
supreme over the states and they must submit themselves to its jurisdiction otherwise they 
ran the risk of being used as “engines against the whole” by foreign governments.571 The 
danger was even starker as new states were formed, because they might also be inhabited by 
foreigners, and could therefore easily owe allegiance or affection to foreign nations and not to 
the union. Just as concerning, new territories and states had the potential to cause intrastate 
                                                          
 
 
565 La Faber believes therefore that nothing contributed more to the calling of the Federal Convention than the belief that the 
Articles were inadequate in the prosecution of foreign policy, see; La Feber (1987), pp.695-717.   
566 Federalists 1 to 8, 15 to 32, 34 to 36 and 73 to 77, TFP, refer to the need for energy in government to ensure political prosperity 
and to preserve the union. See also; Farrand. p.25. 
567 Farrand. p.34. “Mr. Govr. Morris explained the distinction between a federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former being a 
mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat [sic] and compulsive operation. He contended 
that in all communities there must be one supreme power, and one only”. 
568 Farrand. p. 54. James Madison observed that he doubted that force could be used on the people collectively since this would 
look like a “declaration of war” and be regarded by the state as a “dissolution of all previous compacts” made by it and by which it 
might be bound.  
569 The idea of a national interest arises again in Federalist 23, Goldman, when Hamilton explains that “a government, the 
constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any government, 
would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the national interests”. For a discussion of the three different means by which 
federalist structures can come into existence, see Elazar J. D., Exploring Federalism, (The University of Alabama Press: Alabama, 
1987). Elazar indicates that federations are created by force, by consent or they come into existence organically. The modern 
American federation, that Elazar explains is represented by both strong constituent members and a strong government with 
specifically delegated powers, implies federation by consent, resting as it does on the concurrence of the people given, for 
example, in the state ratifying conventions of 1788 to 1789.   
570 Farrand. p. 164.  
571 Farrand. p. 172.  
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and interstate conflict as territorial claims encroached on land claimed by one or more existing 
states.572  
Interstate Conflict 
The localism of the states so apparent in their approach to international trade commitments 
was only one aspect of a more general view of each of them as mere members of a 
confederation, not parts of one nation. Such a loose arrangement of states, pro-
Constitutionalists feared, facilitated engagement of them by outside influences, the creation of 
divisions amongst them, and hence, the circumstances for civil conflict.573  
 
For Federalists, such fears took on importance because America was no longer protected by its 
distance from Europe. The Spanish colonial system, and the British occupation of the western 
forts, caused the States, as John Jay explained it, to “apprehend danger” more locally.574 
Therefore, states, in anticipation of danger, would pursue foreign alliances for protection in 
the event of interstate conflict.575 Hamilton had referred to this theme in the Debates on State 
Equality during the Convention, when he warned that dissolution of the union would inevitably 
follow a failure to reform the Articles.576 If the state ratifying conventions did not grasp this 
opportunity to replace the Articles, the union would become fertile ground for foreign 
governments to encroach on states’ rights, form confederacies of them, and use these 
                                                          
 
 
572 PHP p. 78. See the resolution adopted by the Virginia Assembly on 10th December 1779.   
573 Bowen-Drinker (1986), p. 81. Foreign intrigues were defined to be the Spanish influence in the Southwest, Vermonters with 
loyalties to the Canadians and therefore the British, and the continued influence from European powers mainly the French and the 
Spanish.   
574 Federalist 5, TFP, p. 28. The states had much to fear from the existence of Britain, Spain and the Indian nations, and because 
the states had the ocean to their rear and aggressors to their front, there was no option but for the states to share the burden of 
defence, see; Federalist Papers 25 to 29. TFP. pp 122-142.  
575 For the meaning of interstate conflict, see Onuf P., The Origins of the Federal Republic, Jurisdictional Controversies in the 
United States, 1775-1787, (University of Pennsylvania Press: Pennsylvania, 1983), who describes such conflict in terms of disputes 
over boundaries which did not threaten to disrupt into actual civil war. See also Jensen M., The New Nation, A History of the 
United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789, (Northeastern University Press: Boston, 1981), in which the post War state 
system is described as being in “chaos”, but not in conflict, p. xii. The boundary conflict is put in terms of claims over western 
lands, in Jensen, pp. 9-10.        
576 Madison (1966), The debates on state equality took place between June 28 to July 2 1787. pp. 215-216.   
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alliances to set one state against another, a policy of divide et impera, as Hamilton described it 
in Federalist Thirty-Two.577  
 
John Jay reinforced this point by comparing the situation in America to that of seventeenth 
century Britain when it had been three individual nations in which troubles were “perpetually 
kept inflamed” by outside influence.578 Unlike Britain in the seventeenth century, the American 
geography provided for an even worse outcome as the western territories tried to form states 
and join the union.579 Since, the Articles made no provision for the admission of new states to 
the union, they would be free to choose any attractive partner that met their requirements, 
whether this was the American union, Spain or Britain.580  
 
To underline the susceptibility of the union, Hamilton explained that it was not just outside 
influence that would catalyse interstate conflict, because, Hamilton explained, neighbouring 
states are “natural enemies” which will either go to war or league in confederacies because of 
their individual weaknesses.581 One cause of this may be found in Federalist Seven, in which 
                                                          
 
 
577 Federalist Thirty Two, TFP, p.39.  
578 Federalist Five, TFP, p.26.  
579 Federalist Fourteen, TFP, p.71.  
580 Federalist Forty five, TFP, p.216. See also;  Letter from John Adams to Secretary Jay. Grosvenor Square. London. 8 May, 1787. 
TWJA, Volume VIII, p. 439. The Annapolis Convention of September 1786 was the earliest opportunity to consider a change to the 
Articles to address the war debts, the failing credit of the states, interstate disputes based on tariff laws, the fact that nine states 
maintained their own navies and the fact that Virginia had ratified the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 independently of Congress, see 
Bowen-Drinker (1986), pp.5-9. A farmer disturbance, in Massachusetts, was regarded as a demand, to reduce state debt, however 
the concern was that some faction in society, possibly backed by the British, was using debt as an excuse to cause dissension and 
therefore to destabilise the union as a whole, see;  Raphael R., The American Revolution, A People’s History, (Profile Books: 
London, 2001), pp.306-210, who explains the so called Shays rebellion, a rebellion of Massachusetts farmers, as an incidence of 
domestic upset. If British backed, the aim was to establish a monarchy in America which would mean that the French, for reasons 
of politics, would be encouraged to also interfere in American domestic affairs in order to contain British interference, see; Letter 
from Samuel Osgood to John Adams. New York, 14 November. 1786. TWJA, Volume VIII, pp. 419 to 420. 
581 See; Federalist Six, TFP, pp.29-34. See also; TDC, Part One, pp. 52 to 62. Centinel I. Centinel, considered to be the pseudonym of 
Samuel Bryan the Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist, explains that it was the experience of antiquity that a large country cannot be 
governed on democratic and therefore republican principles but only as a confederation of independent smaller republics. Intrigue 
would firstly include causing dissension between the states, finding advantage in existing sectional differences and causing the 
creation of three confederacies, intent on pursuing pan confederate interests. The idea of the colonies as three sections had its 
roots in Congressional administrative convenience in or around 1775, based on, there being three departments that managed 
Indian, and naval and military affairs, see; Jensen M. (ed.), Regionalism in America, (The University of Wisconsin Press: Wisconsin, 
1965), pp. 26-27. Jay, in Federalist 5, TFP, pp. 25-28, somewhat contradicts the argument for the union as a collective security 
arrangement when he compares the confederacies that might arise in America to the relationship between Great Britain and say 
Spain as being so distinct that they would not form alliances against their enemies. One possible reason for this assertion may be 
that inherent in the conception of confederacies would have been the involvement of competing European interests which would 
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Hamilton explained that disagreements over the western territories, that had been ceded by 
the landed states to the union as a whole, would be a prime cause for conflict. If the states 
failed to ratify the Constitution, then it would not simply be a question of handing those lands 
back to the states that had originally ceded them, since the landless states would also demand 
a share, claiming ownership by virtue of representation in the Continental Congress.582 A 
stronger union was therefore not only a protection from “external danger”, it made sense in 
the context of the domestic situation.583  
 
The permissive environment in which foreign intrigue could flourish, however, was not just to 
be found in the domestic situation but in the international trade.      
Incompetence in Trade 
Before the War, North American colonies had produced agricultural produce and raw 
materials, including rum, pine, lumber and planks, indigo.584 Trading relationships had been 
reciprocal, Britain met a huge American demand for manufactured goods, provided capital for 
long term credit, and convenient ports from which American goods could be distributed 
around Europe.585 In the post-War years, American Commissioners were instructed to expand 
                                                          
 
 
perpetuate, in the confederacies, the malign policies of distrust and jealousy similar to that, for example, between Spain and Great 
Britain. Indeed, Jay supports this assertion when he talks of the confederacies as being more likely to form alliances with the 
European powers as amongst themselves. This in itself may presuppose the existence of the confederate blocks as independent 
quasi nations anxious to take advantage of international trade. 
582 Federalist Seven, TFP, pp.34-39.  
583 Other statesmen such as Franklin and Jefferson, tried to play down the instability of the union and the danger of anarchy in 
order to reassure the nation’s creditors who might otherwise seek immediate repayment of their debts, see; Morris R. B. ‘The 
Confederation Period and the American Historian’, (The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series Vol. 13 No 2, April 1956), pp. 140-
156. This is one of the first illustrations in America of calming international markets by addressing sentiment, and demonstrates 
that foreign affairs were paramount, to both economy and security. However, for Federalists, the dangers were so real, that they 
required an almost immediate military build-up, in the form of a navy to protect merchant shipping, which, since it was essentially 
benign should not attract opposition, but would require finance, see; Federalist 24, TFP, 117-122. For Hamilton, in papers Twenty-
Five to Twenty-Nine, TFP, despite the fear of standing armies a military capable of protecting against domestic insurrection was 
needed. 
584 Gilbert M., The Routledge Atlas of American History. (Fourth Edition), (Routledge: London, 1968), p.17. In 1770 British imports 
from the 13 colonies were tobacco £700,000, rice £170,000, indigo £130,000 and under £100,000 each of whale oil, naval stores, 
furs, hides and iron. See also; Draper T., A Struggle for Power. The American Revolution. (Times Books: New York, 1996). p. 128. 
Draper explains that Britain’s trade with Europe at the time was declining and this coincided with an increase in its trade with 
America  
585 Losse W. J.  The Foreign Trade of Virginia 1789 to 1809, (The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, Vol. 1 No 2, April 1944), 
pp 161-178. 
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the pre-War trade by creating treaties of amity and commerce along the principles of free 
trade.586  
 
However, it was one thing making trade treaties, it was another enforcing them across the 
United States as one nation. Whilst France had been prepared from 1778 to commit itself to 
the pre-War confederation of thirteen states, even though, for example, the state of Maryland 
had not ratified the Articles until January 1781, after the end of the War, their remained doubt 
in the effectiveness of the Articles in international affairs.587 Luzerne, the French Minister to 
America, complained that the trade laws of the confederacy were “incoherent, contradictory 
...and particularly prejudicial to foreigners”.588 Hence there would be doubt when foreign 
nations made commercial treaties with America,  whether they would be consistent with all 
state laws, suited the requirements of all states, and would be honoured in full.589  
 
                                                          
 
 
586 Instructions of Congress to the American Commissioners for Negotiating Treaties of Amity and Commerce. TEN II, 7th May 1784.  
pp. 358-361. See also; Resolution of May 11th 1784. Congress resolved that America valued its foreign treaties but the financial 
situation of the nation was such that it could not afford to locate diplomats and ministers at the capital of each nation. JCC, 
pp.367-368. Congress required a commercial treaty that offered terms no more favourable than those with whom similar treaties 
had already been concluded, see; Instructions to the American Commissioners in Europe. 29th October 1783. TEN II. pp. 241-244.  
By the middle of 1785, a plan had been prepared by John Jay, now Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the first of the American 
Secretaries of State, which worked roughly according to the principles of reciprocity, see; John Jay’s Report on a Plan of Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce. 17th May 1785. TEN II. pp. 634-636. Treaties proposed by the Americans were to be on substantially similar 
terms, for example, the envoy, Baron de Thulemeyer, charged with negotiating a Prussian treaty was content to adopt the model 
that had been successfully negotiated with Sweden, see; Letter from Baron de Thulemeyer to John Adams. 11th March 1784. TEN II, 
p. 315. Treaties were required with twenty countries, including; Russia, Spain, Genoa, Tuscany, Naples, Portugal, Denmark, and 
the Barbary Powers. Britain, objected to this expansion of American trade believing that huge pre-War debts owed to British 
merchants mandated policies aimed at improving relations with Great Britain, instead of which Americans seemed intent on 
promoting a notion of their equality with other nations in the international trade, see; Letter from Sir John Temple to Lord 
Carmarthen. 5th January 1786. TEN III. pp. 63-64. 
587 What is referred to as the Longchamps Affair is an example of how lacking in competence in international affairs the 
Continental Congress remained. A French soldier, Charles de Longchamps struck Luzerne’s secretary with a stick in Pennsylvania. 
When Luzerne requested Longchamps’ extradition to France, Congress was obliged to refer the matter to the Pennsylvania 
Executive Council, the only body competent to grant such a request. TEN II. p. 373. Later, there were suspicions that the 
Longchamps affair had been orchestrated by the British in order to cause fracture in the American French alliance, see; Charles 
Thomson to Benjamin Franklin. 13th August 1784, TEN II. pp. 426-428. However, in 1781 France was not prepared to advance 
further aid to Maryland until the latter ratified the Articles of Confederation, see; McDonald (1965), p.16       
588 Letter from Chevalier de la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes. 5th October 1781. TEN II. pp.230-232.  
589 Examples of uneven state trade laws included a law by Connecticut not to permit any British ship into port where American 
ships were similarly treated in Britain, a resolution from New Jersey that authorised Congress to pass similar legislation, an impost 
on all cargoes from Great Britain, whether or not they were destined for re-export, contrary to the general rule that only landed 
cargoes attracted the impost, and a flat duty of two percent on all goods imported from England, see; Letter from Chevalier de la 
Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes. 15th January 1784. TEN II. p. 279. By April 1784, aware of these problems, Congress adopted a 
resolution calling on the thirteen states to provide it with the power to prohibit imports into the United States in any boat that 
was not owned and navigated by American citizens or citizens of countries with whom the United States had a treaty, see; 
Congressional Resolution Relating to Commercial Matters. 30th April 1784. TEN II. pp.354-355. 
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Similarly, Hamilton explained that trading partners would be unwise to enter into commercial 
arrangements with Congress since they might at any moment be “violated by its members” 
and prospective partners would be unlikely to enter into reciprocal arrangements given the 
“nature of our political association”.590 This was a very real worry and Madison, speaking 
during consideration of the New Jersey Plan that had been put to the Federal Convention in 
1787, referred to Congressional files recording complaints from nations with whom treaties 
had been formed by the states but which had been violated.591 Complaints threatened to 
develop into a much more serious problem for the new nation, and Madison, warning that 
violation of treaties by any one state could give rise to the “national calamity” of a “rupture 
with other powers”, was anxious for a grant of power to a Constitutional Congress, that made 
it both the only body legally capable of making treaties, and with the power to bind the states 
behind it.592  
 
John Adams felt similarly, and explained to Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts politician and 
delegate to the Convention, that trade disputes might give excuse for military conflict. Hence 
that, “commercial connections” with foreign nations would involve America in “perpetual 
disputes and frequent wars if we do not keep up our part”.593 European governments would 
                                                          
 
 
590 Federalist Twenty Two, TFP, p.106. Commerce, its regulation, and promotion through treaty negotiation, was a primary 
consideration of early American foreign policy even, as has been suggested with regard to the Barbary Pirates issue, if this would 
result in entangling alliances. This is the argument made in Federalist 22 in which Hamilton suggests that the want of a 
Constitutional government could lead to treaty violations and hence causes for international conflict. Jay referred to this type of 
situation in Federalist Five, TFP, pp. 25-28., when referring to the lack of uniformity in "sound policy, prudence and foresight" 
currently across the states. A strong national government would remedy inconsistent state policy and decision making, by 
recruiting the best and most well informed representatives from each state into a federal legislature.  The writers of the Federalist 
however probably echoed Edmund Burke when he wrote to his Electors of Bristol in 1774 refusing to accept instructions from 
them since he said that once he was elected he was representing them all, see: Elofson W. M. Woods J. A., and Todd W. B. (eds.), 
The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Vol. 3: Party, Parliament, and the American War: 1774-1780, (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1996).  
591 Journal of the House, 19th June 1787, Farrand Volume I, p.316.. 
592 Madison (1966), p.142.  
593 Clarfield G. John Adams: The Marketplace and American Foreign Policy, (The New England Quarterly, Vol 52, No.3, September 
1979), pp. 345-357. In an essay, published in the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, it was argued that the national 
reputation had been “sinking” amongst foreign powers, and Congress, although it had made international treaties, could not 
enforce them. Foreign nations had “shackled” American commerce and the country was unable to retaliate  by imposing its own 
tariffs. The Constitution was therefore needed to enlarge the powers already conferred by the Articles enabling Congress to 
regulate commerce, see; TDC. Part One, pp. 526-552. The power to make treaties was therefore paramount, see; Madison (1966), 
p. 521. The importance of the treaty making power is made forcibly by Casper, a twentieth century lawyer writing on matters of 
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use trading relationships as fertile ground from which could be established, even baseless, 
excuses for war, because monarchical nations sometimes sought war for reasons unconnected 
with national interest.594 John Jay explained why this might happen, referring to the six treaties 
in place between America and the European powers and the extensive commerce with 
Portugal, Spain and Britain.595 He believed that “just causes of war” between countries also 
often arise from their mutual ties and involvements, and that countries that have connections 
were more likely to go to war over “real or pretended” causes arising from those 
connections.596 Jay later explained the ways in which resentment might arise by pointing to the 
American involvement in the cheaper supply of fish and in shipping more generally in 
competition with the European states.597 Hence, because trade was a zero sum game, if 
American trade flourished, it in “some degree” diminished that of the Europeans, and hence 
could cause conflict.598   
What the Constitution Would Achieve 
In conclusion then, the Constitution would “[prevent] the fulfilment of the prophecies of the 
American downfall”, described above, by achieving two national security objectives; protection 
from foreign invasion and the prevention of interstate conflict.599 It would do this by providing 
                                                          
 
 
American defence, who explains that since, the main objective of the Constitution was to set up the national government to 
enable the conduct and control of foreign policy that the Constitutional powers were to be “exercised principally on external 
objects, as war, peace, negotiation and foreign commerce”, see; Casper G., Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign 
and Defence Policy. A Non Judicial Model, (The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 43 No 3, Spring 1976), pp. 463-498. Security 
of the union could not, therefore, be divorced from trade, see; Ketcham R. (ed.). The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional 
Convention Debate, (Signet: London, 2003). pp 237-238.   
594 See for example, Wood. G. S. Revolutionary Characters. What Made the Founders Different, (Penguin: New York, 2006), p. 167, 
who explains that liberal American revolutionary aims extended both to domestic and international affairs, the latter in the desire 
to avoid wars and promote peace. Hence, the desire was for an end to interest based on “selfish monarchical courts, irrational 
dynastic rivalries, ….and [instead]….. ruled by commerce alone”.   
595 Federalist Three, TFP, p. 19.  
596 Ibid.  
597 The nature of foreign intrigue is described plainly by Hamilton in Federalist 22, TFP, 105-112, when he explains that under the 
Confederation system, since a two thirds majority is needed for treaty making, it is in the interests of foreign nations to attempt to 
influence one third of states in order to obtain a favourable result.  
598 Federalist Four, TFP, p. 22.  
599 At the opening of the Convention, William Randolph had immediately explained that reform would prevent these prophecies 
from coming true, see; Farrand, Volume I, p.18.    
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for collective security, and by making the government superior to that of the states, restraining 
the states from legislating in such a manner that was contrary to the national interest.600  
The Federalist Argument for Engagement in Foreign Affairs  
The Federalists supported Constitutional reform because it would mitigate the above 
explained causes for interstate conflict by creating a nation under one superintending 
government.601 Their argument that external dangers existed, relied on a concept of the-post 
War international system as a constellation of dangerous monarchical and absolutist nations, 
intent on dominating American trade or unravelling its union in pursuit of their own ends.602 
Such was the desire of the Federalists to encourage support amongst the people for the 
Constitution, the extant dangers were liberally complemented by reference to those from 
antiquity, which provided experiences that could not be illustrated exclusively by reference to 
the more recent American experience. Hence, the Greek and Roman experience of republican 
government, conflicts between neighbouring states, and the insecurity of loose 
confederations, were all explained as dangers illustrative of those that might befall America.603  
                                                          
 
 
600 Farrand. p. 24. Hamilton makes the same argument in Federalist Twenty Three but goes further by suggesting that a standing 
army is critical to the national security because the risks faced by the republic are infinite. In Matson C. D. and Onuf P. S., A Union 
of Interests, Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America, (University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 1990), p. 145., the 
argument is made that the Federalists believed in the state system, and ideas of state level republican government, but based not 
on ideas of collective security, but on the notion that the “vigor and vitality” of the states was key to successful Constitutional 
reform.  See also; APW, p. 565.  Anonymous. Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced from the Law of Nature. Of Peace and 
War. Charleston. 1783. For example “peace should be maintained inviolate by every consideration of prudence, conscience, and 
honor”. The passions of the people were for state level government now that the need for a union to fight a war for independence 
had come to an end, see; Jensen M., The Articles of Confederation, An Interpretation of the social-constitutional history of the 
American Revolution, 1774-1781, (The University of Wisconsin Press: Wisconsin, 1940), pp.244-245. See also; Amar A. R., 
America’s Constitution, A Biography, (Random House: New York, 2005), pp. 3-55, for discussions of the issue of state sovereignty 
that underlies the problem with the Articles. 
601 Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson. London. 6th December 1787, TWJA, Volume VIII, p. 464. To achieve these goals a 
stronger union was needed, that left little room for foreign intrigue, but, for example, centralised information within Congress, on 
imports and exports to ensure that the states acted in concert in relation to their overseas dealings, see; Letter from John Adams 
to Secretary Jay. Auteuil. 5th May, 1785, TWJA, Volume VIII. Clearly thirteen diplomats trying to negotiate treaties would only cause 
confusion in Europe, a situation that could be used as a pretext for delaying treaty making, until all thirteen states had expressly 
vested the power of treaty making in Congress, see; Letter from John Adams to Secretary Jay. Auteuil. 8th May, 1785. TWJA, 
Volume VIII, pp. 242 to 243. 
602 See; Van Alsytne (1965), pp.198-199., for an explanation of the fears of the British from what they considered to be the 
inevitability of an American empire. For example, America was heavily involved in the West Indies, one of Britain’s most important 
markets for trade. American trade in Barbados included, the export of tobacco, flour, wheat, Indian corn, timber, salt meat, fish, 
iron, lead and hemp and importing hogsheads, sugar and molasses. Losse (1944), pp. 161- 178. 
603 For a view of the extent to which the Founders were influenced by their reading of antiquity see Carl. R. J.,  The Founders and 
the Classics. Greece, Rome and the American Enlightenment. (Harvard University Press: Massachusetts, 1995).   
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At heart of the Federalist argument, was the idea that preservation of the union from these, 
essentially foreign inspired interests, would assure security, stability, and economic growth, by 
perfecting it under a strong national Constitution.604 This is evident from the construction of 
the Federalist Papers, the argument of which is  made in distinct parts; the warning of foreign 
dangers supported the argument for preservation of the union. The arguments in support of 
republican government, together with considerations of revenue and economy talked to its 
perfection, and subsequent essays attempted to assuage the fears of loss of state 
sovereignty.605  
 
What follows from these arguments for preservation of the union was a point of view on 
foreign affairs that, far from espousing a strict isolationism in the form of, say, Jefferson’s agri-
idealism promoted a message of more and active involvement in world affairs, based on a 
stronger, unassailable union.606  
 
By proposing Constitutional ratification, the Federalists were advocating the creation of a 
power that could successfully prosecute a foreign policy supporting the entry of the nation 
into the European balance. Why the Constitution, if adopted, would permit such an outcome is 
summed up by a comment made by Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 
Alexander George Sutherland in 1936. Discussing the powers, a Constitution would grant to a 
                                                          
 
 
604 Federalist Forty Five, TFP, pp. 228-232. The theme of union as a collective security arrangement is continued by Madison when 
he defines the union to be essential to the security of the people against foreign danger, protect them from wars amongst the 
different states, guard them against violent and oppressive factions, and guard them against military establishments. Marks (1973) 
takes the view that 25 of the first 36 Federalist papers concerned national security.  
605 Pole J. R. (ed.) The Federalist. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. (Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, 
2005). In summary, papers 1 to 11 and 21 to 29,45,64 and 75 deal with foreign affairs, papers 30 to 36, 12 and 13 address the 
economy and revenue, papers 15 to 19 and 23 deal with preservation of the union, five papers deal with state sovereignty and the 
remainder deal with the defence of republican government.   
606 The idea of active involvement in foreign affairs is a theme of; Edling M. M., A Revolution in Favour of Government, Origins of 
the US Constitution, and the Making of the American State, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), in which Edling argues that 
“the need for a stronger state in America emanated from the ambitions of such powerful and efficient “fiscal-military states” in 
Europe”, indicating that the desire of Federalists was to counteract threats to American interests. See also; Fensterwald (1958), 
pp.111-139.   
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Federal government in foreign affairs, he explained that “the powers to declare and wage war, 
to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties 
as a member of the family of nations” should be in the powers of the nation state.607  
 
Sutherland’s comments concisely describe what John Jay, one of the authors of the Federalist 
Papers and a former wartime Secretary for Foreign Affairs, believed the federal government 
needed to achieve under a Constitution if the country were to take its place in this family of 
nations.608 American diplomats, representatives of a perfect American union, would participate 
in the European equilibrium or “the balance of European competitions” as Hamilton had 
described it.  The nation would eventually develop the means to execute its foreign policy by 
the creation of a navy which, even if it did not initially “vie with the great maritime powers” 
could be of sufficient size as to “decide the fate of a campaign” if deployed in favour of one 
side or another in some conflict involving trade.609 Hence, America, under a strong federal 
government, would take its place as an equal partner amongst the nations of the world, as an 
important member of the equilibrium.  
 
An illustration of the role that America would play in this equilibrium can be found not in a 
military or naval power, and therefore as a general balance participant, but as a peripheral 
nation critical to the interests of the European powers. Hence, Hamilton identified the value of 
American ports and naval stores to a European power involved in military operations in pursuit 
of trade in the West Indies given its proximity to the region.610 Therefore, for Federalists, 
America would be an important participant in the European balance of power system, and 
                                                          
 
 
607 Sherwood F. H. Foreign Relations and the Constitution, (The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 1, No 4, December 1948) pp 386-
399.  
608 Deudney D. H. The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control and Balance of Power in the American States–Union Circa 
1787 to 1861, (International Organisation, Vol. 49, No. 2, Spring 1995), pp.191-228. 
609 Federalists Four to Eleven, TFP, pp.22-59. 
610 Gilbert (1968). p. 24.  
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would use its influence to negotiate valuable trading rights, or offer not to intervene on one 
side or the other in a conflict.   
 
To achieve the goal of an engaged foreign policy, the states would have to accept that there 
were clear external threats from the jealous European nations, that these perils had the 
potential to create faction in society, and that the Constitution was the remedy. Madison in 
Federalist Ten, explained that these factional interests would be diluted in a national 
government comprised of representatives from the greater republic. This is because 
“designing men”, whilst they might gain the upper hand in state legislatures, would not gain 
traction with representatives of the states to a federal government. The simple reason being, 
that federal congressmen, chosen in their states by a majority within which “the cabals of the 
few”, had been fully guarded against, would make it difficult for “unworthy candidates” to 
emerge as state representatives. Hence, whilst a faction may influence state legislatures, they 
would not be able to spread conflict across all states.611 This essential Federalist 
internationalism was the precise opposite of the belief of the Anti-Federalists in the ruinous 
effects of centralisation of power, and hence a desire to maintain the isolation that geography 
provided.  
  
                                                          
 
 
611 Farrand Volume I, p. 136. Faction should not always be considered dangerous however. See also, Federalist Ten, TFP, pp. 48-
54;  Madison explained that American society should be comprised of many, or a “great a number of interests and parties”, so as 
to mitigate the effect of a large majority willing and able to exert its will on the minority. In this way it would be unlikely that there 
would be a common interest amongst such a large and disparate group and the best way to achieve this is by having as many 
disparate interests as possible that were unable to combine.  
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The Anti-Federalist Argument for Isolation in Foreign Affairs  
The Isolationism of the Anti-Federalists   
For Anti-Federalists, external dangers were exaggerated by Federalists solely to secure the 
vote for ratification in each state.612 Anti-Federalist writer, Luther Martin was at pains to 
explain that America was safe, and wild Federalist claims that external foreign dangers would 
cause interstate conflict, were wrong because currently, no one individual or state posed the 
risk of tyranny to any other. Hence, the only way to protect the states from federal tyranny 
was by maintaining the balance of power that was the state system.613  
 
This was not least because state militia were better equipped to deal with domestic 
insurrection, which might occur intrastate, than would a federal military that could, in any 
case, be turned on the people.614 Patrick Henry, former state legislature and delegate to the 
Virginia ratifying convention, speaking in the ratifying debate in Virginia in June 1788, 
explained that the proposal to give a federal government the power to maintain an army, 
exposed the true reason for the clamour for reform, It was, he said, illustrative of the desires 
                                                          
 
 
612 Marks (1973). Marks believes that the Anti-Federalists rarely discussed foreign affairs. This point of view is not shared by 
Graebner N. A. Isolationism and Anti-Federalism: The Ratification Debates, (Diplomatic History, Vol. 11. No. 4., 1987), pp. 337- 353, 
who explains that far from being disconnected from foreign affairs, Anti-Federalists shared a keen interest in international 
relations. They differed in that they took, what Graebner describes as an isolationist view of the world. For them, the dangers to 
the union, described by Federalists, were exaggerated with the sole intention of securing ratification. The world was a safe place 
for Americans to do business and did not require a robust foreign policy; hence Americans could remain aloof from the balance of 
power.  
613 For a discussion of the state system as a balance of power arrangement, see also Hall M. D. Roger Sherman and the Creation of 
the American Republic, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013), p. 125. The group of Federalists that were against expansion 
westwards explained that the balance of power relationship of the state system would fail as the union expanded west and the 
“political equipoise” of the state system was destroyed, see; essay, Onuf. P. S., The Expanding Union, in Konig (1995),p. 73. See 
also, Wakelyn (2004), p. 131., in which the author describes Martin’s desire for smaller states to be created from larger ones in 
order to ensure that government remained “closest to the people”. For the ubiquity of the idea of balance of power systems as 
those that protect participants from, what are referred to as, “predators” see; Dunne T. (et.al.), International Relations Theories, 
Discipline and Diversity, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007), p.57., in which the authors quote from the Morgenthau H. 
definition of balance of power as “a social phenomenon…found..[at]..all levels of social interaction”.   
614 Cato III, TDC, pp.214-218.  
 
 
185 
 
of a cabal in support of reform, for imperial glory, at the expense of the ideals of republicanism 
and representation, which a national government should infact protect.615 
 
Whether Anti-Federalists generally accepted the threat from external dangers or not, America 
was naturally isolated from European powers by virtue firstly of distance. Geographical 
isolation meant more than just some abstract thought about safety as a result of distance. It 
was borne out of practical considerations of the difficulties that Europeans would have of 
maintaining and supplying armies on the American continent. Similarly, risks of Indian tribes 
acting as proxies in a European conflict in America, were dismissed on the ground that they 
would be relatively minor border irritants not capable of harassing the main body of the 
states.616 
 
Secondly America was isolated from Europe because the state system of the Articles denied 
foreign agents the opportunity to interfere in domestic politics an opportunity, that only 
centralised power would bring. 617 A federal government, constituting a strong executive and a 
small number of powerful representatives possessing vast delegated power, would only 
compromise natural safety, because it would provide fertile ground for the intrigue of foreign 
agents. The belief in states’ rights that this argument implies, provides a basis for isolationism 
                                                          
 
 
615 Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention, June 1788. CAF, pp. 207-210. The Anti-Federalist writer, 
Agrippa also rejected the idea that only a strong government with the power to regulate trade and impose duties, would be able 
to pay down the War debt of some twelve million pounds. The same objective could easily be achieved by selling the western 
lands to settlers, who would be encouraged to accept a loan from the federal government, repayable in agricultural produce. 
Foreign creditors would, in turn, be repaid part of the War loan in-kind from the agricultural output. The objective of such an 
arrangement, according to Agrippa, would be not only to pay down the debt, but to also demonstrate the strength of the 
American economy and its credit worthiness; Letters of Agrippa, 8th December 1787, CAF, 4.6.27, pp. 81-85. The same point was 
made by A Farmer. CAF, 4.17. Essays by A Farmer. 11th January 1788. A Farmer dismissed, on the basis of distance and the 
attractiveness to foreign creditors of the high rate of interest being paid, fears of foreign wars that might be caused if the states do 
repay the foreign debt in short order. The Storing publication of seven volumes is generally regarded as a relatively complete 
collection of Anti-Federalist writing. References to the essays in these volumes is given by the paragraph, essay location and 
volume in one of the seven volumes. Hence, the reference; 3.16.2, is to be found in Volume III, 16th essay, paragraph 2. The Anti-
Federalists were the, men (with the exception of Mercy Warren) who are recognised as the pseudonymous authors of essays 
either against Constitutional reform or in support, subject to amendment. The title Anti-Federalist was given to dissenters to the 
Constitution by its supporters who wished to discredit their arguments by claiming the title, Federalist, to themselves.     
616 Essays of Brutus, New York Journal, October 1787- April 1788, CAF, 2.9.90, p. 403.   
617 See, Madison (1966), p. 437, in which Edmund Randolph warns of interference from foreign emissaries.  
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with its origins in the colonial experience, and in the experience of the Seven Years’ War. 
Colonists reluctantly complied with British demands for militia support, and for intercolonial 
alliances, being attributed to their belief in colonial [states] rights, and hence a belief in 
isolation from what was perceived as a European war.618     
 
Aside from the arguments of safety of the union from distance, and from the existing state 
system, was the aversion, amongst some Anti-Federalists, to compromising this situation 
through international trade, where it led to imbalances that enriched foreign merchants at the 
expense of Americans.619 The pseudonymous Anti-Federalist writer Alfred, believed that 
America was too dependent on foreign trade to the extent that it had squandered its gold and 
silver reserves for the luxuries offered by British merchants.620 The nations of Europe had 
cynically exploited America’s natural agricultural resources when those products should have 
been diverted to meet the needs of the domestic population. It was therefore America’s 
reliance on British manufactured goods that had to be broken.621 An excess of imports over 
exports would leave America in permanent debt, and merchants would outnumber American 
farmers.622 Because foreign trade implied an unhealthy reliance on European manufactured 
goods, the creation of a strong production basis in America must be encouraged provided 
production costs were competitive when compared with those of Britain.623   
                                                          
 
 
618 Boorstin D. J., The Americans, The Colonial Experience, (Phoenix Press: France, 1958), p. 362.   
619 Main J. T., The Anti-Federalists, Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788, (W.W. Norton and Company: New York, 1961), p. xi., 
Main describes the large number of small farmers that supported the Anti-Federalist objection to the Constitution as representing 
the desire of the majority for protection against an elite interested in concentration of power. In this sense, the Anti-Federalists as 
representative of the agrarian interest is congruent with a Jeffersonian form of isolationism. This idea is reinforced by Main (1961), 
p. 270., in his association of the “mercantilist interest” with Federalists. This is however rejected by Cornell. S., The Other 
Founders, Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828, (University of North Carolina Press: North Carolina, 
1999), p. 83., who warns against generalisations, and describes some small farmers as intent on accommodating agrarian, 
commercial and merchant interests. This description is reinforced by Wakelyn (2004), p. xvii., who explains that Anti-Federalists 
were smaller farmers, but also large plantation owners, and a smaller number were middle sized farmers.              
620 Essay by Alfred, 13th December 1787, CAF, 3.10.3, pp.141-142.  
621 For a discussion of the cultural affinity of Americans with the British, the desire to adopt British manners, dress, customs, 
literature, political thought, etc., and the motivations behind demand for British manufactured luxuries, both before and after the 
War, see Griffin. P. America’s Revolution. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013). 
622 Address by A Plebeian, New York, 1788, CAF, 6.11.23, p.141. 
623 Letter from Sir James Jay to Patrick Henry,30th December 1784. PHP, Volume III. pp.248-253. 
 
 
187 
 
This is not to say that Anti-Federalists as a group of writers, thinkers and politicians presented 
a common policy reconciled against international trade. Patrick Henry, a delegate to the 
Virginian Ratifying Convention, for example, regarded a growth in the carrying trade as crucial 
to American growth and expansion. He expressed, however, a rejection of the monopolistic 
British merchants seeking to control American markets by exploiting free ports at Norfolk and 
Alexandria, Virginia, and a policy that relied for protection of that commerce on foreign aid. 
For Henry, a strong navy would not just relieve America of the reliance on foreign nations, but 
would provide security for the nation since the geographical distance from Europe and the 
separation by an ocean alone were insufficient to deter belligerents without a strong naval 
presence.624  
The Anti-Federalist Objection to Concentration of Power 
Generally, however, the Anti-Federalists presented a distance and trade centric framework for 
isolation from Europe, that denied the existence of external dangers.625 As explained, some 
took the view that the dangers had been overdone and were being exaggerated by their 
opponents to force ratification. Others did not entirely deny the external dangers on, for 
example, the western border, but attributed these to the special circumstances of a nation, 
with an extended border occupied on the whole by unfriendly Indian tribes.626  
 
However, what would bring foreign influence to bear directly in the American government, 
would be annihilation of the existing loose confederation of the states in which state legislative 
representatives were close to the people they represented. Centralisation of power would 
                                                          
 
 
624 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, 15th September 1776, PHP, Volume III, pp. 10 to 11. 
625 See for example, the comments of Aristocrotis, The Government of Nature Delineated, or an Exact Picture of the New Federal 
Constitution, Carlisle 1788, 3.16.2, CAF. pp. 196 to 213.  
626 Edmund Randolph, the second American Secretary of State, believed the risk of European military involvement in America 
would be aided by their presence in the west, see; CAF, 6.11.1 to 6.11.33, pp.128-147. See also Letters of Agrippa. 25th January 
1788, Agrippa’s warning that foreign influence was just as likely to be felt from the interference of large trading companies that 
dominated European trade. CAF, 4.6.63, pp.104-105.   
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mean that the states would be reduced  from sovereign power to subsidiary status.627 Elbridge 
Gerry, a delegate to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, explained that the Constitution 
would so alter state constitutions that they would in effect be dissolved, and Federal 
government substituted for state assemblies.628 According to George Mason, a delegate to the 
Virginian state Ratifying Convention, it was the implicit powers granted to the Federal 
government that were most dangerous of this outcome, in other words what the draft 
Constitution did not say as opposed only to what it did say. Hence, Mason pointed to the 
absence of a bill of rights that might guarantee certain freedoms to the people and the danger 
that the Constitution, might easily supersede states’ bill of rights by retaining powers to the 
federal government by virtue of its position as a centralised power.629 However, even with the 
protection that a bill of rights could provide, concerns remained that a government that was to 
be so geographically remote from its constituents would fail to represent local needs, and 
therefore be unconcerned with the liberties of the people, making it more likely to side with 
foreign interests.630  
 
For Anti-Federalists, political representatives that derived their power locally, under the 
existing state system, would be less corruptible than delegates to a federal government. 
                                                          
 
 
627 Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention, Letters from the 
Federal Farmer, 1787 and 1788, CAF, 2.8.81, p. 261. Federal Farmer reinforces the idea that the states had the right to retain 
sovereignty by explaining that the original intention of the union was the “common defence”, a union borne out of “friendship”.  
The general theme of the Federal Farmer illustrates the major Anti-Federalist themes of (i) the absence in the Constitution of a bill 
of rights, (ii) the danger of a consolidation of the states, and (iii) the belief that republican government, based on the experience of 
antiquity, was feasible as a sustainable form of government only in small republics not in a nation that was already widely disperse 
by 1787. See also Main (1961), p.168, in which the author refers to the fears of the Anti-Federalists as being one from “extreme 
centralization”.   
628 CFA, Volume II, p. 7.  
629 Objections to the Constitution of the Government formed by the Convention, 1787, CAF, 2.2.1, pp.11-14 
630 Robert Yates and John Lansing, Reasons of Dissent. (New York Journal. 14th January 1788). This was the argument of both 
Robert Yates and John Lansing who doubted whether a bill of rights would be sufficient a guard against a government that could 
become so disinterested in the basic freedoms of the people. CAF, 2.3.6, p.17. See also; Bromwich D., A Republic Divided, 
(Daedalus On the Humanities, Vol. 135 No. 2, Spring, 2006), pp. 5-10., in which the author explains that “eagerness for foreign 
entanglements always stands in inverse proportion to a regard for liberty at home”, a further objection to Federalist eagerness to 
secure ratification and hence to create a government active in foreign affairs.  The closer the people were to power, the more they 
would participate in government, and the distant central government would only be disruptive of this fundamental desire of the 
people; Countryman E., A People in Revolution, The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-1790, (W. W. 
Norton and Company: New York, 1981), p.277. 
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Representatives to a federal legislature, by definition comprising a small number, would 
possess great power and therefore more likely to be subjected to foreign influence. Thus, for 
example, Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia and the Virginia delegate that introduced 
the so called Virginia Plan to the Convention, objected to the Article I provisions for election of 
representatives and senators, because frequent elections would encourage foreign interests to 
bribe voters to support, or reject incumbents.631 Similarly, the proposed treaty making power 
which, because it required the consent of two thirds of the senate to treaties, would give 
extensive scope for foreign influence on the mere ten senators needed to support any 
treaty.632  
 
Indeed, simply the perceived difference between Representatives and Senators would be 
sufficient to induce foreign agents to exert influence, particularly on Senators, anxious to 
outwit their counterparts in the House.633 The pseudonymous Anti-Federalist writer, A Farmer, 
explained that there were a variety of other influential individuals in America, whom he 
referred to as the aristocrats, who would also be easily corrupted. They were the self-
interested, property owning men who had originally opposed not the right of the British to 
maintain the American colonies within its imperial system, but to the imposition of direct 
taxation.634 These were the merchants, men of money and power, and those with loyalist 
                                                          
 
 
631 This issue of foreign influence by virtue of recall, is more correctly the ability of foreigners to purchase votes as candidates 
stand for frequent election. Agrippa explains that, although not currently a mischief in the state legislature, congressional 
representatives to a federal government are more likely to be influenced by foreign bribes by virtue of the proportionately greater 
power they would exercise at the national level, see;. Letters of Agrippa. 8th January 1788, CAF, 4.6.45, pp.91-93. 
632 The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. CAF, 3.11.43. pp.145-167.   
633 Address by John Francis Mercer, Maryland. CAF, 5.5.7, pp.102-106. The Executive might be subject to such influence because 
the President was more likely to have control over foreign affairs even though he was not intended to be the “principal” therein, 
see; Rakove J. N., Original Meanings, Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, (The Easton Press: Connecticut, 1996), 
pp. 266-267.   
634 Foreign influence on American affairs was also more likely amongst papists and atheists who it was believed, respectively 
owed allegiance to a foreign power, or because they “lack virtue”, see; Letters by David, 7th March 1788, CAF, 4.24.1, p. 246. 
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leanings, who had closely aligned themselves to Europe, its trade and fashions, and were 
susceptible to the foreign control of British merchants.635  
 
However, it was the Executive that was most a risk of acting against national interests given his 
control of a standing army. An army that comprised cutthroats, and villains, at the behest of an 
Executive, who himself could easily be in thrall to interest groups, was more likely to turn on 
the people.636 The Anti-Federalist argument against standing armies, as well as being a fear 
that the army might turn on the people in times of peace, is also a more nuanced argument 
against foreign involvement.637 In explaining this, the pseudonymous Anti-Federalist Writer, 
Impartial Examiner places emphasis on the danger that an unscrupulous executive would 
ultimately seek the self-aggrandisement that is common to a monarch and his aristocratic 
court.638 Hence, that the objective of keeping and maintaining an army was purely for the 
purpose of pursuing an imperialist foreign policy.639 Fears were therefore being stoked by a 
cabal that demanded international respect and equality amongst nations, not because of a 
fear of foreign dangers.640 
 
                                                          
 
 
635 Essays by a Farmer, 18th March 1788, CAF, 5.1.53, pp.32-36.  
636 Essays of Philadelphiensis. No. 3, Philadelphia Independent Gazette. November 1787 to April 1788, CAF, 3.9.41. p. 121. 
Philadelphiensis was keen, however, to point out it was a large standing army that would be destructive of the liberty of people. A 
small standing army would only invite attack from foreign powers in the knowledge that the Republic could then be easily overrun. 
The idea of the incompetence of a proposed federal government was reflected in the belief that it would never be capable of 
investing in the development of a navy, not because of an inability to raise taxes, but because it would not do so given that the 
expense might threaten its existence, see; Essays of Philadelphiensis. No. 3., CAF, p. 99.   
637 Anonymous. Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced from the Law of Nature. On Modes of defence. Charleston. 1783.  
APW, Volume I, p. 601.  Such was the concern with standing armies that this writer suggested that the nation would be able to 
defend itself better with a navy since a standing army could oppress the people. 
638 Essays by the Impartial Examiner, 5th March 1788. CAF, 5.14.16. pp.183-188. 
639 Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention, 12th June 1788. CAF, 5.16.23, pp.229-239. The difference 
between republican and monarchical nations, in so far as waging war is concerned, is explained in this speech as the just war of 
the former prosecuted in the national interest as opposed to the war of the Prince, undertaken for reasons of ambition. See also 
Cincinnatus, CAF, 6.1.2.5, pp.17-22. 
640 Essays by a Farmer. Maryland 7th March 1788. CAF, 5.1.52. pp. 29 to 32.  The protection that the army might provide to the 
republic could be achieved instead, according to the Anti-Federalist Denatus, by providing for academies in each state that would 
tutor the people in the art of defensive war; Address by Denatus, 11th June 1788, CAF, 5.18.12, pp.260-267. 
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For Patrick Henry, a self-appointed Federalist elite would use untrue concerns of foreign 
dangers to achieve this goal of continental expansion.641 Expansion westwards and the claim of 
existing states to jurisdiction over those territories, would cause unrest as frontiersmen sought 
self-determination and state legislatures resisted. Article IV, Section IV which prohibited the 
creation of a state within a state without consent of the state legislature, would only 
encourage civil war. This is because, Martin explained, the Federal government would have to 
intervene, leading to state wide resistance and hence to contagious interstate civil war.642 
Therefore centralisation of power would magnify faction into an existentialist crisis for the 
union.643 
 
Finally, the pseudnonymous Anti-Federalist writer, Philadelphiensis explained that 
centralisation of power would be destructive of the basic freedoms for which the Revolution 
was fought, making it less likely that America would continue to attract Europeans fleeing from 
oppression.644 However, such largess to foreigners would always be tempered by a fear of its 
influence on morality, education, religion, and race. The pseudnonymous Anti-Federalist writer 
Agrippa, for example, warned that the power of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution which 
gave Congress the sole right of naturalisation, threatened to reduce the other states to the 
                                                          
 
 
641 Indeed, some authors take the point of view that Anti-Federalists were supported by those that would not have benefited 
from foreign trade, i.e. those that instead depended on local trading relationships, see; Pole (1987), p. 21., see also; Ketcham R., 
The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, The Clashes and the Compromises that Gave Birth to Our 
Form of Government, (Putnam, New York, 2003), p.16.  Such desires for national glory inimical to Republican ideas and more in 
keeping with those of European monarchies, see; Kidd, T.S., Patrick Henry, First Among Patriots, (Perseus: New York, 2011), p. 
197.  Martin believed that false and wholly unsustainable claims that the states faced external threats outside the powers of the 
Articles to contain, were being used to achieve this aim, see; Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature 
of the State of Maryland, 1788, CAF, p.19. See also CAF. Volume III. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the 
Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents. CAF, Volume III, pp.145-167. 
642 CAF, 2.4.45 to 2.4.102, pp. 48 to 72. The closeness of the ratification vote in the states meant that an effective opposition to 
Federal coercive acts was already forming, see; CAF, 6.11.1 to 6.11.33, pp.128-147. 
643 Factionalism was not to be considered a pernicious influence in all circumstances and situations, and indeed the extent of 
divisions in society could be safely accommodated provided the “common interests” remained superior. This was the essential 
message of Washington’s Farewell Address which combined factionalism with ideas of foreign engagement and entanglement, 
hence his warning against “inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others”, quoted in, 
and based on Beard C. A., The Republic, Conservations on Fundamentals, (The Viking Press: New York, 1943), pp.48- 49. 
644 Essays of Philadelphiensis. Nos. 5. and 6. CAF, 3.9.38, pp.118-119. Patrick Henry, desirous of commerce as the driver of 
economic growth, believed that the question was whether America would grow on a slow track, or on a fast track by encouraging 
immigration to exploit the industry and economy of the entrepreneurial classes seeking refuge, see; Letter from Richard Henry Lee 
to Patrick Henry, 15th September 1776, PHP, Volume III, pp.10-11. 
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licentious position of the state of Pennsylvania which, for many years had welcomed free and 
unrestrained immigration. To guard against the same fate befalling the other states, the level 
and the type of immigration should therefore be under the control of each state.645  
The Anti-Federalist Reliance on the Balance of Power of the State System 
In essence therefore, the antidote to the Federalist desire for imperial glory was to be found in 
the maintenance of the status quo, the interstate balance of power afforded by the Articles 
which had the effect of limiting the powers of Congress, and protecting basic liberties.646 Since 
a Constitutional union was more conducive to a fracture in the union than a confederated one, 
the overarching object must be to maintain a system akin to the European equilibrium within 
the American continent. 
 
Hence, ironically, Anti-Federalists did not so much warn against involvement in European 
politics, as adopt its relationship framework to prevent European balance rivalries from 
irretrievably altering their republican ideal of what the interstate relationship should be. 
Hence, the response of the states should be in the wholesale adoption of the principles of 
equilibrium, as a means to mitigate the external pernicious effects of the European version of 
it. In other words, to maintain a balance of power within the thirteen states that would 
prevent the success of European influence.  
                                                          
 
 
645 Letters of Agrippa, 28th December 1787, CAF, 4.6.34, pp. 85-87. 
646 See also PHP, p. 382 for support from Patrick Henry for this idea of the balance of power in America. Onuf takes the view that 
the Anti-Federalist concept of state autonomy was achieved under the Constitution, in so far as the states continued to “exercise 
most governmental functions”, see, The Expanding Union, Onuf. P. S., in Konig (1995), p. 79. See, also: Claude I. L Jr. The Balance of 
Power Revisited, (Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, Special Issue on the Balance of Power. Apr., 1989), pp. 77-85. 
Claude explains that “balance of power is more appealing to statesmen than collective security in large part because, in contrast to 
the principled rigidity of behaviour demanded by the latter, balance of power caters for the sovereignty of the state.” In contrast to 
this balance of power argument, Deudney (2007), pp. 162-189, in what he calls the Philadelphian System (a system designed to 
reign in the anarchical tendencies of republican states), explains that the states existed in a situation of, what he calls, “negarchy” 
or the negation of overt power by any one state not solely as a consequence of a balance of power but also because of “the 
division of power” between state and government. Seperately, Deudney (2007), p. 166, explains that contrary to the argument 
that the Articles limited the power of Congress, the Constitution would control the state militia, the possible cause of interstate 
conflict.      
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The desirability of maintaining the equilibrium between the states were behind Martin’s desire 
for two important amendments to the draft Constitution, ultimately not taken up.647 The first, 
was to the treason clause of Article III, Section III, to exclude any citizen from being charged 
with treasonous behaviour solely because he was engaged in waging war against the Federal 
government, at the behest of his state legislature. The second to require that the Constitution 
explicitly recognise state militia, when engaged in military action against the United States, as 
being subject to the law of nations. Both amendments were to afford the states the same 
rights as any foreign belligerent when waging war against the federal government, since they 
were in that instance engaged in a war to maintain the states qua states. Hence, Martin 
wished for a high degree of state autonomy, albeit within a continental American system.   
In conclusion therefore, for Anti-Federalists, national government could never effectively 
govern vast territories, with the state system alone providing the only means of truly 
representative government.648 According to A Farmer, in distinction to the European 
equilibrium, an American state balance of power system would not rely on relative hard power 
between its member states, but political power alone.649 Political power, because it emanated 
from, and was close to, local representation, could not be usurped by outside influences. A 
balanced state system therefore provided safety, and in many ways reflected the pre-
Revolutionary War status quo. 
  
                                                          
 
 
647 An alternative interpretation of this idea of the maintenance of an equilibrium intrastate and between states and congress, is 
put forward by Brown R. H., Redeeming the Republic, Federalists, Taxation, and The Origins of the Constitution, (The John Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore, 1993), who explains that Anti-Federalists desired not so much equilibrium but an amended 
Confederation in which the states were supreme and representative.    
648 Essays by a Farmer, Maryland, 7th March 1788. CAF, 5.1.53, pp. 29-32. 
649 Essays by a Farmer, 22nd April 1788, CAF, 5.1.109 to 5.1.113, pp. 60-73.   
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6. Chapter Six: Conclusion 
The Argument of this Thesis 
Isolationism has become the enduring view of American foreign affairs in the early part of the 
twentieth century, both before America’s entry into the First World War, and during the 
interwar years. With a claimed origin in Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address, the warning of 
entangling alliances has been the tradition of American foreign affairs for well over two 
hundred and fifty years, and is generally taken to mean two things. Firstly, that there should be 
no political connection with European nations, and secondly any connection that is made, for 
example in providing for the rights of belligerents in times of war, should not involve America 
in European wars. Whilst historians have tried to place the Address in context by arguing that 
it made sense for America to remain aloof from Europe given that it was militarily weak at the 
time, the idea that Washington would have disapproved of any military or political 
involvement in Europe continues to persist. Washington’s words are therefore invoked to 
justify anything from a twentieth century refusal to intervene in foreign wars, to a twenty first 
century refutation of the theory and practice of globalisation.  
 
There are sufficient grounds to suggest that the prevalence in the literature on American 
foreign policy of the Address as the origin of isolationism, and therefore a tacit rejection of the 
earlier period before it was given by Washington, rests on the notion that until there was a 
Constitutional Republic, there was no national interest. Such arguments appear to rely on; 
firstly, an underlying assumption that it was only what might be described as, a truly 
representative, Constitutional Congress that could legitimately articulate the national interest. 
Secondly, that there was no such thing as a national interest given the separateness of the 
colonies at the outset of the Revolution, and their continued failure to act in concert after 
Independence was won.    
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This thesis has sought to dispel the conception of an isolationist bent to American foreign 
affairs by attempting to demonstrate that, based on a broadly defined framework of what is 
national interest, the necessary conditions for it had been met at the start of the Revolution. In 
many ways the word national is unhelpful in this argument, since it creates a diversion for the 
researcher that leads to a search for evidence that a nation state was in existence. Such an 
argument is unnecessary since the correspondence of the Committees of Correspondence 
provide ample evidence of the shared colonial vision that the relationship with Britain was to 
depend on there being an independent union of the states that protected the autonomous 
government in each state.         
 
Given that there was, what it is convenient to call a, national interest there was the foundation 
of a foreign policy which, this thesis argues, had a distinctly internationalist bent because it 
involved active participation in the balance of power. Hence, this thesis does not present an 
alternative point of view of the meaning of the Address. Instead it delves into the motives 
behind alliance formation, and the American exploitation of European state rivalries in the 
period before the Address was given. By clarifying the underlying considerations that went into 
policy making in these Revolutionary War years, what emerges is a nation keenly aware that 
active engagement with Europe would promote its trade, and assure its security. After the 
War, the definition of interest is more in keeping with what have become generally acceptable, 
but by no means the only, central planks of interest, viz, the pursuit of security, trade and 
territory. What is important about the post-War interest is that the union, critical to national 
interest at the outset of War, now became an end in itself, that is, the union had to be 
preserved for the sake of security from foreign influence, compliance with trade treaties, and 
to provide for a territorial expansion that assured that new states could join the other states of 
the union.  
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The early period, which forms the basis of this study, is the single most important phase in 
American foreign affairs history for two reasons. Firstly, during these years, two principles for a 
future American foreign policy were laid down. The first was that isolation was not a realistic 
consideration for a nation currently, or prospectively influential in the foreign affairs of other 
nations. By its own design or by that of others, it would always be fully engaged in world 
affairs, whether because of its trade interests, its importance as a military ally, or because of 
the universalism of the ideals of the Revolution. The second was, that ideology, whether of 
political separation, or of universal values, would be secondary to hard headed assessments of 
national interest. That these values would be compromised, traded off, and otherwise 
postponed between short and long term interests, would only confirm that realistic 
assessments of interest were central to foreign affairs.    
 
Secondly, realism entered the American foreign policy discourse. Hence, statesmen rapidly 
concluded that it would never be in the interests of monarchical nations, absolutist or 
otherwise, to support an American independence on ideological grounds connected with ideas 
of liberty and freedom.650 Indeed, such ideas were inimical to the fundamental premise of 
societies that were based not on the rights of man, given to them by God or nature, but at the 
pleasure of the monarch. Once this realisation gained traction in the foreign affairs thinking of 
American statesmen, policy decisions that exploited balance rivalries in the name of interest 
played a key role in policy making. Hence, fears or outright dislike of Catholicism, of absolutists 
nations with interests based on the whim of a monarch, or of politically entangling alliances, 
                                                          
 
 
650 According to one modern author, “foreign policy has always been easiest for the United States when the nations who stood in 
the way of the realisation of American interests could also be regarded as the opponent of freedom and civilisation”, Widenor 
W.C., Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy, (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1983), p. 167  
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were all postponed to what was in the interest of the thirteen colonies, that is 
independence.651  
 
Whereas these ideas had been forged in the years when the disparate colonies, represented 
by a weak Congress, had been desperate to create an independent nation and would 
therefore, for example, surrender even navigation rights to the Mississippi River, in return for a 
Spanish alliance, they also formed the foundation for post-War policy making. With the War 
finally over, American foreign policy thinkers set about trying to define how the ideology that 
was the essential basis for bringing disparate colonies together, would be fashioned into an 
approach to foreign affairs. They settled on a state of ostensible neutrality that allowed for 
two apparently conflicting bases for policy, a perfect impartiality and participation in the 
equilibrium, to be maintained as simultaneously realistic choices.  
 
Hence, policy makers proclaimed themselves unwilling to align with either France or with 
Britain, and stated a desire to treat both equally so that there would be no risk that they might 
inadvertently cause offence by being seen to be too closely the ally of one or other. However, 
what this so called American neutrality represented in reality was the pre-War idea that 
ideology in foreign affairs would be blended with a healthy dose of realism. Hence, neutrality 
would be a transitory state, a framework for securing national interests without adopting a 
fixed alignment with either Britain or France. American policy would be defined to include, the 
no political connections mandate of the 1776 Model Treaty. Reality, however dictated that 
such a policy could never include a situation in which America was cut off from the outside 
                                                          
 
 
651 Historians are by no means agreed that the French monarchy was absolutist and explain the nuances in this concept especially 
in New France (the French colonisation, before 1763, of America from Canada to Louisiana) during which colonists are regarded as 
having enjoyed a degree of independence from French monarchical control and direction. See; Rule J. C.  The Old Regime in 
America. A Review of Recent Interpretations of France in America, (The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4, October 1962), 
pp. 575-600. 
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world, because, insularity could not achieve national aims. American diplomats would be 
instructed in the art of active foreign engagement, negotiation and treaty creation, and in 
agreeing the rules of engagement of a neutral America in times of conflict. Subject to this, 
American statesmen would offer military commitments, to protect the Mediterranean trade, 
or threaten a military alliance with France, to encourage Britain to treat with it. Therefore, 
American foreign affairs would continue to be heavily influenced by the European balance of 
power.    
 
Hence, while historians have traditionally believed that neutrality meant aloofness and even 
isolation from Europe after the War had ended, Americans only offered their neutrality as a 
means of coaxing Europeans to offer valuable concessions. Americans were willing to 
surrender neutrality for a defensive alliance with either France or with Britain if this were 
necessary in the national interest, and they were also prepared to maintain an ostensible 
neutral position until such time as they were able to secure these concessions.     
 
Adoption of neutrality saved Americans from the defensive commitments of the 1778 alliance, 
since it enabled American Commissioners to profess ideological objection to military 
commitments whilst paving the way for them to enter into alliance with France’s great enemy. 
It is for these reasons that, whilst the term neutrality appears consistently in the private 
papers and letters of American Commissioners and statesmen involved in foreign affairs, a 
close reading of this correspondence, reveals a far more nuanced, and limited interpretation of 
the term and one based firmly in pragmatic realism. Neutrality had a very specific meaning to 
these men. It involved a delicate combination of ideology and realism. The ideological 
consideration of staying apart from European intrigue was combined with an offer to trade this 
position of ostensible impartiality, of favour of national interest. A claim to neutrality was used 
to strengthen America’s bargaining hand.  
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Whereas the above arguments attempt to dispel notions of isolationism in early American 
foreign affairs by offering the alternative balance of power perspective, this thesis also 
confronts ideas of isolationism more directly. Hence, the closed, agriculturally focused society 
of Jefferson, and the isolationist ideas that stem from the Anti-Federalist argument during the 
Constitutional debates are explored, but then rejected on the ground of respectively economic 
infeasibility, and, a failure to persuade the ratifying conventions of their merits. Once the Anti-
Federalist argument for the state system as the guarantor of the safety of the union failed to 
gain traction, all ideas of geographical isolation were quickly rejected in favour of the 
internationalist foreign policy outlook of the Federalists.  
 
In conclusion, the analysis of early foreign affairs through the prism of the balance of power 
that is presented by this thesis illustrates the effectiveness of the emerging, ideologically 
polarised American nation in confronting the established international structure that was the 
European equilibrium. An equilibrium that was designed to contain conflict and restrain 
power, provided fertile ground for American statesmen to achieve the objectives of national 
interest without compromising the fundamental tenet of the American founding. Indeed, the 
existence of a balance of power relationship between European nations in the eighteenth 
century was propitious to the American ambition to secure independence. The very fact that 
nations fought wars, or entered into alliance with peripheral nations to reinstate the 
equilibrium, mandated the success of American policies that depended on exploiting rivalries 
between those nations.   
 
Finally, the much criticised Trumpian desire to put America, or even Americans, First [sic] 
should be seen within the context not of Washingtonian political separation at all, or even 
therefore through the lens of isolationism. More accurately, Trump’s view of the world should 
be viewed from the perspective, before 1789, of the founders, who early recognised that, 
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above all else, national interest was the privilege of sovereign nations, that it was interest that 
should guide all policy, and that the promotion of interest as the overarching objective of 
policy should hold sway over any other consideration. It could be argued that because an early 
independent America lacked the political will and military prowess to promote universalist 
values abroad, that its ideas of liberty could not in any event, influence interest or policy, in 
these early years. This is true, and only a detailed enquiry into foreign policy making in 
subsequent decades could properly say whether values, distinctly American or of universal 
applicability, played any part in policy making. However, if modern politicians are to insist on 
using original intent to justify policies and decisions, what is clear is that Trump is simply 
asserting a position that has held true since the early founding period, that American interests, 
above any other consideration, should be the true basis of policy.    
 
The argument presented herein contributes new knowledge to study of the field of early 
American foreign affairs. Firstly, it identifies in the literature the series of conditions that must 
be fulfilled if a new and emerging, disparate group of ostensibly separate colonies was to 
declare a shared interest. The identification of national interest helps to shift the Founding 
Father’s view of the relationship that America should have with the rest of the world to much 
earlier in the founding period, freeing it from the association with Washington that has so 
coloured subsequent thinking about America’s role in the world. Secondly, the very specific 
and highly nuanced meaning of a post-War neutrality, also associated with isolationism, is 
exposed as being more a freedom to engage with other nations in the national interest than it 
is a policy of separateness and desire for exclusion from unwanted commitments. Hence, 
thirdly, balance of power considerations are placed at the heart of foreign affairs thinking in 
preference to the traditional attention that has been given to ideas of universalism, 
isolationism, and neutrality, all underpinned by ideology. Given the importance, therefore, of 
the equilibrium this thesis explains that active engagement in foreign affairs was central to 
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Constitutional reform. Finally, this thesis exposes ideas akin to isolation in this early period as 
little more than theoretical arguments, and in the case of a closed agricultural society of 
Jefferson, as lacking a sound empirical economic basis. The Anti-Federalist argument for 
separation was, in all likelihood, simply another argument in the overall armoury of this bloc to 
prevent Constitutional reform at all, or only subject to amendment.   
Future Research Agenda 
The analysis that has been presented in this thesis has highlighted important concepts that 
could form the basis of a future research agenda. Firstly, whereas the ideology that dictated 
separation from the affairs of Europe has been considered as an important aspect of foreign 
policy thinking, and indeed subject to compromise when pragmatic considerations dictated, 
research into the meaning and effect on foreign affairs of American exceptionalism more 
generally could stand analysis. Ideas  of universalism have been shown, in this thesis, to be 
idealistic and not present in policy in the years under review, other than when associated with 
the spread of republican government into the western domain. However, the influence of 
American ideas of liberty and democracy as they affected its approach to foreign affairs in this 
period require further research. Hence, questions such as; Did ideology play any part in 
shaping an American foreign policy in this period?, and; To what degree was the spread of the 
republican ideal [i.e. the extension of republican forms of government] in the west, important 
in creation of the Northwest Ordinance 1785?, would be important to an argument that 
ideology played a role in early foreign policy formulation.    
 
Secondly, the evolution of the Committees of Correspondence that were formed at each 
colonial town, village and parish level have not been comprehensively considered in the 
literature. They were not only instrumental in forging colonial consensus, but an enquiry into 
the reasons why they were created, by whom in each colony, and what their original 
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objectives were, might provide  alternative assessments of the causes of the American 
Revolution. One aspect of their formation that might yield such interpretations could spring 
from a consideration of the role that foreign, particularly French, agents played in their 
formation. Hence questions might include; Were French agents responsible catalysts for the 
seeding of dissent that led to the creation of some Committees?, If so, to what degree can 
foreign influence be said to have contributed to the Revolution?, and; Were some states more 
than others affected by foreign influence? The answers to these questions would also assist in 
obtaining a more complete picture of the fear of foreign dangers that was such a part of post-
War foreign affairs thinking. The archives that would support such research will be 
fragmented, and located widely in what were the original thirteen colonies, and in France. 
 
Finally, there are inherent limitations in a study which relies on the writings and papers of a 
relatively small group of American foreign affairs thinkers and writers for insights into the very 
specific issue of the European balance of power and America’s participation in it in this very 
narrow period of time. This thesis has inquired into the correspondence, and other writings of 
men who shaped American foreign affairs in these years. These men, because they were 
vested with great power as plenipotentiaries, and because problems of communication with 
Europe meant that they had wide latitude of action, were able to shape an American foreign 
policy. It has also based the argument in the writings of men actively involved in politics in the 
states and in Congress, particularly during the debates for ratification of the Constitution. 
However, an analysis based on a more in-depth and wider consideration of Congressional 
records, and the writings and speeches of other founders could provide further insight into the 
balance of power argument set out herein, but more particularly into ideas of national 
interest. A question that remain to be answered is; Did national interest only become 
engrained in the foreign policy debate after Constitutional ratification?. An answer to this 
question would more fully address the essential argument of modern historians who, as 
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postulated in Chapter One, may have placed confidence in the Farewell Address as the origin 
of future American engagement solely because they would answer this question in the 
affirmative.  
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